A hegemonic power can guarantee the status quo in an international economic system. However, domestic or international changes may unsettle a hegemon’s priorities. In such phases, smaller states benefiting from the existing system may fear that the hegemon will fail to keep the system stable. How do they react if they lose trust in the hegemon’s ability or will to maintain the status quo? This article argues that in such cases, free riding becomes less rewarding. Therefore, smaller states build publicly visible coalitions to ‘voice’ their preferences. Applying this argument to the role of small ‘creditor states’ in the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), the article draws on original in-depth interviews to analyze the ‘New Hanseatic League’ as a strategy to defend the present euro regime and counterbalance the Franco–German tandem. By elaborating and tracing a fine-grained causal mechanism, the article thus explains the emergence of vocal small-state coalitions in a hegemonic environment.

The Satisfaction With Democracy (SWD) indicator is very often used in social sciences’ research. However, while there is debate about which concept it measures, the discussion about the size of its measurement errors (how well it measures the underlying concept ‘satisfaction with the way democracy works’) is scarce. Nonetheless, measurement errors can affect the results and threaten comparisons across studies, countries and languages. Thus, in this paper, we estimated the measurement quality (complement of measurement errors) of the SWD indicator for 7 response scales across 38 country-language groups, using three multitrait-multimethod experiments from the European Social Survey. Results show that measurement errors explain from 16% (11-point scale) to 54% (4-point scale) of the variance in the observed responses. Additionally, we provide insights to improve questionnaire design and evaluate the indicator’s comparability across scales, countries and languages.

Most analyses dealing with the interaction of parties in parliament assume their interests to be fixed between elections. However, a rational perspective suggests that parties adapt their behaviour throughout the legislative term. I argue that this change is influenced by incentives and possibilities to shape legislation and the need to distinguish oneself from competitors. While for government parties it matters whether they have to share offices, for opposition parties the influence on policy-making is important. By examining the sentiment of all parliamentary speeches on bill proposals from six established democracies over more than twenty years, I analyse institutional and contextual effects. The results show that single-party governments tend to become more positive towards the end of the legislative cycle compared to coalition governments. On the other hand, opposition parties under minority governments, or with more institutionalised influence on government bills, show a more negative trend in comparison to their counterparts.

This article aims to explain the variation in the electoral support for extreme-right parties (ERPs) in Europe. The extant literature on the far-right party family does not answer this question specifically with regard to the extreme-right variants for two main reasons. Firstly, theories did not expect the electoral success of these parties in post-war Europe due to their anti-democratic profiles and association with fascism. Secondly, despite the fact that they acknowledge the differences between the parties under the far-right umbrella – namely, the extreme and the radical – they normally do not take these differences into account, and if so, they focus on the radical-right parties. This article shows that electoral support for ERPs is associated with low quality of government and highly conservative mainstream-right parties. The former creates political legitimization for anti-democratic parties and the latter ideological normalization of extreme right.

The comparative study of authoritarianism has neglected plebiscites, and the comparative study of referendums tends to see in them a form of direct democracy regardless of the regime. We conceptualize dictatorial plebiscites as a genuine authoritarian tool, as part of a repressive strategy with the objective of hindering internal regime rivals and discouraging the coordination of the external opposition. We provide empirical evidence from dictatorships for the period 1946–2008 that is compatible with our expectations.

To win a policy debate, political actors may apply two analytically distinct counterframing strategies, rhetoric and heresthetic. Rhetoric is when counterarguments are formulated in the original dimension of the debate, while heresthetic is using arguments in a different dimension compared to the original frame. Although both rhetoric and heresthetic are ubiquitous phenomena in the process of public opinion formation, there are no general rules to specify their efficacy. Drawing on a survey experiment carried out in Hungary in 2020 (N = 2000), this paper uncovers the factors determining the effect of the two strategies. Introducing a conceptual distinction between open and trade-off framing situations, the paper demonstrates that the structure of the situation matters. While heresthetic has a robust effect in trade-off framing situations, rhetoric may have a strong impact in open framing situations. Moreover, the effectiveness of counterframing depends on the party affiliation of respondents and the strength of their related attitudes.

This article examines one arena of decision-making in cabinet government: cabinet committees. It assesses the relationship between the composition of cabinets – their party make-up – and the structure of cabinet committees. Cabinet committees are groups of ministers tasked with specific policy or coordination responsibilities and can be important mechanisms of policymaking and cabinet management. Thus, the structure of committees informs our understanding of how cabinets differ in their distributions of policy influence among ministers and parties, a central concern in parliamentary government. We investigate two such dimensions: collegiality – interaction among ministers – and collectivity, the (de)centralization of influence. We find that cabinet committees in coalitions are significantly more collegial, on average, than single-party cabinets, though this is driven by minority coalitions. At the same time, influence within cabinet committees is less collectively distributed in most types of coalitions than in single-party cabinets.