While there is broad scholarly agreement that policy-making in the European Union (EU) involves a multitude of public and private actors at different levels of government, there is less agreement whether the EU should be conceptualized as a form of governance by networks or governance in networks. This article first examines different concepts of networks. It then sets out multiple functions of networks within the EU policy process. Particular attention is paid to the extent to which networks may provide added value to European integration and improve the quality of governance by effectively solving common problems and helping to address the democratic deficit or whether, by acting as mechanisms of exclusion rather than inclusion, they actually contribute to the EU's legitimacy deficit. Since networks can enhance governance quality as well as undermine its democratic credentials, a balance sheet shows both positive and negative consequences.

This article utilizes a quantitative network approach to analyze complex interaction patterns of public and private actors in EU multi-level governance, concerning the common agricultural policy. It demonstrates, in particular, that the theoretically founded policy network approach provides a powerful tool for comparative politics allowing a quantitative analysis of complex governmental systems. At the micro level, lobbying strategies of different groups can be identified and compared, while at the macro level the classical Corporatism-Pluralism typology could be generalized using this network approach. Further, due to its explicit integration with a legislative decision-making model the suggested approach is a valuable tool in comparative politics as it allows testing to what extent observed lobbying structures are systematically related with specific policy outcomes. In this article the policy network approach is applied to the lobbying system of the Common European Agricultural policy of the EU-15 and EU-27.

The ongoing financial turmoil has brought into sharp relief the importance of financial services regulation. Yet, we still know relatively little about how financial regulation is negotiated within the EU, in particular which policy actors are most influential and what are the mechanisms that allow them to exercise influence. This paper addresses these questions using Social Network Analysis (SNA), focusing on the banking regulation network and one core piece of legislation: the Capital Requirements Directive (CRD). Of particular interest is the flow of influence among the key actors. Triangulating an in-depth case study with qualitative interview data and social network analysis, this work investigates a number of hypotheses, associating brokerage roles and extroversion with relative influence in the policy making process. We find that influential actors are those that hold key structural positions in this network and by implication appear to have a better understanding of network topography.

The European Commission has taken significant steps towards the recognition of political party foundations at EU level. Firstly, it has agreed to recognize them as actors of European development policies. Secondly, it has proposed the creation of political foundations at EU level, linked to the European political parties. This article analyses the reasons, modalities and potential impact of this process, which signifies a breakthrough in comparison with the Commission's previous attitude towards party affiliated organisations. For the foundations, network-building turns out to have been a crucial means to attain legitimacy and access to the European institutions: firstly, through the mobilisation of political entrepreneurs in the European Parliament lobbying the Commission and Council representatives; and secondly, by linking the future role of non-state actors such as political foundations to the reconsideration of the EU's communication policy.

This article discusses the results of recent historical research on the governance of networks and their impact on policy-making in the formative period of the EU. It concludes that historically aware research on networks in EU governance has great potential. In particular, in can contribute to enhancing our knowledge about the formation and dynamics of networks; conceptualising the role of supranational institutions such as the Commission in instigating network formation and steering new networks; and improving our understanding of change over time in the governance of networks and their policy impact in the EU.