• The world economy grew by 3.0 per cent in 2015, as indicated in our last two forecasts. It is now projected to grow only slightly faster this year, by 3.2 per cent, and by 3.8 per cent in 2017.

• In the advanced economies, the modest and uneven recovery is expected to continue, while many major emerging market economies continue to face significant challenges, with slower growth in some cases and deep recessions in others.

• The renewed decline in global oil prices in the past three months, accompanied by sharp falls in equity prices worldwide, have increased uncertainty about the global economic outlook.

• Recent falls in oil and other global commodity prices will lower inflation again in the short term, but should boost global demand while increasing the challenges faced by commodity producers.

• Economy to grow 2.3 per cent in 2016 and 2.7 per cent in 2017.

• Inflation rate of just 0.3 per cent this year and 1.3 per cent in 2017, reaching 2.1 per cent in 2018.

• Bank Rate now expected to remain ½ per cent until the second half of 2016.

• Chancellor forecast to miss the primary target of the Fiscal Mandate by a slim margin.

• Productivity performance the largest domestic risk, but emerging market slowdowns, financial market volatility and policy missteps also represent risks.

The production of this forecast is supported by the Institute's Corporate Members: Bank of England, HM Treasury, Mizuho Research Institute Ltd, Office for National Statistics, Santander (UK) plc and by the members of the NiGEM users group.

Capital regulation is critical to address distortions and externalities from intense conflicts of interest in banking and from the failure of markets to counter incentives for recklessness. The approaches to capital regulation in Basel III and related proposals are based on flawed analyses of the relevant tradeoffs. The flaws in the regulations include dangerously low equity levels, a complex and problematic system of risk weights that exacerbates systemic risk and adds distortions, and unnecessary reliance on poor equity substitutes. The underlying problem is a breakdown of governance and lack of accountability to the public throughout the system, including policymakers and economists.

This paper reviews the market failures that may justify the need for liquidity regulation, assesses whether liquidity regulation is a necessary complement to Lender of Last Resort (LOLR) policies, capital regulation and prompt corrective action, surveys the available evidence on the net benefits of liquidity regulation, and concludes by outlining research directions useful to improve bank regulation design.

‘Too big to fail’ traditionally refers to a bank that is perceived to generate unacceptable risk to the banking system and indirectly to the economy as a whole if it were to default and be unable to fulfill its obligations. Such a bank generally has substantial liabilities to other banks through the payment system and other financial links, which can be sources of ‘contagion’ if a bank fails. The main objectives in this paper are to identify the different dimensions of too big to fail and evaluate various proposed reforms for dealing with this problem. In addition, we document the various dimensions of size and complexity, which may contribute to or reduce a bank's systemic risk. Furthermore, we provide an assessment of economic and political factors shaping the future of too big to fail.

This paper surveys the recent academic literature on the economics of cross-border regulatory cooperation as well as recent policy developments in this area. While institutional arrangements of cross-border regulatory cooperation used to focus on day-to-day supervisory tasks, the crisis has given an impetus to a focus on cooperation at the bank resolution stage, with an array of different cooperation forms. A growing theoretical literature has documented different externalities arising from national supervision of cross-border banks, while empirical evidence has been relatively scarce. The paper concludes with a forward looking agenda both for policy reform and academic research in this area.

Financial supervision focuses on the aggregate (macroprudential) in addition to the individual (microprudential). But an agreed framework for measuring and addressing financial imbalances is lacking. We propose a holistic approach for the financial system as a whole, beyond banking. Building on our model of financial amplification, the financial cycle is the key variable for measuring financial imbalances. The cycle can be curbed by leverage restrictions that might vary across countries. We make concrete policy proposals for the design of macroprudential instruments to simplify the current framework and make it more consistent.