The need for organs to transplant is clear. Due to the lack of transplants, people suffer, they die, and the cost of taking care of them until they die is huge. There is general agreement that it would be good to increase the supply of organs in order to meet the demand for organ transplantation.

Organ shortage is a major survival issue for millions of people worldwide. Globally 1.2 million people die each year from kidney failure. In this paper, we critically examine and find lacking extant proposals for increasing organ supply, such as opting in and opt out for deceased donor organs, and parochial altruism and paired kidney exchange for live organs. We defend two ethical solutions to the problem of organ shortage. One is to make deceased donor organs automatically available for transplant without requiring consent from the donor or their relatives. The other is for society to buy nonvital organs in a strictly regulated market and provide them to people in need for free.

In this paper, I argue for the following points. First, all of us have a presumptive moral obligation to be organ donors if we are in the relevant medical circumstances at the time of death. Second, family members should not have the right to interfere with the fulfillment of that obligation. Third, the ethical basis for that obligation is reciprocity. If we want a sufficient number of organs available for transplantation, then all must be willing donors. Fourth, that likelihood is diminished if individuals are entirely free to refuse to be organ donors but still would demand to be organ recipients. Fifth, although individuals would be ethically obligated to be organ donors, we still need to permit them to refuse to be organ donors. Sixth, to encourage individuals to stay within the organ donation system, we should have as a just and ethically justified policy denying individuals an organ transplant in the relevant medical circumstances if they have chosen to exit the organ donation system. Individuals would not be permitted to be organ recipients if they were unwilling to be organ donors. This is what it means to be part of what Rawls in Political liberalism (15-22) would refer to as a “fair system of social cooperation.” We refer to this as the “reciprocity requirement.”

Organs for transplantation are a scarce resource. Markedly, the transplant community’s primary challenge is the stark disparity between the number of patients awaiting deceased donor organ transplants and the rate at which organs become available. However, the allocation of a limited number of organs poses another constant challenge: maintaining an equilibrium between renal transplant utility and equity, that is, striking a balance between the utilitarian argument of medical efficiency and the principle of equity. In this comprehensive overview, the authors delve into the challenge of maintaining an acceptable balance between equity and efficiency and elaborate on some of the factors that might inform a decisionmaker’s evaluation of the extent to which a given allocation scheme is efficient or equitable.

Some people oppose abortion on the grounds that fetuses have full moral status and thus a right to not be killed. We argue that special obligations that hold between mother and fetus also hold between parents and their children. We argue that if these special obligations necessitate the sacrifice of bodily autonomy in the case of abortion, then they also necessitate the sacrifice of bodily autonomy in the case of organ donation. If we accept the argument that it is obligatory to override a woman’s bodily autonomy for the sake of an unborn child’s survival, we must continue to override the bodily autonomy of parents to ensure the survival of their living children, until the parent no longer has a special obligation to their child to the same degree as their special obligation to the fetus. And if the life of a child is truly more important than the bodily autonomy of its parents, as must be the case to force women to carry unwanted pregnancies to term, this should remain true until such a time that their children are no longer considered their responsibility. Thus, parity of reasoning suggests that policies compelling the gestation of a fetus should be accompanied by policies compelling organ donation.

The genetic modification of pigs as a source of transplantable organs is one of several possible solutions to the chronic organ shortage. This paper describes existing ethical tensions in xenotransplantation (XTx) that argue against pursuing it. Recommendations for lifelong infectious disease surveillance and notification of close contacts of recipients are in tension with the rights of human research subjects. Parental/guardian consent for pediatric xenograft recipients is in tension with a child’s right to an open future. Individual consent to transplant is in tension with public health threats that include zoonotic diseases. XTx amplifies concerns about justice in organ transplantation and could exacerbate existing inequities. The prevention of infectious disease in source animals is in tension with the best practices of animal care and animal welfare, requiring isolation, ethologically inappropriate housing, and invasive reproductive procedures that would severely impact the well-being of intelligent social creatures like pigs.

Organ trafficking in all its various forms is an international crime which could be entirely eliminated if healthcare professionals refused to participate in or be complicit with it. Types of organ trafficking are defined and principal international declarations and resolutions concerning it are discussed. The evidence for the involvement of healthcare professionals is illustrated with examples from South Africa and China. The ways in which healthcare professionals directly or indirectly perpetuate illegal organ transplantation are then considered, including lack of awareness, the paucity of both undergraduate and postgraduate education on organ trafficking, turning a blind eye, advocacy of organ commercialism, and the lure of financial gain.

Organ donation after brain death has been practiced in China since 2003 in the absence of brain death legislation. Similar to international standards, China’s brain death diagnostic criteria include coma, absence of brainstem reflexes, and the lack of spontaneous respiration. The Chinese criteria require that the lack of spontaneous respiration must be verified with an apnea test by disconnecting the ventilator for 8 min to provoke spontaneous respiration. However, we have found publications in Chinese medical journals, in which the donors were declared to be brain dead, yet without an apnea test. The organ procurement procedures started with initiating “intratracheal intubation for mechanical ventilation after brain death,” indicating that a brain death diagnosis was not performed. The purpose of the intubation was not to resuscitate the patient but rather was directly related to facilitating the explantation of organs. Moreover, it was unmistakably stated in two of these publications that the cardiac arrest was induced in these patients without brain death determination by cold St. Thomas cardioplegic solution or other cold myocardial protection solutions. This means that the condition of these donors neither met the criteria of brain death nor that of cardiac death. In other words, the “donor organs” may well have been procured in these cases from living human beings. Thus, brain death definition is abused in China by some individuals for organ harvesting, and a systematic investigation is needed to clarify the situation of organ donation after brain death in China.

The demand for liver transplants continues to far exceed the number of available viable donor organs; hence, it is of utmost importance to determine those individuals who are best able to care for these valuable, limited resources as potential recipients. At the same time, psychiatric comorbidity is common in the course of end-stage liver disease and can be mutually complicating. This article focuses on liver transplant candidacy from a psychiatric perspective, using illustrative cases to underscore the foundational facets of medical ethics that serve as the guide to these complex medical and ethical decisions.

In the following interview, philosophers Leonard Fleck and Arthur Ward discuss the latter’s recent experience of being a nondirected kidney donor. The interview took place in the Center for Bioethics and Social Justice at Michigan State University.

In this paper, the author describes her personal experiences with liver disease and the challenges both before and after receiving an organ transplant. She describes how organs are currently allocated and offers her perspective on what fairness entails in situations where organs fail and patients need multiple organs.

As a transplant surgeon at California Pacific Medical Center in San Francisco, I cannot forget those cases where I faced forks in the road and had to decide whether the right direction lay in the well-charted direction of objective metrics or immeasurable feelings of intuition. I carry those cases with me still.

This essay advocates for the wholesale reevaluation of the process used by American medical schools for selecting physicians, examining fundamental questions such as the purpose of physicians and the nature of meritocracy. It raises questions about the size of medical school classes, the specific academic requirements, and the inadequacy of current efforts to increase diversity. Ultimately, the essay argues for consideration of a range of reforms that will focus on the community-empowering aspects of medical admissions decisions.