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Due Process in the United Nations

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 January 2017

Devika Hovell
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Extract

“For hard it is for high and stately buildings long to stand except they be upholden and staid by most strong shores, and rest upon most sure foundations”

—Jean Bodin, The Six Books of a Commonweale (1576)

It has been said of the redemptive quality of procedural reform that it is “about nine parts myth and one part coconut oil.” Yet, as the recent history of the United Nations shows, failure to enact adequate procedural reform can have damaging consequences for an organization and its activities. In the targeted-sanctions context, litigation in over thirty national and regional courts over due process deficiencies has had a “significant impact on the regime,” placing it “at a legal crossroads.” In the peacekeeping context, the United Nations’ position that claims in the ongoing Haiti cholera controversy are “not receivable” has been described in extensive and uniformly critical press coverage as the United Nations’ “Watergate, except with far fewer consequences for the people responsible.” Complacency in the face of allegations of sexual abuse by UN blue helmets led to the unprecedented ousting of a special representative to the secretary-general in the Central African Republic. Economizing on due process standards is proving to be a false economy.

Type
Research Article
Information
American Journal of International Law , Volume 110 , Issue 1 , January 2016 , pp. 9 - 48
Copyright
Copyright © American Society of International Law 2016

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Footnotes

*

I wish to thank Mark Aronson, Elizabeth Fisher, Carol Harlow, Sandy Steel, and Emmanuel Voyiakis for generously commenting on earlier versions of this article. All errors are mine. The epigraph is from page 517 of the 1606 translation into English by Richard Knolles. A downloadable facsimile edition is available at https://archive.org/details/sixbookesofcommo00bodi

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41 SC Res. 1904 (Dec. 17, 2009). The website for the 1267 Ombudsperson is at https://www.un.org/sc/suborg/en/ombudsperson.

42 The relevant sanctions regime (created by UN Security Council Resolution 1267 of October 15, 1999, and developed in subsequent resolutions) was initially known as the Al Qaeda and Taliban sanctions regime. In 2011, it was divided into two separate sanctions regimes, with the ombudsperson mandate restricted to the Al Qaeda regime. SC Res. 1998 (June 17, 2011); SCRes. 1999 (June 17, 2011). In 2015, the Al Qaeda regime and ombudsperson mandate were extended to encompass the Islamic State in Iraq and Levant (ISIL). SC Res. 2253 (Dec. 17, 2015).

43 See Joined Cases C-584/10 P, C-593/10 P & C-595/10 P, Comm’n v. Kadi (Eur. Ct. Justice July 18, 2013) (Grand Chamber) [hereinafter Kadi II]; Al-Dulimi v. Switzerland, App. No. 5809/08, para. 119 (Eur. Ct. H.R. Nov. 26, 2013); Nada v. Switzerland, 2012 Eur. Ct. H.R. 1691, paras. 209 –14; HM Treasury v. Ahmed, [2010] UKSC 2, paras. 78 (Lord Hope), 149 (Lord Phillips), 181, 185 (Lord Rodger), 239, 248 (Lord Mance); Ben Emmerson (Special Rapporteur), Second Report on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms While Countering Terrorism, paras. 14, 20–21, UN Doc. A/67/396 (Sept. 26, 2012).

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45 I distinguish here courts that assess Security Council decision making under domestic or regional law, dis cussed infra as examples of the dignitarian model in action.

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51 Kadi v. Council, supra note 46, paras. 218 –25.

52 Id., paras. 226 –31.

53 Id., paras. 226 –29.

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107 Supra note 43, para. 134.

108 Thomas Scanlon has recognized that this form of “due process” is not readily exportable to regimes outside the domestic context; doing so so depends on a minimal commitment to particular domestic institutional arrangements. Scanlon, Thomas M., Human Rights as a Neutral Concern, in The Difficulty of Tolerance: Essays in Political Philosophy 116 (Scanlon, Thomas M. ed., 2003)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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120 Al Jedda v. Secretary of State for Defence, [2007] UKHL 58. A possible exception was Lord Mance, who alluded to a presumption (subsequently adopted by the European Court of Human Rights in Al Jedda) that measures implementing Security Council resolutions should be subject to “the basic rights of the individual.” Id., paras. 247, 249.

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132 In fact, petitioners were assisted by legal counsel in twenty-six of the fifty-five cases processed by the ombudsperson to date. Eighth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, supra note 130, para. 7.

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134 Between the establishment of the Al Qaeda and Taliban Sanctions Committeein October 1999 and the end of 2014, the 1267 Committee held 45 formal (or public) meetings and 367 informal (or private) consultations, as reported in the Annual Reports of the 1267 Sanctions Committee between 2000 and 2014.

135 Report of the Security Council Committee Established Pursuant to Resolution 1267 (1999) Concerning Al-Qaida and the Taliban and Associated Individuals and Entities Annual Report, at 10, UN Doc. S/2004/1039, annex (Dec. 31, 2004).

136 See, e.g., Third Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1989, paras. 21–29 (2011), UN Doc. S/2012/49 (2012); Seventh Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2083, paras. 14–20 (2012), UN Doc. S/2014/73 (2014).

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140 Id.

141 SC Res. 1989, para. 23 (Jun. 17, 2011).

142 Id., Annex II, para. 12.

143 Thirteenth Report of the 1267 Monitoring Team, supra note 2, para. 12.

144 UN Charter, Art. 94(2) (note, in particular, the interpretation in Medellin v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491 (2008)); Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Art. 16, July 17, 1998, 2187 UNTS 90; see also Carla Del Ponte & Chuck Sudetic, Madame Prosecutor: Confrontations With Humanity & #x2019;s Worst Criminals and the Culture of Impunity 60 (2009).

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149 Buchanan & Keohane, supra note 125, at 429.

150 UN Press Release, Press Conference by Security Council President (Feb. 2, 2010) (Ambassador Gérard Araud), at http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2010/100202_Araud.doc.htm.

151 Kadi II, supra note 43, para. 125.

152 Fisher, Elizabeth, Transparency and Administrative Law: A Critical Evaluation, 63 Current Legal Probs. 272, 280 (2010)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Anne-Marie Slaughter, A New World Order 220 (2004).

153 Second Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1989, para. 26 (2011), UN Doc. S/2011/447 (2011).

154 In the exceptional case, the ombudsperson has acknowledged that the petitioner was prejudiced as the relevant information was obtained at such a late stage that it could not be disclosed to the petitioner before preparation of the comprehensive report, and has invited comments from the petitioner with a view to deciding whether he meets the threshold for anew petition. Sixth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 2083, paras. 33–35 (2012), UN Doc. S/2013/452 (2013).

155 Eighth Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, supra note 130, para. 34.

156 First Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 1903, para. 33 (2009), UN Doc. S/2011/29 (2011).

157 Third Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, supra note 136, para. 7; Seventh Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, supra note 136, para. 30.

158 Some lawyers representing individuals indelisting proceedings have argued that this dialogue sheds little light on the nature of the secret allegations against their clients.

159 SC Res. 1989, supra note 141, para. 25; see also Third Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, supra note 136, para. 41.

160 Third Report of the Office of the Ombudsperson, supra note 136, para. 42.

161 SC Res. 1989, supra note 141, para. 23.

162 SC Res. 1904, supra note 41, Annex II, para. 4.

163 SC Res. 1904, supra note 41, para. 20.

164 Pan-American Health Organization & World Health Organization, Cholera in the Americas—Situation Summary (Oct. 9, 2015), at http://www.paho.org/hq/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_view&Itemid=270&gid=31956&lang=en.

165 Final Report of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Outbreak in Haiti 4, 27 (2011), at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/UN-cholera-report-final.pdf.

166 Id. at 23.

167 Lantagne, Daniele, Nair, G. Balakrish, Lanata, Claudio F. & Cravioto, Alejandro, The Cholera Outbreak in Haiti: Where and How Did It Begin?, in Cholera Outbreaks 162, 180 (Nair, G. Balakrish & Takeda, Yoshifumi eds., 2014)Google Scholar.

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170 William Booth, UN Troops Assaulted, Blamed for Outbreak, Wash. Post, Nov. 16, 2010, at A9.

171 UN Haiti Cholera Panel Avoids Blaming Peacekeepers, Reuters (May 5, 2011).

172 UN Press Release, Secretary-General, upon Receiving Experts’ Report on Source of Haiti Cholera Outbreak, Announces Intention to Name Follow-up Task Force (May 4, 2011), at http://www.un.org/press/en/2011/sgsm13543.doc.htm.

173 United Nations Follow-Up to the Recommendations of the Independent Panel of Experts on the Cholera Out break in Haiti (June 10, 2014), at http://www.un.org/News/dh/infocus/haiti/Follow-up-to-Recommendations-of-IPE.pdf.

174 Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, Petition for Relief (Nov. 3, 2011), at http://ijdh.org/wordpress/wp-content/uploads/2011/11/englishpetitionREDACTED.pdf.

175 Letter from Patricia O’Brien, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Brian Concannon, Director, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti (Feb. 21, 2013), at http://opiniojuris.org/wp-content/uploads/LettertoMr.BrianConcannon.pdf.

176 Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of the United Nations, Sec. 2, Feb. 13, 1946, 1 UNTS 15 [hereinafter General Convention].

177 Letter from Patricia O’Brien, Under Secretary-General for Legal Affairs, to Brian Concannon, Director, Institute for Justice and Democracy in Haiti, at 1 (July 5, 2013), at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/07/20130705164515.pdf.

178 Class Action Complaint, Georges v. United Nations, No. 1: 13-cv-7146 (S.D.N.Y. filed Oct. 9, 2013), at http://www.ijdh.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/10/Cholera-Complaint.pdf; Class Action Complaint, Laventure v. United Nations, No. 14-cv-1611 (E.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 11, 2014), at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/1073738/140311-laventure-v-un-filed-complaint-2.pdf (case stayed pending Second Circuit decision in Georges v. United Nations, Mar. 24, 2015); Class Action Complaint, Petit-Homme Jean Robert v. United Nations, No. 1:14-cv-01545 (S.D.N.Y. filed Mar. 6, 2014) (case dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, Jan. 26, 2015).

179 José Alvarez, The United Nations in the Time of Cholera, AJIL Unbound (Apr. 4, 2014).

180 For a dismal example, see the interview with the deputy spokesperson for the UN secretary-general in the documentary Fault-Lines, supra note 3.

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184 The letter, dated September 25, 2014, is referenced in Letter from Pedro Medrano, UN Assistant Secretary-General, to Ms. Farha, Mr. Galln, Mr. Pras and Ms. de Albuquerque, para. 1 (Nov. 25, 2014), at https://spdb.ohchr.org/hrdb/28th/Haiti_ASG_25.11.14_(3.2014).pdf.

185 Id., paras. 59, 60.

186 General Convention, supra note 176, Sec. 2.

187 Brzak v. United Nations, 597 F.3d 107, para. 112 (2d Cir. Mar. 2, 2010); Manderlier v. Organisation des Nations Unies, Pasicrisie Belge 1966, III, at 103, 45 ILR 446 (Civil Trib. Brussels 1966) (Belg.); Mothers of Srebrenica Ass’n v. Netherlands, paras. 4.3.6, 4.3.14, Sup. Ct. Neth. Apr. 13, 2012, No. 10/04437; Leonardo DíazGonzález (Special Rapporteur), Fourth Report on Relations Between States and International Organizations (Second Part of the Topic), paras. 109–10, UN Doc. A/CN.4/424 & Corr. 1.

188 Agreement Between the United Nations and the Government of Haiti Concerning the Status of the United Nations Operation in Haiti, para. 55, July 9, 2004 [hereinafter UN-Haiti SOFA], at http://www.ijdh.org/2004/07/archive/agreement-between-the-united-nations-and-the-government-of-haiti-concerning-the-status-of-the-united-nations-operation-in-haiti/.

189 General Convention, supra note 176, Sec. 30.

190 Haiti: Still Waiting for Recovery, Economist (Jan. 5, 2013).

191 Draft Articles on the Responsibility of International Organizations, with Commentaries, supra note 183, Art. 5.

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194 Though the ECHR ultimately upheld the immunity of the European Space Agency in Waite & Kennedy v. Germany, App. No. 26083/94,30Eur. Ct. H.R. 261 (1999), itheld that”a material factor” tobetaken into account was “whether the applicants had available to them reasonable alternative means to protect effectively their rights under the [ECHR].” Id., para. 52.

195 General Convention, supra note 176, Sec. 29; see also UN-Haiti SOFA, supra note 188, para. 55.

196 Ryngaert, supra note 193.

197 Mégret, supra note 181, at 166 (translation by author).

198 Center for Economic and Policy Research, Ban Ki-moon Explains to Congress Why the UN Won’t Be Held Accountable for Cholera in Haiti (Feb. 27, 2015) (quoting letter dated Feb. 19, 2015, from the UN secretary-general to members of the U.S. Congress), at http://www.cepr.net/blogs/haiti-relief-and-reconstruction-watch/ban-ki-moon-explains-to-congress-why-the-un-wont-be-held-accountable-for-cholera-in-haiti/.

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207 Ban Ki-moon Explains to Congress Why the UN Won’t Be Held Accountable for Cholera in Haiti, supra note 198.

208 See, e.g., Bisson v. United Nations, No. 06 Civ. 6352 (PAC)(AJP), 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 9723 (S.D.N.Y Feb. 11, 2008).

209 Supra note 194.

210 Freedman, supra note 193, at 241, 245.

211 Moreover, the ECHR has backed down from the promise of Waite and Kennedy in subsequent judgments. See Stichting Mothers of Srebrenica v. Netherlands, App. No. 65542/12, para. 139(f) (Eur. Ct. H.R. June 11, 2013).

212 Peter Bekker, The Legal Position of Intergovernmental Organizations: A Functional Necessity Analysis of Their Legal Status and Immunities 39 (1994); see also Boon, Kristen, The United Nations as Good Samaritan: Immunity and Responsibility, 16 CHI. J. Int’l L. (2015)Google Scholar; Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, supra note 192; C. F. Amerasinghe, Principles of the Institutional Law of International Organizations 316, 318 (2d ed. 2005).

213 13 Documents of the United Nations Conference on International Organization 705 (1945) (emphasis added).

214 Singer, Michael, Jurisdictional Immunity of International Organizations: Human Rights and Functional Necessity Concerns, 36 VA. J. Int’l L. 53, 108 (1995)Google Scholar; Gaillard & Pingel-Lenuzza, supra note 192, at 8.

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221 Class Action Complaint, Georges v. United Nations, supra note 178. In a January 2015 decision, the Southern District upheld the United Nations’ absolute immunity under the General Convention, Georges v. United Nations, 84 F.Supp.3d 246 (S.D.N.Y. 2015). The decision has been appealed to the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, though the court has not handed down its decision at the time of writing.

222 See, e.g., Boon, supra note 212; Freedman, supra note 193.

223 Cane, Peter, Tort Law and Public Functions, in Philosophical Foundations of Law of Torts 148 (Oberdiek, John ed., 2014)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Darwall, Stephen & Darwall, Julian, Civil Recourse as Mutual Accountability, 39 FLA. ST. U. L. Rev. 17 (2012)Google Scholar.

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225 Carol Harlow, State Liability: Tort Law and Beyond 50–51 (2004).

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231 For the use of law in campaigning, see Carol Harlow & Richard Rawlings, Pressure Through Law (1992).

232 International Law Association, Accountability of International Organizations: Final Report 21 (2004).

233 See, e.g., Philosophical Foundations of the Law of Torts, supra note 223.

234 Ernest J. Weinrib, The Idea Of Private Law (1995) (especially chapters 6 and 7); Allan Beever, Rediscovering the Law of Negligence (2007); Robert Stevens, Torts and Rights (2007); Wright, Richard W., Substantive Corrective Justice, 77 IOWA L. Rev. 625 (1992)Google Scholar.

235 Guido Calabresi, The Cost of Accidents (1970); Richard Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (8th ed. 2014).

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237 Cane, supra note 223, at 149.

238 Id.

239 Harlow, supra note 225, at 30.

240 Id. at 26–27.

241 28 U.S.C. §1350.

242 Rosa Freedman & Nicolas Lemay-Hebert, Towards an Alternative Interpretation of UN Immunity: A Human Rights-Based Approach to the Haiti Cholera Case, Questions Int’l L. (July 27, 2015), at http://www.qil-qdi.org/towards-an-alternative-interpretation-of-un-immunity-a-human-rights-based-approach-to-the-haiti-cholera-case/.

243 Harlow, supra note 225, at 17.

244 In the United States, the Federal Tort Claims Act has been describedas “a limited waiver of the United States’ sovereign immunity.” See Figley, Paul F., Understanding the Federal Tort Claims Act: A Different Metaphor, 44 Tort Trial & Ins. Prac. L.J. 1105, 1106 (2009)Google Scholar. In the United Kingdom, judges have adopted a noninterventionist, restrictive approach to establishing duties of care in respect of public bodies. Duncan Fairgrieve, State Liability in Tort: a Comparative Law Study 64 (2003).

245 Sandra Fredman, Human Rights Transformed: Positive Rights and Positive Duties (2008).

246 du Bois, supra note 236, at 595.

247 Id. at 603.

248 Weinrib, supra note 234, at 80.

249 George P. Fletcher, Tort Liability for Human Rights Abuses 9 (2008).

250 Cane, supra note 223, at 165.

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253 The UN secretary-general proposed this rationale for limiting liability in his reports Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, UN Doc. A/51/389 (Sept. 20, 1996), and Agenda Item 140(a): Administrative and Budgetary Aspects of the Financing of the United Nations Peacekeeping Operation, UN Doc. A/51/903 (May 21, 1997), both of which were cited with approval in General Assembly Resolution 52/247 (July 17, 1998) on limiting third-party liability.

254 Boon, supra note 212, at 371.

255 This figure represents the “total net budget,” including the “regular budget” of U.S. $5.6 billion and “extra-budgetary” expenditures such as support, substantive, and operational activities. Proposed Programme Budget for the Biennium 2016–2017, at 25, UN Doc. A/70/6 (May 15, 2015).

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260 Model Status-of-Forces Agreement for Peace-Keeping Operations, annex, UN Doc. A/45/594 (1990).

261 Human Rights Watch, Better Late Than Never: Enhancing the Accountability of International Institutions in Kosovo 18 (June 14, 2007), at https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/kosovo0607web.pdf. See also criticism by the European Commission on Democracy Through Law (VeniceCommission), Opinionon Human Rights in Kosovo: Possible Establishment of Review Mechanisms 13–14 (2004).

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269 Ian Johnstone’s model of an “interpretive community” as three concentric circles is persuasive. Ian John Stone, The Power of Deliberation: International Law, Politics and Organizations 7, 41 (2011).

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272 Deborah Sontag, Global Failures on a Haitian Epidemic, N.Y. Times, Apr. 1, 2012, at A1.

273 Fisher, supra note 266, at 495.

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275 See supra note 34 and accompanying text.

276 Jutta Brunnée & Stephen J. Toope, Legitimacy and Legality in International Law (2010).

277 Johnstone, supra note 269.

278 Nonet & Selznick, supra note 34, at 100.

279 Hoffmann, Florian & Mégret, Frédéric, Fostering Human Rights Accountability: An Ombudsperson for the United Nations?, 11 Global Governance 43 (2005)CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Schrijver, Nico, Beyond Srebrenica and Haiti: Exploring Alternative Remedies Against the United Nations, 10 Int’l Org. L. Rev. 588 (2013)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

280 These elements are drawn from the literature on public accountability, including the Oxford Hand Book of Public Accountability, supra note 169, and Anne Davies, Accountability: A Public Law Analysis of Government by Contract (2011).

281 I draw these values from Pablo de Greiff’s broad conception of justice in Justice and Reparations, in The Handbook of Reparations 451 (Pablo de Greiff ed., 2006).

282 See, e.g., Habermas, Juürgen, Why Europe Needs a Constitution, 11 New Left Rev. 8 (2001)Google Scholar; John Dryzek, Deliberative Democracy and Beyond: Liberals, Critics, Contestations (2000); Bohman, James, International Regimes and Democratic Governance: Political Equality and Influence in Global Institutions, 75 Int’l Aff. 499 (1999)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

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289 Richard Falk, Reparations, International Law and Global Justice, in The Handbook of Reparations, supra note 281, at 478, 491. For example, it is clear that most human rights treaties (and indeed, scholarship) recognizing a right to judicial compensation are configured to redress human rights violations on an individualized basis rather than en masse.

290 de Greiff, supra note 281, at 459.

291 See Falk’s suggestions for a UN voluntary fund or “Tobin tax” on activities that pollute the commons. Falk, supra note 289, at 498.

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