Domestic climate change litigation is prospering across the globe to the extent of becoming a transnational phenomenon of growing importance. At the international level the Paris Agreement, although still in its infancy, has been established as the core element of the climate change governance framework. This article explores the still opaque relationship between domestic climate change litigation and the Paris Agreement. It is argued that dynamic interaction between domestic litigation and the Paris Agreement may improve the overall efficacy of both regimes. On the one hand, an examination of the Paris Agreement's architecture and provisions reveals pathways that are already being used or can be explored further in litigation. On the other hand, litigation can assist and complement the Paris Agreement with regard to its implementation and progress towards its overall goals. The result may deliver more than a multi-level perspective on climate change law. As it captures the law in action on different levels, the proposed ‘cross-level’ approach has due regard to the implications of the mutual supportiveness or complementarity of legal tools. It also thereby responds to the concern of whether the law can be of significant benefit in addressing complex global issues like climate change.

Domestic courts enjoy generous attention in international political and legal climate change literature. As a result of the reluctance of national governments to pursue climate protection measures, courts are called on to enforce international climate goals. This article assesses two domestic climate change cases (the Thabametsi Case and the Vienna Airport Case) in the light of Anthea Roberts’ functional understanding of the role of domestic courts in international law. It argues that domestic courts play a pivotal role in linking international obligations of conduct with national obligations of result. This role depends on domestic contexts and, therefore, requires a comparative approach.

What scholars referred to as a climate change litigation ‘explosion’ in 2015 has today become an established movement which is unlikely to stop in the near future: worldwide, over a thousand lawsuits have been launched regarding responsibility for the dangers of climate change. Since the beginning of this trend in transnational climate litigation scholars have warned that the separation of powers is threatened where judges interfere with the politically hot issue of climate change. This article uses Jürgen Habermas's political theory on deliberative democracy to reconstruct the tension between law and politics generated by these lawsuits. This reconstruction affords a better understanding of the implications of climate change litigation: while the role of the judiciary as such remains unchanged, the trend is likely to influence the democratic legitimacy of judicial lawmaking on climate change, as it indicates an increasing realization that a sound environment is a constitutional value and is therefore a prerequisite for democracy.

Cases involving climate change have been litigated in the courts for some time, but new directions and trends have started to emerge. While the majority of climate litigation has occurred in the United States and other developed countries, cases in the Global South are growing both in terms of quantity and in the quality of their strategies and regulatory outcomes. However, so far climate litigation in the Global South has received scant attention from the literature. We argue that climate litigation in the Global South opens up avenues for progress in addressing climate change in highly vulnerable countries. We first highlight some of the capacity constraints experienced in Global South countries to provide context for the emerging trend of strategic climate litigation in the area. In spite of significant constraints experienced, the strategies adopted by litigants push the climate litigation agenda forward as a result of their outward-looking objective of combating ongoing environmental degradation, and, on a doctrinal level, the way in which they link climate change and human rights. Bearing in mind the limitations resulting from the selective nature of the cases examined, we draw upon Legal Opportunity Structures (LOS) approaches and identify two reasons for innovative cases and outcomes in Global South strategic climate litigation: (i) how litigants are either overcoming or using procedural requirements for access to environmental justice, and (ii) the existence of progressive legislative and judicial approaches to climate change. The strategies and outcomes from these judicial approaches in the Global South might be able to contribute to the further development of transnational climate change litigation.

Over the past few years, the number of climate cases being filed against corporations and public authorities around the world has been on the rise. Aware of the central role of finance in economic development, the financial sector has remained vigilant. Traditionally, climate litigation in financial markets had been rare, but that seems to be changing: in 2018 there were more cases filed than in any previous year. The development of existing and forthcoming private and public sector initiatives with the aim of promoting sustainable finance may usher in even greater numbers in the next few years. This article provides the first systematic overview of climate cases in financial markets and introduces a typology to classify this type of climate case. This classification reveals common issues across different financial systems and raises questions for further enquiry that define a new research area within the emerging literature on climate litigation.

This contribution takes the form of an uncommon case report. It discusses an action brought to the Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU) before the final decision has been rendered. The author believes this is justified because the innovative character of the procedural and substantive reasoning of the application could be of interest to a wider public. This may be the case even if the CJEU eventually dismisses the action as being inadmissible, leaving the substantive questions undecided. The applicants in Carvalho and Others v. European Union claim that European Union (EU) law does not limit greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions as strictly as is required by EU human rights and international law. The case note explains the parties in the case, the acts being challenged, the relief being sought, and the content and application of the relevant procedural and substantive law. The case is illustrative of the high barriers for direct access to the CJEU, and suggests how they might be overcome. It is also a laboratory for examining the interface of climate science, economics, and law. At this interface, available emissions budgets and the technical and economic feasibility of emissions reductions are calculated and made legally relevant. Carvalho is based on the applicants’ conviction that, where the EU assumes a regulatory competence such as that of GHG emissions reduction, it must exercise it in accordance with its human rights and international obligations.

Several scholars have claimed or implied that the Paris Agreement imposes a collective obligation on states to keep global warming below 2°C, but what is a collective obligation from a legal point of view? The literature that asserts the existence of a collective obligation fails to address this question. In this article I argue two points. Firstly, while a legally binding collective obligation for states is not a theoretical impossibility, the Paris Agreement has not demonstrably created such an obligation; therefore, the collective obligation that appears in the treaty constitutes at most an objective of the Agreement, albeit a crucial one. Secondly, while state observance of the Agreement's apparent collective obligation (but, in fact, paramount objective) is necessary for the success of the treaty, the Agreement does not provide for a process to resolve the global mitigation burden into state-level ambition commitments to ensure that the paramount objective is met. While this is a significant failing of the Agreement, the provisions in the 2018 Paris Rulebook on the global stocktake are sufficiently loose to allow for this mechanism to play a role in the ‘individuation’ of the mitigation burden.