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Conceptual knowledge: Grounded in sensorimotor states, or a disembodied deus ex machina?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  20 December 2010

Ezequiel Morsella ,
Carlos Montemayor ,
Jason Hubbard  and
Pareezad Zarolia
Ezequiel Morsella
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology; San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132-4168. [email protected]@[email protected]://bss.sfsu.edu/emorsella/ Department of Neurology, University of California, San Francisco, CA 94143.
Carlos Montemayor
Affiliation:
Department of Philosophy, San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132-4168. [email protected]
Jason Hubbard
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology; San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132-4168. [email protected]@[email protected]://bss.sfsu.edu/emorsella/
Pareezad Zarolia
Affiliation:
Department of Psychology; San Francisco State University, San Francisco, CA 94132-4168. [email protected]@[email protected]://bss.sfsu.edu/emorsella/
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Abstract

If embodied models no longer address the symbol grounding problem and a “disembodied” conceptual system can step in and resolve categorizations when embodied simulations fail, then perhaps the next step in theory-building is to isolate the unique contributions of embodied simulation. What is a disembodied conceptual system incapable of doing with respect to semantic processing or the categorization of smiles?

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Information
Behavioral and Brain Sciences , Volume 33 , Issue 6 , December 2010 , pp. 455 - 456
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2010

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