No CrossRef data available.
Article contents
Behavioral mechanism design
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 30 August 2023
Abstract
The authors make a convincing case that behavioral scientists have mistakenly focused on improving individual decision making and in so doing have deflected attention from necessary changes in the rules of the game – societal institutions and policies – that shape individual decisions. To address this problem a behavioral science of public policy requires rethinking fundamental economic concepts including preferences and incentives.
- Type
- Open Peer Commentary
- Information
- Copyright
- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
References
Bowles, S. (2016). The moral economy: Why good incentives are no substitute for good citizens. Yale University Press.Google Scholar
Bowles, S., & Carlin, W. (2020). Shrinking capitalism. American Economic Association, Papers and Proceedings, 110, 372–377.Google Scholar
Bowles, S., & Polania-Reyes, S. (2012). Economic incentives and social preferences: Substitutes or complements? Journal of Economic Literature, 50(2), 368–425.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Chaloupka, F., Warner, K., Acemoglu, D., Gruber, J., Laux, F., Max, W., … Sindelar, J. (2014). An evaluation of the FDA's analysis of the costs and benefits of the graphic warning regulation. Tobacco Control, 24(2), 112–119. doi:10.1136/tobaccocontrol-2014-052022CrossRefGoogle ScholarPubMed
Deci, E. L. (1971). Effects of externally mediated rewards on intrinsic motivation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 18(1), 105–115.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Hume, D. (1898). Essays: Moral, political and literary. In Green, T. H. & Grose, T. H. (Eds.), David Hume, the philosophical works (Vol. I, p. 565). Longmans, Green [first published 1742].Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. (1994). New challenges to the rationality assumption. Journal of Institutional and Theoretical Economics, 150(1), 18–36.Google Scholar
Lepper, M. R., Greene, D., & Nisbett, R. E. (1973). Undermining children's intrinsic interest with extrinsic reward: A test of the “overjustification” hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 28(1), 129–137.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Schmelz, K. (2021). Enforcement may crowd out voluntary support for COVID-19 policies, especially where trust in government is weak and in a liberal society. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the USA, 118. https://doi.org/10.1073/pnas.2016385118CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Target article
The i-frame and the s-frame: How focusing on individual-level solutions has led behavioral public policy astray
Related commentaries (33)
An inconvenient truth: Difficult problems rarely have easy solutions
Behavioral market design
Behavioral mechanism design
Behavioral public policy in practice: Misconceptions and opportunities
Behavioral winter: Disillusionment with applied behavioral science and a path to spring forward
Community-engaged research is best positioned to catalyze systemic change
Conspiracy theory
Don't throw the individual perspective out while waiting for systemic change
Expectations, opportunities, and awareness: A case for combining i- and s-frame interventions
i-Frame interventions enhance s-frame interventions
Individual-level solutions may support system-level change â if they are internalized as part of one's social identity
It's always both: Changing individuals requires changing systems and changing systems requires changing individuals
Misdiagnosing the problem of why behavioural change interventions fail
Moral psychology biases toward individual, not systemic, representations
Moving from i-frame to s-frame focus in equity, diversity, and inclusion research, practice, and policy
Nudges, regulations, and behavioral public choice
Nudging is being framed
On Skinner's pendulum: A framework for assessing s-frame hope
Optimizing behavior change through integration of individual- and system-level intervention approaches
Real systemic solutions to humanity's problems require a radical reshaping of the global political system
Structural problems require structural solutions
The influence of private interests on research in behavioural public policy: A system-level problem
The psychology and policy of overcoming economic inequality
The real cause of our complicity: The preoccupation with human weakness
The social sciences are increasingly ill-equipped to design system-level reforms
The “hearts-and-minds frame”: Not all i-frame interventions are ineffective, but education-based interventions can be particularly bad
Unpacking the nudge muddle
Use behavioral research to improve the feasibility and effectiveness of system-level policy
Using effective psychological techniques to subvert a US sociopolitical context
When nudges have societal-level impact
Why a group-level analysis is essential for effective public policy: The case for a g-frame
Wise interventions consider the person and the situation together
“More effective” is not necessarily “better”: Some ethical considerations when influencing individual behaviour
Author response
Where next for behavioral public policy?