On the solely jurisdictional reading, the nonestablishment clause in the US Constitution's First Amendment was designed to confirm that power over politics in relation to religion was assigned solely to the several states. This article first summarizes two presentations of that view (those of Steven D. Smith and Akhil Reed Amar), offers a critique of it, and then outlines an alternative. The critique is theoretical, seeking to show the incoherence of the solely jurisdictional reading, such that any theorist who assumes its internal consistency cancels her or his own interpretation of the First Amendment. This incoherence is present because that reading assumes the suprarational character of religious or comprehensive convictions, even while those citizens who hold any such conviction believe that justice depends on the ultimate terms of political evaluation they affirm. On the alternative outlined, religious freedom makes sense if and only if the ultimate terms of evaluation are given in common (adult) human experience, and thus the question about them is itself rational.

Two primary impulses have historically motivated the Iraqi Shi'i juristic establishment in its relations with the Iraqi state. The first, deeply embedded in centuries of Islamic jurisprudence, is to achieve maximum autonomy for the Shi'i community from the state. The second has developed more recently in response to the modern state's efforts to extend its hegemonic control over areas that premodern empires were content either to leave to the jurists to administer or at least to share the administration of with jurists. This is to have the state recognize and implement Shi'i rules within parts of the state infrastructure that are of core interest to the juristic establishment. There is an obvious tension between these two desires, nowhere more evident than in the subject of this article—namely, the law pertaining to the creation, management, and liquidation of the Islamic charitable land trust known as the waqf. On the one hand, Article 43 of Iraq's constitution declares the followers of religions and sects to be “free” in administering the waqfs and their affairs, suggesting a strong desire for autonomy and separation from state control. Yet the implementing legislation for this provision extends the existence of a thick state bureaucracy and hands its administration over to juristic authorities. The ultimate irony of this arrangement is that it subjects juristic forces to far more potential interference as a legal matter than they have ever been subjected to, even during the totalitarian rule of the Ba'ath. In the end, a religious establishment historically deeply suspicious of political rulers and political engagement—indeed, one that defines itself by virtue of its separation from the state—now finds itself deeply and dangerously entangled in state political and administrative affairs. This article explores how this came to be and some of the significant consequences that arise from it.

Responding to recent calls made within the UK Parliament for a government-backed definition of Islamophobia, this article considers the unanticipated consequences of such proposals. I argue that, considered in the context of related efforts to regulate hate speech, the formulation and implementation of a government-sponsored definition will generate unforeseen harms for the Muslim community. To the extent that such a definition will fail to address the government's role in propagating Islamophobia through ill-considered legislation that conflates Islamist discourse with hate speech, the concept of a government-backed definition of Islamophobia appears hypocritical and untenable. Alongside opposing government attempts to define Islamophobia (and Islam), I argue that advocacy efforts should instead focus on disambiguating government counterterrorism initiatives from the government management of controversies within Islam. Instead of repeating the mistakes of the governmental adoption of the International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance (IHRA)'s definition of antisemitism by promoting a new definition of Islamophobia, we ought to learn from the errors that were made. We should resist the gratuitous securitization of Muslim communities, rather than use such definitions to normalize compliance with the surveillance state.

People believed to be witches have been killed in many parts of Africa since precolonial times. Belief in witchcraft persists today among many people, occasionally resulting in the killing of the suspected witch. The killer views witchcraft as an attack similar in nature to the use of physical force and therefore kills the witch in an attempt to end the perceived attack. As it stands today, the law in Uganda fails to strike a balance between the rights of the deceased victim violated through murder and those of the accused who honestly believes that he or she or a loved one was a victim of witchcraft. This article argues that the defenses that are currently available—mistake of fact, self-defense, insanity, and provocation by witchcraft—are insufficient, as they fail to strike that delicate balance. A more pragmatic approach to the issue of witch-killing, one that deals with the elimination of belief in witchcraft, is necessary.

In this article, the authors examine how the potential success of head/body transplantation raises questions as to how halakha—Jewish law and jurisprudence—might draw the line between determining whether a person is dead or alive. In presenting the primary Talmudic passages that refer to determination of life and death, and their discussion among halakhists and halakhic decisors, the authors show how the halakha might determine the demarcation between life and death as it applies to head/body transplants or potentially other innovations in medical technology.