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Divorcing the puzzles: When group identities foster in-group cooperation

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 March 2016

Daniel Seewald
Affiliation:
Department of Social Psychology, Friedrich Schiller University, 07743 Jena, Germany. [email protected]@[email protected]://www.sozialpsychologie.uni-jena.de/?lang=en
Stefanie Hechler
Affiliation:
Department of Social Psychology, Friedrich Schiller University, 07743 Jena, Germany. [email protected]@[email protected]://www.sozialpsychologie.uni-jena.de/?lang=en
Thomas Kessler
Affiliation:
Department of Social Psychology, Friedrich Schiller University, 07743 Jena, Germany. [email protected]@[email protected]://www.sozialpsychologie.uni-jena.de/?lang=en

Abstract

We argue that general social psychological mechanisms (e.g., common group identity) can account for prosocial behavior and cooperative norms without the need for punishing Big Gods. Moreover, prosocial religions often do not prevent conflict within their religious groups. Hence, we doubt whether Big Gods and prosocial religions are more effective than alternative identities in enhancing high-level cooperation.

Type
Open Peer Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2016 

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