We live in a time when fanaticism seems to have permeated politics across the globe. It seems especially crucial, therefore, that we understand fanaticism and its vicissitudes in specific contexts. It also seems imperative that we begin “at home,” as it were, by exploring how fanaticism has operated on American terrain and how it has informed our own politics. Joel Olson initiates this analysis in our lead article by attending to the words and actions of prominent Abolitionists in nineteenth-century America and the zeal with which they sought the demise of slavery. Olson offers a provocative argument regarding the role of fanaticism in democratic politics and, in so doing, prompts us to re-assess our own understandings of zealotry.

This issue of Perspectives on Politics presents a disparate sampling of research from across the discipline. The papers are diverse in terms of substantive focus, methodological approach, and disciplinary subfield. They offer, in various creative combinations, historical analysis, theoretical exploration, policy advice, and informed prognostication. More importantly perhaps, the authors whose work you find here range across ranks from the very junior to full professors and across institutional affiliations from small liberal arts colleges to some of our most prominent public and private research universities, all with several stops in between. In these ways I hope the work we are publishing does not simply reflect or even celebrate the diversity of our discipline. I hope instead that our continuing to publish work of this quality and provenance goes some distance toward insuring that rich diversity will remain a central feature of our future.

The issue of Perspectives that you hold in your hands (or that you perhaps are perusing online) is the product of complex behind-the-scenes editorial and production processes. In this sense Perspectives is like other journals where, in particular, much of the editorial process properly takes place out of sight. This opacity is inherent in the anonymous review process that every manuscript we publish undergoes. That said, there are aspects of the editorial process here that have created understandable frustration among a subset of the authors who have submitted manuscripts for consideration. For some of our contributors our editorial process has been too slow and I have been insufficiently responsive to concerns expressed by some of those who have been frustrated by that pace. Two contributing factors provide relevant background here.

To whom should political scientists address themselves? Should we be content to pursue more or less purely intra-disciplinary concerns, whether those be driven by some specialist “literature” or by one or another preferred method of inquiry? Is it intellectually responsible to do so? Do we have the tools or capacity to do otherwise? Given the fallible character of even our most confidently held research findings, what are the ethical or intellectual consequences of addressing ourselves to audiences in the world of law or policy or politics? And given that any potential interlocutors in those extra-disciplinary, non-academic domains quite legitimately have interests and agendas of their own, how should we anticipate the knowledge claims we advance might fare on various terrains of contest and power? These questions and others are central to the mission of this journal.

Zealotry or fanaticism is increasingly regarded as one of the principal threats to liberal democracy in the twenty-first century. Yet even as it is universally disparaged, zealotry is a severely understudied concept. This article seeks to formulate a critical theory of zealotry and investigate its relationship to democracy through a close reading of the speeches of the radical abolitionist orator Wendell Phillips. The American abolitionists were passionate democrats. Yet many of them, such as Phillips, were also self-defined fanatics who believed in using extremist language and tactics on behalf of the slave. Phillips's speeches suggest a specifically political definition of zealotry as a strategy that seeks to mobilize populations in defense of a particular position by dividing the public sphere into friends (those who support the position) and enemies (those who oppose it) and pressuring the moderates in between. Through his defense of fanaticism and his argument for disunion, Phillips articulates a democratic form of fanaticism that challenges common pejorative associations of zealotry with irrationality, intolerance, fundamentalism, or terrorism.Joel Olson is Assistant Professor of Political Science at Northern Arizona University ([email protected]) and the author of The Abolition of White Democracy (University of Minnesota Press). Thanks to Randall Amster, Lisa Disch, Mike Kramer, Michael Lienesch, Jill Locke, Ryan Narce, David Schlosberg, and the anonymous reviewers for their comments and criticisms of earlier drafts of this article. Thanks also to Baohua Yan, Steve VanDalen, Katrina Taylor, and Adria Mooney for valuable research assistance.

An anonymous late eighteenth century British painting at the Ackland Museum in Chapel Hill portrays “Satan Leaving the Court of Chaos,” a reference to Book II of John Milton's Paradise Lost. In an assertion of demotic power, Satan, “the adversary of God and man,” travels “full fraught with mischievous revenge” from Chaos, where he is most at home, to God's created world in order to corrupt Adam and Eve and induce original sin.Ira Katznelson is Ruggles Professor of Political Science and History, Columbia University ([email protected]). This text is a slightly revised version of the presidential address delivered at the Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association, August 31, 2006. The program's theme, “Power Reconsidered,” animated the choice of subject. He is particularly grateful to the Program Chairs, Judith Goldstein and Richard Valelly, for their intellectual and instrumental leadership.

Humanitarian and human rights movements have gained influence as impartial ethical responses to injustice and suffering, yet their claims to impartiality are commonly dismissed as misleading, naïve, or counterproductive. To date, little attention has been paid to the very different ways human rights and humanitarian movements have conceptualized impartiality in relation to distinct and conflicting activist goals.Bronwyn Leebaw is Assistant Professor of Political Science, UC Riverside ([email protected]). The author is grateful to Hanna Pitkin, Lisa Disch, John Cioffi, Mark Reinhardt, Jennifer Hochschild, and three insightful anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this article. In developing ideas for this article, she also benefited from conversations with Helen Kinsella, Mark Drumbl, Chandra Sriram, Eric Stover, Harvey Weinstein, Lon Troyer, Kateri Carmola, David Pion-Berlin, Chris Laursen, John Medearis, Juliann Allison, Victor Peskin, Ruti Teitel, Targol Mesbah, Helen Lennon, Tom Reifer, Dean Mathiowetz, and the graduate students at UC Riverside.

Against the backdrop of a decade-long wait for a Supreme Court vacancy, legal academics from across the political spectrum have recently proposed or supported significant constitutional or statutory reforms designed to limit the terms of Supreme Court justices and increase the pace of turnover at the Court. Fearing a Court that is increasingly out of touch with the national mood and staffed by justices of advanced age, advocates of term and age limits contend that the trend in Supreme Court tenures is inexorably upward. But are Supreme Court justices really serving longer now than in the past? If so, why? And what might such trends mean for American constitutional democracy? In a debate otherwise dominated by law professors—and largely without careful empirical analysis—we place the issue of judicial tenure in historical perspective, with special attention to the institutional development of the Court, the changing politics of the appointments process and the types of individuals who emerge from it, and to a lesser extent, broader socio-demographic trends in technology and medicine. In the process, we show how proponents of reforms designed to end life tenure have ignored a significant factor influencing patterns in judicial service: the decline of the “short-term” justice. Trends in judicial tenure, we argue, cannot be explained by more justices serving unusually long terms; rather, they are driven at least in part by the fact that fewer justices are serving relatively short terms. In this article, we consider why justices have retired after only short service throughout much of history, why they rarely do so today, the conditions under which future justices might be compelled to serve shorter terms, and the democratic gains and losses associated with short-term service on the Court. In sum, by following the rise and fall of the short-term justice over the course of American political development, we offer a new perspective, grounded in political science, on an issue currently occupying the attention of lawyers, journalists, and policymakers alike.Justin Crowe is Assistant Professor of Politics, Pomona College ([email protected]). Christopher F. Karpowitz is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Brigham Young University ([email protected]). We thank Chris Achen, Steve Burbank, Chris Eisgruber, Mark Graber, Ken Kersch, Kevin McGuire, David Stras, Keith Whittington, and two anonymous reviewers for encouragement and helpful feedback. An earlier version of this article was presented at the 2006 annual meeting of the Western Political Science Association, Albuquerque, NM.

The counter-majoritarian difficulty has for many years framed constitutional scholarship for both law professors and political scientists studying judicial review. Unfortunately, shared attention has not led to shared insights, as these scholars have remained isolated in their respective academies. Recently scholars have begun targeting this disciplinary barrier, and questioning whether developing norms of judicial supremacy have importantly raised the stakes of determining the legitimacy of courts setting policy in a democracy. This article proposes a new approach to the study of judicial review aimed at understanding systemic change rather than institutional legitimacy, using recent concerns over the drift from judicial review to judicial supremacy as a point of departure for study. I recommend, to both normative and positive scholars, a new and integrated focus on the relationship between judicial policymaking and wider transformations of the constitutional order that have previously been obscured by orienting constitutional scholarship around the counter-majoritarian difficulty.Allison M. Martens is: Assistant Professor of Political Science, University of Louisville ([email protected]). She thanks Jeffrey Tulis, James Johnson and three anonymous referees for their helpful comments and suggestions

We examine judge bias in Olympic figure skating as an exploratory analysis of a leading constructivist approach to identity using quantitative methods more closely associated with non-constructivist social science. While constructivism is a major theoretical orientation in international relations, large-n quantitative studies of the approach are uncommon in large measure due to the principal argument of constructivists: that interests should be treated endogenously. If interests and identities are mutually constituted, then it would seem to be impossible to distinguish their effects, creating a problem of observational equivalence. Some constructivist theorists nevertheless suggest that under certain conditions material interests can be thought of as causes of collective identity, meaning that it is in principle possible to isolate the influence of identity. We build on this “bounded” version of constructivism by identifying an arena of international relations in which the observable effect of the identities constituted by interactions among states can be analyzed independent of those states' national security concerns. We study whether collective identities constituted by the international system during the Cold War systematically influenced judge bias in Olympic figure skating, examining whether judges' evaluations of skaters systematically vary according to whether their respective states viewed one another as “friends,” “rivals,” or “enemies.”Brian R. Sala is assistant professor in the Department of Political Science at University of California, Davis ([email protected]). John T. Scott is professor in the Department of Political Science at University of California, Davis ([email protected]). James F. Spriggs II is Professor of Political Science at Washington University at Saint Louis ([email protected]). Previous versions of this paper were given in the Department of Political Science at University of California, Davis, and at the 2004 Western Political Science Association meeting, for which we owe thanks to Kris Kanthak.We would like to thank the Olympic Museum in Lausanne, Switzerland, and Karen Cover at the World Figure Skating Hall of Fame and Museum in Colorado Springs, Colorado for providing the data for this study. We would also like to acknowledge the generous research funding provided by the University of California, Davis, and the tireless work Dan Brunstetter did in entering the data and consulting his mother on the finer points of figure skating. A number of friends and colleagues offered valuable advice: Dan Brunstetter, James Fowler, Scott Gartner, Bob Huckfeldt, Cindy Kam, Yuch Kono, Zeev Maoz, Jennifer Ramos, Randy Siverson, Jennifer Sterling-Folker, Walt Stone, Mike Thies, and Chris Zorn. Finally, for his immense statistical expertise and especially for inspiring us to publish this paper we owe special thanks to Jeff Gill.

Scholars in international relations have failed to note a paradox about the balance of power: the concept of checks and balances and equilibria underlie classical Liberal constitutional and economic theory. Interest balancing interest lies at the core of the Liberal solution to the problem of anarchy, power, and human nature, whether in politics, economics, or the international sphere. Liberal scholars have adopted instead a rationalist utilitarian or a normative democratic approach. At the same time, Realists in international relations predict a balance, which realist scholars in domestic politics, like Schattschneider, have effectively questioned. This intellectual confusion denies Liberal theory a robust view of international politics, not least because the balancing principle is erroneously rejected as conservative. The confusion also undermines the coherence of Realist theory, which has hitherto tried to accommodate opposing predictions (balance of power and power concentrations) under one paradigm. I offer an explanation of how this conflation of theories arose. Conflating Liberalism with idealism leaves Realism as the only prudent alternative in international politics. The relation between the two theories is not zero-sum: both capture important aspects of international dynamics, and each can ignore the other only at serious cost.Deborah Boucoyannis is Lecturer in Social Studies at Harvard University ([email protected]). For comments and suggestions over the time the article has been in gestation, the author thanks Bear Braumoeller, Tim Crawford, Daniel Drezner, Nisha Fazal, David Grewal, Arman Grigorian, Mark Haas, Russ Hamilton, Michael Heaney, Jacques Hymans, Seth Jones, Andreas Kalyvas, Jacob Levy, Jack Levy, John Mearsheimer, Jennifer Mitzen, Kevin Narizny, Jacob Schiff, Jack Snyder, Kenneth Waltz, Alex Wendt, Bill Wohlforth, and the participants at the Political Theory and PISP workshops at the University of Chicago. Special thanks are due to Monica Toft, John Ikenberry, and Jennifer Hochschild for their support of the article; it was mostly written with the generous support of the Olin Institute for Strategic Studies at Harvard University.

In the last round of the Israeli-Palestinian peace talks at the Taba Conference (January 2001), Israeli negotiators went where no Israeli officials went before: they considered the right of return of Palestinian refugees, and a quasi-statement that acknowledges the Palestinian tragedy and Israel's share of historical responsibility. This paper argues that at least in part this shift in the negotiations' framework can be traced back to the public debate instigated by the work of Israeli New Historians.Michal Ben-Josef Hirsch is a Ph.D. candidate in the Department of Political Science at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology ([email protected]). She thanks Boaz Atzili, Naomi Chazan, Orit Gal, Eran Kaplan, Daniel Levy, Ran Levy, Gil Merom, Clair Moon, Melissa Nobles, Jeremy Pressman, Stephen Van Evera, Amos Zehavi, and two anonymous reviewers for their insightful and helpful comments and suggestions. She also thanks Kezia Avieli-Tabibyan from the Center of Educational Technology (MATAH, Israel) for her valuable assistance with Israeli history textbooks.

Scholars have long expressed concern that the ascendance of the modern presidency since the New Deal and World War II, by hastening the decline of political parties and fostering the expansion of the administrative state, portended an era of chronically low public engagement and voter turnout and an increasingly fractious and impotent national politics. Presidents' inattentiveness to the demands of party-building and grassroots mobilization, coupled with their willingness to govern through administration, were seen as key obstacles to the revitalization of a politics based in widespread political interest and collective responsibility for public policy. This article argues that George W. Bush's potent combination of party leadership and executive administration, foreshadowed by Ronald Reagan's earlier efforts, suggests the emergence of a new presidential leadership synthesis and a “new” party system. This new synthesis does not promise a return to pre-modern party politics; rather, it indicates a rearticulation of the relationship between the presidency and the party system. The erosion of old old-style partisan politics allowed for a more national and issue-based party system to develop, forging new links between presidents and parties. As the 2006 elections reveal, however, it remains to be seen whether such parties, which are inextricably linked to executive-centered politics and governance, can perform the critical function of moderating presidential ambition and mobilizing public support for party principles and policies.Sidney M. Milkis is Professors of Politics ([email protected]) and Jesse H. Rhodes is a doctoral student ([email protected]) at the University of Virginia. The authors would like to thank the anonymous readers who reviewed the manuscript for their thoughtful and constructive comments.

Conflict within and beyond the United States Senate has refocused scholarly and public attention on “advice and consent,” the constitutional provision that governs the Senate's role in confirming presidential appointments. Despite intense and salient partisan and ideological disputes about the rules of the game that govern the Senate confirmation process for judicial appointees, reformers have had little success in limiting the ability of a minority to block contentious nominees. In this paper, we explore the Senate's brush with the so-called “nuclear option” that would eliminate filibusters of judicial nominees, and evaluate competing accounts of why the Senate appears to be so impervious to significant institutional reform. The past and present politics of the nuclear option, we conclude, have broad implications for how we construct theories of institutional change.Sarah A. Binder is Professor of Political Science at George Washington University and a Senior Fellow at The Brookings Institution ([email protected]). Anthony Madonna is a Ph.D. candidate at Washington University ([email protected]). Steven S. Smith is the Kate M. Gregg Professor of Social Sciences, Professor of Political Science, and Director of the Weidenbaum Center, Washington University ([email protected]). The authors thank Stanley Bach, Richard Baker, Greg Koger, Forrest Maltzman, Elizabeth Rybicki, Eric Schickler, and Greg Wawro for helpful comments and advice.

The article develops an approach to the study of modular political phenomena (action based in significant part on emulation of the prior successful example of others), focusing on the trade-offs between the influence of example, structural facilitation, and institutional constraints. The approach is illustrated through the example of the spread of democratic revolution in the post-communist region during the 2000–2006 period, with significant comparisons to the diffusion of separatist nationalism in the Soviet Union during the glasnost' era.Mark R. Beissinger is Professor of Politics, Princeton University ([email protected]). The author is grateful to the School of Social Science at the Institute for Advanced Study at Princeton, the Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin, and the University of Wisconsin-Madison for the opportunity to pursue research for this essay. He would also like to thank Nancy Bermeo, Valerie Bunce, Atul Kohli, Jon Pevehouse, Grigore Pop-Eleches, Edward Schatz, Jack Snyder, Al Stepan, Joshua Tucker, and two anonymous reviewers for their feedback on an earlier version of this article.

Samuel Huntington argues that the sheer number, concentration, linguistic homogeneity, and other characteristic of Hispanic immigrants will erode the dominance of English as a nationally unifying language, weaken the country's dominant cultural values, and promote ethnic allegiances over a primary identification as an American. Testing these hypotheses with data from the U.S. Census and national and Los Angeles opinion surveys, we show that Hispanics acquire English and lose Spanish rapidly beginning with the second generation, and appear to be no more or less religious or committed to the work ethic than native-born whites. Moreover, a clear majority of Hispanics reject a purely ethnic identification and patriotism grows from one generation to the next. At present, a traditional pattern of political assimilation appears to prevail.Jack Citrin is Professor of Political Science at University of California, Berkeley ([email protected]). Amy Lerman is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at University of California, Berkeley ([email protected]). Michael Murakami is a doctoral candidate in Political Science at University of California, Berkeley ([email protected]) and Kathryn Pearson is Assistant Professor Political Science at University of Minnesota ([email protected]).

A new conventional wisdom characterizes the comparative study of electoral politics. Social cleavages, once a stabilizing factor of electoral behavior in Western Europe, are on the wane. Voting decisions have become individualized and old social cleavages have been superseded by new value-related cleavages. This article challenges that view as an exaggeration.Martin Elff is Assistant Professor in the Department of Social Sciences of the University of Mannheim, Germany ([email protected]). The author wishes to thank William Maloney, Anthony Mughan, Betty Haire Weyerer, Thomas Gschwend, Jan van Deth, Sigrid Roßteutscher, Simone Abendschön, Daniel Stegmüller, and especially Jennifer Hochschildt and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and suggestions on earlier drafts.

Is it acceptable (or perhaps even imperative) that the United States works to spread democratic liberty, even when nation building requires warfare on behalf of the oppressed? I argue that Mark Twain's novel A Connecticut Yankee in King Arthur's Court is a useful aid for reflection regarding this question. What Twain accomplishes, thanks in great part to his humor, is an honest exposure of the partial truths and considerable falsehoods contained in each common opinion regarding benevolent intervention. To highlight the complexity of Twain's thoughts on nation building, I discuss three possible interpretations of Connecticut Yankee. The first conceives of Hank Morgan as a well-intentioned democratic reformer, laying the proper foundation for a peaceful democratic transition after King Arthur dies. The second reads the book as ironically criticizing Hank for his overzealous promotion of democracy amidst a traditional culture. The third portrays Hank as an all-out revolutionary, justified in using any means to rid Camelot of slavery and oppression. Each of these interpretations represents, I believe, one aspect of Twain's outlook on the world. Brought together in the minds of thoughtful readers, these three themes prompt deeper reflection on the moral status of benevolent imperialism. Joel Johnson is Assistant Professor of Government and International Affairs at Augustana College in Sioux Falls, South Dakota ([email protected]). He is the author of Beyond Practical Virtue (University of Missouri Press, forthcoming). Special thanks to John Nelson, Lilly Goren, Peter Schotten, Brent Lerseth, Joe Dondelinger, three anonymous reviewers, and the participants in the Augustana Faculty Research Colloquium for helpful comments on preliminary drafts. This article was written with the help of a grant from the Augustana Research and Artist Fund (ARAF).

As reflected in theory, laboratory evidence, and field studies, altruistic punishment of defectors promotes cooperation. Costly self-enforcement of socially optimal behavior has a number of independent links in political science, economics, psychology, sociology, computer science, and biology. This paper integrates the study of sanctions-based provision of public goods in the social sciences with the research on evolutionary adaptedness of altruistic punishment in the life sciences. Altruistic punishment appears to be (1) economically rational, (2) evolutionarily robust as an individual propensity and as a cultural norm, (3) normatively more appealing than tit-for-tat, which is a reciprocal punishment by defection, and (4) socially common. The theoretical and empirical importance of altruistic punishment has immediate policy implications. Examination of commons around the world suggests that privatization and centralized coercion are not the only solutions to the tragedy of the commons. A viable policy alternative is to facilitate the evolution of the commons as a common-property regime with its own norms and a certain degree of independence.Oleg Smirnov is Assistant Professor of Political Science, Stony Brook University ([email protected]). He would like to thank Terry Anderson, Daniel Benjamin, James Fowler, Tim Johnson, John Orbell, Tony Smith, Wally Thurman, and anonymous referees for helpful comments. This research was supported by the Property and Environment Research Center (PERC), Bozeman, MT.

Although the use of models has come to dominate much of the scientific study of politics, the discipline's understanding of the role or function that models play in the scientific enterprise has not kept pace. We argue that models should be assessed for their usefulness for a particular purpose, not solely for the accuracy of their predictions. We provide a typology of the uses to which models may be put, and show how these uses are obscured by the field's emphasis on model testing. Our approach highlights the centrality of models in scientific reasoning, avoids the logical inconsistencies of current practice, and offers political scientists a new way of thinking about the relationship between the natural world and the models with which we are so familiar.Kevin A. Clarke is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester ([email protected]) and David M. Primo is Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, University of Rochester (david.primo@ rochester.edu). Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the 2004 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science Association and at the 2005 Annual Meetings of the Midwest Political Science Association and the Canadian Political Science Association; we thank the participants for their comments. We thank Chris Achen, Jim Alt, Jake Bowers, Henry Brady, Bear Braumoeller, John Duggan, Mark Fey, Rob Franzese, John Freeman, Gary Goertz, Miriam Golden, Jim Granato, Gretchen Helmke, John Jackson, Keith Krehbiel, Skip Lupia, Scott de Marchi, Andrew Martin, Becky Morton, Bob Pahre, Kevin Quinn, Curt Signorino, Randy Stone, and three anonymous reviewers for helpful comments and discussion. We also thank Matt Jacobsmeier for research assistance. Support from the National Science Foundation (Clarke: Grant #SES-0213771, Primo: Grant #SES-0314786) is gratefully acknowledged.