Judicial Stereotyping Associated with Genetic Essentialist Biases toward Mental Disorders and Potential Negative Effects on Sentencing

Abstract

This research, utilizing qualitative methodology with grounded theory, develops a model that illuminates a process by which judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders may affect judges' views regarding the sentencing and punishment of offenders with mental disorder diagnoses presented or understood to be genetically influenced. Data, collected through interviews with a sample of 59 Pennsylvania State Court judges, suggest that judges exhibit stereotyping behavior by linking the relationships between three particular genetic essentialist biases (immutability, informativeness, uniformity) and three types of stigmatization (pessimism, dangerousness, family stigma) associated with each bias. When judges exhibited this stereotyping behavior without the effects of intervening conditions, they then expressed how knowledge of the genetic influences of an offender's mental disorder would negatively influence views on punishment, specifically related to more restrictive sentences and support for deterrence and incapacitation. Three intervening conditions associated with judges' personal characteristics (personal experiences involving genetics, strength of determinism vs. free will beliefs, having no personal experiences with mental disorders) influenced whether judges' sentencing views were negatively influenced by such knowledge on genetics. Implications related to therapeutic jurisprudence are discussed.

U.S. judges have immense power, invoking social ideals of equality and objectivity. The goal of equality before the law depends upon judges setting aside biases and codes of ethics mandate that judges disregard any consideration of offender characteristics in decisionmaking. Stereotyping behavior, which is largely unconscious, is widespread among most U.S. adults. Although judges hold themselves to a high standard, literature provides evidence that judges are not immune from such behavior and can fall short of the goal of equality before the law, especially during sentencing (Steen et al. 2005).

Judges often stereotype offenders based on certain characteristics during sentencing, particularly related to making attributions of blameworthiness and community protection (Hartley et al. 2007). Research supports that judges' sentencing views appear to be particularly affected by the stereotyping of offender characteristics that have been defined as essential characteristics, which are viewed to be deep, unchangeable properties of an individual that dictates a person's identity (Norenzayan and Heine 2005). People often shape their views by stereotyping and categorizing individuals into groups by their essential characteristics and extending beliefs that outcomes are determined for a person if he exhibits that “essence” (Haslam et al. 2002). Although stereotyping of essential characteristics can have both positive and negative effects, race, gender, and mental disorder diagnoses have been identified as essential characteristics that often negatively affect judges' views on sentencing certain individuals (e.g., Johnson 2003; Jones and Cauffman 2008; Steffensmeier et al. 1998).

However, one topic in this arena that has not yet been empirically examined is when essential characteristics are described or thought to have genetic contributions, and how and why this knowledge may produce judicial stereotyping behavior and negatively affect views on sentencing offenders with such characteristics. This is especially interesting given that a number of cases in U.S. courts have had behavioral genetics evidence introduced and considered in recent years (Denno 2011; Farahany 2016). Adding knowledge of genetic influences to essential characteristics, in addition to other social and psychological influences, can result in additional unconscious biases that may amplify existing stigmatization (Haslam and Ernst 2002). These additional psychological biases have been termed genetic essentialist biases; although genetics may not be perceived to be the sole cause of the characteristic, these biases encompass the reductionist view that genetic makeup is an added immutable characteristic that further determines how aspects of a person's identity should be judged (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011).

Genetic essentialist biases are guided by a cluster of distinct areas: immutability (“a person's genetics cannot be changed”), discreteness (“a person either has certain genetic attributes or they do not”), inherence (“beneath the surface, people with similar genetics are inherently the same”), invariance (“certain genetic characteristics exist and will always exist”), uniformity (“people with similar genetic characteristics are similar.”), necessary features (“people with similar genetic characteristics have certain attributes that if they did not have, they would not have those genetic characteristics”), and informativeness (“knowing that a person has genetic characteristics tells us a lot about a person”) (Haslam 2011). Although thought to be a common psychological practice, genetic essentialist biases often have adverse effects on how the traits of individuals in social groups are judged and can lead to discriminatory outcomes for individuals being stereotyped (Bastian and Haslam 2006).

There is evidence of genetic essentialist approaches to decisionmaking in other legal contexts besides sentencing, such as privacy (Kaye 1999), employment discrimination (Pagnatarro 2001), health insurance (Launis 2000), and reproductive law cases (Bender 2003). Thus, as genetic essentialist thinking is already present in other areas of legal decisionmaking and biases associated with such thinking are known to lead to negative outcomes for individuals being stereotyped, it is reasonable to think that genetic essentialist biases may negatively affect sentencing if an offender's essential characteristics are known to be genetically influenced.

The current study, utilizing qualitative methodology and grounded theory, looks to understand the process of judicial stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases and its potential effects on sentencing with regard to one particular essential characteristic: mental disorder diagnoses, including both psychiatric illnesses and mental disabilities. Particularly, this research asks (1) if and how does judicial stereotyping of offenders with mental disorders known or thought to be influenced by genetics arise from relationships between genetic essentialist biases and stigmatization developing from these biases, and (2) how might this form of judicial stereotyping negatively influence judges' views on the sentencing of these offenders. Pennsylvania State Court judges are used as the research sample. First, I review previous literature on the stereotyping of essential characteristics in sentencing, followed by discussing genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders and why they are examined in this inquiry. After presenting the current study and method, the remainder of the article is devoted to the empirical development and discussion of a model suggesting that judges exhibit stereotyping behavior toward offenders with mental disorders known or thought to be genetically influenced by linking relationships between three particular genetic essentialist biases (immutability, informativeness, and uniformity) and three types of stigmatization (pessimism, dangerousness, and family stigma). Such stereotyping behavior, without the effects of three intervening conditions that were found to potentially disrupt this model, correspondingly negatively affects judges' views on sentencing, particularly related to incapacitation and deterrence. Finally, these findings and their implications are considered.

Judicial Stereotyping of Essential Characteristics

Judicial behavior in sentencing still remains a mystery and has little ties to theory (Rachlinski and Wistrich 2017). Yet research suggests that certain offender characteristics impact sentencing decisions through how judges evaluate blameworthiness, community protection, and bureaucratic constraints, particularly relying on the first two criteria (Hartley et al. 2007). Blameworthiness reflects the retributivist approach that punishment should fit the crime if an offender is perceived to be responsible for his actions; community protection reflects the utilitarian sentencing goals of incapacitation, deterrence, and sometimes rehabilitation in which sentencing protects society by preventing future dangerousness (Steffensmeier et al. 1998). When assessing these criteria, judges seldom have complete information to make fully informed decisions and often develop unconscious “patterned responses” of stereotyping toward offender characteristics to aid in their evaluations of dangerousness and blameworthiness (Albonetti 1991). Ultimately, “automatic biases” influence a wide array of judicial decisions (Levinson et al. 2017).

Judges' views on sentencing appear to be particularly affected by the stereotyping of offender characteristics that have been defined in the literature as essential, such as gender, race, and mental disorder diagnoses, that dictate how a person's identity is perceived and what outcomes are expected of him (Norenzayan and Heine 2005). Stereotyping of these characteristics often leads to negative influences on sentencing for certain categories of offenders, particularly influencing attributions of blameworthiness and community protection (Hartley et al. 2007).

Male offenders often receive less preferential treatment in sentencing, particularly resulting from cultural stereotypes associated with dangerousness, compared to females (Johnson 2003). Cultural stereotypes associated with paternalism are also thought to result in more lenient sentences for women compared to men; women may be seen by judges as more helpless than men, and, therefore, more in need of being protected (Rodriguez et al. 2006). Judges have also been thought to adhere to negative social stereotypes associated with race in sentencing, particularly leading to harsher sentences for African-Americans (Jordan and Freiburger 2010). For example, judges may believe that black defendants cannot afford to pay fines because they are more likely to be poor because of their race, using the “impoverished” status of a black offender to rationalize beliefs that he should receive a more punitive sentence (Starr 2014).

Most pertinent to this paper, judges also often stereotype offenders with mental disorders during sentencing, which in some cases has been found to have negative influences on their punishment views (Parry 2005). Such stereotyping also sometimes interacts with the stereotyping of other essential characteristics, such as gender and race (Perlin and Cucolo 2017). Although mental disorders can also positively influence sentencing (e.g., Berryessa 2014), research has shown that offenders with mental disorders are often perceived as less treatable and more dangerous compared to offenders without diagnoses, leading judges to choose more restrictive sentences based on fears related to dangerousness or lack of rehabilitation (Batastini et al. 2017; Jones and Cauffman 2008).

Particularly, the socio-legal literature on sanism has argued that judicial stereotyping of offenders with mental disorders is an every-day practice, leading to anti-therapeutic effects on sentencing (Perlin 1992). Sanism has been defined as the negative treatment of individuals with mental disorders by those in the legal system, resulting from “a disease of stigmatizing attitudes” toward the diagnosed based upon false assumptions about their character and potential outcomes (Perlin 2013). This negative treatment may include less opportunities for rehabilitative sentencing, longer prison sentences, and more restrictive punishments (Lewis 2012). An intrinsic part of sanism is that people with mental disorders are perceived as “essentially” different from the rest of society and are categorized into a social group with expected outcomes by legal actors (Lewis 2012; Perlin 2013). Thus, sanist decisionmaking in cases involving mental disorders reflects the same kinds of bias- and stigma-driven stereotypes exhibited in decisionmaking in cases involving other essential characteristics, such as gender or race (Mossman 1999; Perlin 2013).

The process by which judges stereotype essential characteristics and how that process may negatively affect sentencing for certain groups remains unknown from existing literature. However, social psychological literature has suggested that stereotyping related to essential characteristics may result from linking relationships between unconscious biases toward the essentialist characteristic and stigmatization of individuals resulting from such biases (Heatherton 2003; Yzerbyt et al. 1997). Biases in stereotyping are automatic attitudes outside of one's control (Yzerbyt et al. 1997; for a discussion on unconscious bias in social psychology, see Hassin et al. 2004). For example, essential characteristics can lead to biases related to homogeneity, meaning all individuals with an essential characteristic are perceived to have similar characteristics because of their shared “essence” (McGill 1998). Such biases lead to group-level stigmatization in which whole groups of people with certain characteristics are thought to possess certain attributes (Heatherton 2003). Goffman (1963) argues that stigma is a perceived characteristic of an individual that is “deeply discrediting” and reduces identity to this stigma. Ultimately, discrimination or punishing behavior is a behavioral response based on stereotyping that may result in harm toward members of a group defined by an essential characteristic (Crocker et al. 1991). Thus, although the process by which judicial stereotyping of essential characteristics may negatively influence sentencing remains unknown, this literature suggests that this process and punishing behavior related to stereotyping, such as negative effects to judges' views on sentencing, may be connected to the relationships between biases toward essentialist characteristics and stigmatization resulting from such biases.

Genetic Essentialist Biases toward Mental Disorders

Genetic essentialist biases arise from knowledge that an essential characteristic has genetic influences and can amplify existing stigmatization of that characteristic (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011). As specified above, the current study looks to understand if and how stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases toward one particular essential characteristic, mental disorders, potentially negatively affects judicial views toward sentencing. All mental disorders are thought to have some genetic influences, in addition to both social and psychological factors; research on some diagnoses, such as depression, addiction, schizophrenia, and intellectual disability, has supported there may be more genetic contributions to these disorders than some other diagnoses, but are not thought to be solely caused by genetics (McGuffin and Murray 2013). In addition to the evidence discussed above, I will mention three reasons for studying genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders in this inquiry.

First, contrary to other essential characteristics, there is a significant amount of empirical literature on genetic essentialist biases specifically toward mental disorders, suggesting that such biases result in negative stereotyping and treatment of individuals with mental disorders. As the U.S. public has been increasingly exposed to research on genetic influences to common mental disorders (Conrad 1997), researchers have begun to examine how stigmas associated with mental disorders may be either mitigated or exacerbated by this growing knowledge of their genetic “essences” (Schnittker 2008). Numerous studies have provided support for genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders among the U.S. public and linked them with enhanced stigmatizing attitudes, including increased negative beliefs related to social distance, dangerousness, and lack of treatability/recovery, that result in discrimination toward those with mental disorders if their illnesses are known to be genetically influenced (e.g., Angermeyer et al. 2011; Bastian and Haslam 2006; Lam and Salkovskis 2007; Phelan 2005; Phelan et al. 2002; Phelan et al. 2006). Overall, the literature has identified four main dimensions of the stigmatization of mental disorders that are significantly exacerbated by genetic essentialist biases (social distance, dangerousness, pessimism for outcomes/treatability, blame) and two other common forms of stigma (family stigma and self-stigma) (Haslam 2011). Ultimately, the exhibition of these stigmas as a consequence of these biases often results in the negative treatment of and punishing behavior toward individuals with mental disorders in different social situations (Haslam 2011).

Although a few existing studies have examined judges' sentencing views on aspects of behavioral genetics related to mental disorders (e.g., Aspinwall et al. 2012; Berryessa 2016; Fuss et al. 2015), no literature has specifically provided direct empirical evidence for judges' genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders and their effects on sentencing. However, based on the evidence discussed thus far, it is reasonable to believe that some judges, like other members of U.S. society, likely exhibit stereotyping behavior associated with genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders, and that this behavior may result in the negative treatment of offenders during sentencing. This assumption is further supported by the fact that most judges are thought to have no specialized knowledge on or background in genetics, and, similar to the public, are believed to exhibit lay conceptualizations of genetics, both generally and toward mental disorders (Dreyfuss and Nelkin 1992).

Second, judges appear to be increasingly likely to be presented with or have knowledge that mental disorders are genetically influenced. There have been a number of cases in recent years in which behavioral genetics evidence related to an offender's predisposition to a mental disorder has been presented and considered in U.S. courts (Denno 2011; Farahany 2016). Pyun (2015) argues, as this evidence is increasingly admitted, that unconscious biases associated with genetics of mental disorders will become more prevalent in court, as the nature of the genetic evidence provides a physical cause for the diagnosis and may be convincing to those interpreting the evidence. What might be more influential to judges and their decisionmaking on a larger scale, however, is the growing number of media reports on genetics and mental disorders (Conrad 1997). Media is the platform by which most members of society learn about genetics, and through this exposure, members of U.S. society now commonly understand and accept that common mental disorders are influenced by genetics (Condit et al. 1998). Thus, like other members of U.S. society, judges likely have some basic knowledge that mental disorders are in some way genetically influenced. Even if genetics evidence is not presented during trial, basic knowledge on the genetic influences to mental disorders might be integrated into judges' views during sentencing and lead to stereotyping behavior related to genetic essentialist biases.

Third, mental disorders are being studied in this research in order to add to literature on the “psycho-judicial soft spots” of judges in mental disorder cases in the area of therapeutic jurisprudence and to help to illuminate ways to counteract such soft spots. The therapeutic jurisprudence movement, in which the law and the judge are viewed as “therapeutic agents” to improve the treatment of offenders, helps to promote judges' cognitive awareness that their decisions can have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for offenders with mental disorders (Kaiser and Holtfreter 2016). Wexler (2000) argues that it is important to empirically explore “psycho-judicial soft spots” in therapeutic jurisprudence literature in order to examine how judges' unconscious biases may lead to potential anti-therapeutic outcomes. By identifying “psycho-judicial soft spots,” knowledge can be provided in order to examine how judges can best overcome their biases (Rottman and Casey 2000). Thus, if judges do indeed exhibit stereotyping behavior associated with genetic essentialist biases that results in the negative treatment of offenders with mental disorders during sentencing, this study not only augments the therapeutic jurisprudence literature on the “psycho-judicial soft spots” of judges, but it may also be instrumental in crafting “therapeutic interventions” that promote judges' cognitive awareness related to genetic essentialist biases and how such biases in cases involving mental disorders may result in anti-therapeutic outcomes by hindering an offender's potential treatment opportunities.

Relatedly, this study also seeks to illuminate the potential connections between sanism, defined as the negative and anti-therapeutic treatment of offenders with mental disorders by legal actors due to stereotyping behavior (Perlin 1992), and genetic essentialism. As sanist decisionmaking in cases involving mental disorders supposedly reflects the same kinds of stereotypes exhibited in decisionmaking in cases involving other essential characteristics (Mossman 1999; Perlin 2013), decisionmaking affected by genetic essentialist biases, if indeed found to be a form of judicial stereotyping and leading to negative outcomes for offenders, may be considered a new type of sanist decisionmaking.

Present Study

Building upon this framework and utilizing grounded theory (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998), this research attempts to develop a model that illuminates a process by which judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases may negatively affect judges' views toward the sentencing and punishment of offenders with mental disorders known or thought to be genetically influenced. The process by which judges stereotype essential characteristics remains unknown from the existing literature, as well as how that process may negatively affect sentencing. However, the model of stereotyping related to essential characteristics from the social psychological literature provides a promising potential framework for studying the potential negative effects of judicial stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders on sentencing. As discussed above, such literature suggests that stereotyping may result from the linking of relationships between biases toward the essentialist characteristic and stigmatization of individuals resulting from such biases (Heatherton 2003; Yzerbyt et al. 1997). Correspondingly, this stereotyping then may lead to discrimination or punishing behavior toward individuals with the essential characteristic (Crocker et al. 1991). Thus, by adopting this framework, this study's research questions can be dissected into two inquiries:

1. 1. If and how does judicial stereotyping of offenders with mental disorders known or thought to be genetically influenced arise from relationships between judges' genetic essentialist biases and potential stigmatization developing from these biases?

2. 2. How and in what ways might this form of judicial stereotyping negatively influence judges' views on the sentencing and punishment of these offenders?

Ultimately, this research attempts to develop an emergent model from the collected data that links these two inquiries in order to explain the relationships between these phenomena. If such a model develops, then this framework and the relationships between these phenomena are suggestive of how judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders may negatively affect sentencing.

In addition, it is important to identify if and what may influence whether some judges do not exhibit stereotyping, or, even if exhibited, what may influence whether this thinking indeed results in negative effects on sentencing. In grounded theory, these factors are called intervening conditions, referring to factors that can “bear down” or influence the research's developed model, “mitigate[ing] or otherwise impact[ing] causal conditions on phenomena” being studied (Strauss and Corbin 1998, p. 131). Thus, this research will seek to identify intervening conditions that influence whether or not some judges exhibit the model developed in this study. Although this research did seek to identify any emergent intervening conditions from the data, three intervening conditions were identified during the research design process and are ultimately those examined:

1. 1. Judges' personal experiences related to genetics: this factor was studied as a potential intervening condition because lack of background or knowledge on genetics has been argued to reinforce the negative effects of genetic essentialist biases (Condit et al. 1998; Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011). Thus, judges' previous exposure or experiences with genetics may affect how and to what extent they exhibit stereotyping behavior related to genetic essentialist biases and the other aspects of the model developed in this research.

2. 2. Judges' personal experiences with or exposure to individuals with mental disorders: this factor was studied as a potential intervening factor because judges' personal experiences with mental disorders have been shown to affect their views and potentially influence decisions in legal contexts, especially related to more positive or sympathetic views toward diagnosed offenders (Berryessa 2014; Hochstedler 1987). Thus, it is possible that judges' personal experiences with mental disorders may affect how and to what extent they exhibit stereotyping behavior toward diagnosed offenders.

3. 3. Judges' views on scientific determinism compared to their views on free will: This factor was studied as a potential intervening condition because individuals' strength of views on free will, which can be defined as the ability to act at one's own discretion, is negatively associated with the exhibition of genetic essentialist biases (Ogletree and Archer 2011). Furthermore, strength of views on scientific determinism, which can be defined as the idea that human characteristics are determined by biological attributes, is known to be intertwined and positively associated with negative effects of genetic essentialist biases (Wachbroit 2000). Support for the concept of free will is also a construct known to permit punishment of crimes; a larger degree of perceived free will, and therefore responsibility, can lead to more retributive punishments (Clark et al. 2014). Conversely, when an offender is described to have little control over his behavior due to deterministic influences, this can lead to more support for utilitarian punishments based on deterring future transgressions (Weiner et al. 1997). Thus, it is possible that judges' views toward free will and scientific determinism might affect this research's developed model.

Method

This research uses qualitative methodology and a grounded theory analytical approach, as it allows for the development of theoretical models from data and the examination of relationships between phenomena being studied (Strauss and Corbin 1990). In the remainder of this section, the study's participant selection and interview protocol will be discussed, followed by data collection and analysis.

Participant Selection

Purposeful random sampling was used for this research (Maxwell 2013). The purposeful sample is a random selection of judges who sit on the Minor Courts and Court of Common Pleas in Pennsylvania. Judges from these courts have been chosen because they either decide whether criminal cases go to the Court of Common Pleas (in the case of Minor Courts) or hear almost all criminal cases in Pennsylvania (Court of Common Pleas) (Pennsylvania Courts 2016). This population was also targeted in order to maximize potential participation. Judges are known to be a difficult research population to reach and decisions surrounding methodology when judges are sought as a research sample must be partially made based on the goal of maximizing participation (Dobbin et al. 2001). Thus, the reason to target a sample of judges in Pennsylvania was based on the assumption that these judges would be more likely to be exposed to the author's doctoral granting institution and willing to participate.

The initial goal for the research sample was 40–60 judges, which is the ideal size for a grounded theory study (Mason 2010). As there are over 1100 judges who sit on these courts (Pennsylvania Courts 2016), a purposeful random sample of 800 judges was chosen to target for participation based on the fact that the interview request response rate in previous research interviewing state court judges has been around 5% (e.g., Berryessa 2014; Berryessa 2016). The participation of 59 judges was secured (7.4% response rate).

Data Collection

Sources of data include semi-structured interviews with judges fitting the selection criteria. The courthouse mailing addresses of all sitting judges (N = 1124) from the Pennsylvania Minor Courts and Court of Common Pleas (publically available) were collected. A random selection of 800 was chosen to be contacted via U.S. mail to request an interview. The request included a letter with information on the study and contact information for the author. Interviews were conducted via telephone, audio-recorded, and transcribed from June to August 2016.

Interview Protocol

Interviews lasted on average approximately 45-minutes and included areas of questions that allow for qualitative model development in grounded theory (see Patton 2015 and protocol in Supporting Information). Judges were asked to (1) describe their thoughts about sentencing offenders with mental disorders and (2) their thoughts on sentencing if an offender's mental disorder was known to be genetically influenced. As mentioned above, all mental disorders are generally thought to have at least some genetic influences (McGuffin and Murray 2013). These two questions were not asked to distinguish views on mental disorders with genetic influences from those without, but rather to focus on how knowledge of genetic influences of mental disorders would affect judges' views on sentencing, compared to when that knowledge was not present. Questions were about mental disorders generally. Language on specific diagnoses was not used; this was done intentionally in order to capture judges' general views on these issues, rather than views on particular diagnoses. Finally, I was clear in using language such as “genetically influenced” and “genetic contributions,” as I did not want to suggest that the cause of mental disorders was solely rooted in genetics.

Furthermore, questions were asked in order to identify potential intervening conditions that may influence model development, particularly related to judges' knowledge of and personal experiences with genetics and mental disorders. In order to measure judges' views of free will and determinism, the protocol included seven validated measures from the Free Will and Determinism Plus scale (FAD-plus) (Paulhus and Carey 2011) that measures views on free will (three items) and scientific determinism (four items). Both free will and scientific determinism scores (each on a scale from 1–5) for each judge were calculated by adding together the values of free will and determinism items, respectively, and dividing by the number of items for each score. Higher scientific determinism scores represent higher support for how influential biological forces are on outcomes, while higher free will scores represent higher support for people being in control of their actions. Questions were also asked to capture judges' basic demographics.

Data Analysis

A grounded theory approach was used to analyze the data (Strauss and Corbin 1990, 1998). Even though this study's research goals were influenced by existing literature, the developed model in this research, and the relationships between the phenomena being studied, emerged from the data. Although often portrayed as an inductive process, researchers admit that this interaction of deductive framing of research from existing theory and inductive reasoning in model development is common in grounded theory research (Goulding 2017).

Dedoose software was used to organize and code the data. First, open coding was used after 12 interviews, which is the initial process of iteratively defining codes and organizing data into preliminary themes (Strauss and Corbin 1990). As it is common in qualitative research, a combination of data-driven and theory-driven codes was established, based on the emergent themes in the data, research questions, and previous literature (Goulding 2017). Next, axial coding was used following full data collection, in which themes established during open coding were grouped and organized into categories (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Finally, selective coding was conducted, in which primary theoretical schemes were developed by comparing categories of data to explain the ways in which categories from axial coding relate to each other, in order to identify the process that best explains the emerging theoretical model from the data related to the study's research questions (Strauss and Corbin 1990). Interrater reliability was calculated to validate the internal consistency of the coding scheme (Guba 1981). Three independent co-coders coded and analyzed a random sample of 19 interviews and calculated high interrater reliability (87% agreement).

Results

Demographics

Basic demographics of the 59 interviewed Pennsylvania judges can be found in Table 1. None of the demographics collected in this study appeared to influence any themes observed in the data related to the research questions. All judges handled criminal offenses, most of who hear all criminal case types from misdemeanors and felonies under general jurisdiction. Other demographics (e.g., court served upon, unique aspects of caseload/backgrounds, statistics on specific types of offenses heard), which did not have any bearing on the results but may be noteworthy to interested parties, are available upon request.

Table 1. Judge Demographics (N = 59)

Results of the Theoretical Model

Three overarching axial coding categories (genetic essentialist biases, stigma, effects on sentencing/punishment) were recognized and organized during the coding process, as influenced by the aims of this study. Ultimately, by positioning the relationships that emerged in the axial coding categories during selective coding, findings support the model presented in Figure 1 representing how judicial stereotyping may negatively affect sentencing of offenders with mental disorders known or thought to be genetically influenced. As discussed below, judges exhibited stereotyping behavior by linking the relationships between three particular genetic essentialist biases (immutability, informativeness, uniformity) and three types of stigmatization (pessimism, dangerousness, family stigma) associated with each bias when exhibited. When judges exhibited this stereotyping without the effects of the intervening conditions discussed below, judges expressed how knowledge of the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder would negatively influence their views on sentencing and punishment, specifically related to more restrictive sentences and support for deterrence and incapacitation. Three intervening conditions (personal experiences with genetics, higher scientific determinism scores vs. free will scores, and no personal experiences with mental disorders) influenced whether stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases resulted in either positive or no effects, rather than negative effects, on judges' sentencing views.

Figure 1. Developed Model of How Judicial Stereotyping Associated with Genetic Essentialist Biases toward Mental Disorders May Negatively Influence Judges' Views on Sentencing and Punishment.

Each part of the developed model is presented in the following sections. First, data are presented to illustrate how results from the two axial coding categories, genetic essentialist biases and stigma, relate to each other as a form of judicial stereotyping. Then, results associated with the axial coding category, effects on sentencing/punishment arising from knowledge than an offender's mental disorder is genetically influenced, are then presented. Although this research and model development focused on how stereotyping may negatively influence judges' views on sentencing, all three effects on sentencing/punishment (negative, positive, no effect) are discussed, as intervening conditions were found to influence whether judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases resulted in either positive or no effects on judges' sentencing views. Finally, intervening conditions and how they influenced the model, specifically focusing on how they disrupted judges' negative views on sentencing, will be presented.

Stereotyping

Forty-nine judges exhibited nine different types of genetic essentialist biases, which were identified during open coding and organized during axial coding (Table 2). No genetic essentialist biases were coded in the interviews of 10 judges. However, the majority of observed biases, such as discreteness, were only exhibited by a few judges rather than across the entire sample. Arising from the exhibition of these biases, 47 judges exhibited five different types of stigma toward offenders, which were identified during coding (Table 3). However, two stigmas (blame/personal responsibility, social distance) were only exhibited by a small number of judges and not found to be consistently associated with the exhibition of any particular genetic essentialist biases. No stigmas were coded in the interviews of 12 judges, and 9 of these judges were those whose interviews did not include codes for genetic essentialist biases.

Table 2. “Genetic Essentialist Biases” Coding Category

Table 3. “Stigma” Coding Category

These data support patterns of judicial stereotyping, particularly the consistent relationships between judges' exhibition of three genetic essentialist biases and three types of stigmatization. Immutability, informativeness, and uniformity were observed during open coding as biases present in more than half of the responses of the 49 judges who exhibited biases and were each consistently associated with the exhibition of pessimism, dangerousness, and family stigma in unique ways. As such, the data here are organized by a description of each exhibited bias, followed by discussions of how each stigma arose from that bias. Positioning data in this way illustrate how different aspects of stigmatization are uniquely linked with each genetic essentialist bias.

Immutability

Thirty-five judges discussed the immutable nature of the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder, largely focusing on how mental disorders are not thought to be as malleable if they are known to be genetically influenced. One characteristic response related to this sentiment was as follows: “To what extent can behavior be modified regarding someone with a genetic disorder as opposed to a non-genetically acquired disorder? I'd like to see the comparisons between the two and say okay, well, this guy is screwed because he's got a genetic disorder. I just don't know to what extent behavior can be modified” (Judge 41). Judges also likened the genetic influences to an offender's illness to genetic physical characteristics, such as eye color, that they perceived to be predestined characteristics. For example, one judge said, “If it's a genetic disorder it would weigh in on a sentence because it's like having blue eyes. There's nothing you can do about it, but you would have to deal with it” (Judge 15).

In addition, judges discussed how the genetics of an offender's mental disorder determines behavior and destiny, which cannot be “overridden” because of how strong the genetic influences are on the offender's characteristics, specifically impulse control. One judge commented that, “I'd say that if [offenders with mental disorders known to be genetically influenced] know right from wrong, then they shouldn't let the genetic disposition use as an excuse. Now, I'm going to say that with a caveat. There are some genetic dispositions obviously that override a person's willpower, override a person's ability to control it” (Judge 41). Many judges also connected this idea of genetically determined behavior to inevitable recidivism: “[Those] people are just wired differently. Their DNA is different…what can you do? [Do they come back], which they will. That's what the statistics show and that's certainly what I've seen in my court room” (Judge 56). Another judge stated that, “I believe that [genetics] takes over…it becomes who that person is, in the negative way…and because of that, I think it overshadows what the person's real personality, real behavior” (Judge 31).

Stigmas arising from Immutability.

Pessimism: Twenty-eight judges who exhibited biases related to immutability discussed pessimism for offenders and outcomes because the genetic influences to their mental disorders have unchangeable influences on those individuals' lives. Judges specifically related how the genetic influences may minimize the potential for successful treatment amenability. One judge said that, “[genetics] is not an excuse but certainly, it gives you some idea about how you're going to handle someone because that's not something they can usually help” (Judge 11). Commenting on lack of potentially successful services for these offenders, a judge stated, “I have read some studies on the fact that maybe they don't have as much control over things that as we think they do but…I am not sure that services are out there to help them” (Judge 25).

Dangerousness: Twenty judges who exhibited immutability discussed how the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder makes him more likely to be dangerous toward others in the future; this was specifically associated with the offender's perceived impaired ability to control his behavior due to his disorder's immutable qualities. One judge commented that, “I think that we all have the ability to make choices, but if we have some sort of [genetic mental health problem]…that affects our ability to check our impulses…that that deprives us of the capacity to make choices.” (Judge 1).

Family Stigma: Fifteen judges whose responses were associated with immutability related how genetic influences to an offender's behavior, as dictated by his familial lineage, may predispose him to antisocial outcomes. Judges described how parents' ill raising of an offender is also influenced by genetics, potentially preordaining an offender's inevitable or immutable criminality. For example, one judge stated, “Kids who get into [bad things]…how much of that is an extension of a genetic issue…sucky parents usually make kind of sucky kids and good parents usually make good kids, so how much of that is genetic, well, they're good parents because they got good genes and they pass these good genes onto their kid and sucky parents have sucky genes” (Judge 20).

Informativeness

Forty-two judges who exhibited genetic essentialist biases discussed the informativeness of knowing how an offender's mental disorder has genetic influences can tell judges a lot about an offender's behavior, characteristics, and outcomes. Judges considered how knowing that an offender's mental disorder has genetic influences informs judges about the reason why an offender has entered the criminal justice system, rather than other factors. For example, one judge commented that, “Someone with a mental disorder more genetically prone…[does] their disorder push them into the criminal justice system rather than their societal conditions? Probably, yes” (Judge 53). Judges discussed how knowledge of the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder provides information on his likelihood for antisocial outcomes: “It's pretty easy to see that genetics plays a very large role in crime in general as well as in mental illness and crime…I think that determining whether or not somebody lives an honest life free of criminal activity or whether somebody lives a life with criminal actions, I think that genetics plays the biggest role in that. I'm sad about that because I don't want it to be that way. I don't like the idea of punishing people for bad genes. I like the idea of punishing people for bad choices” (Judge 1).

Stigmas arising from Informativeness.

Pessimism: Twenty-six judges who exhibited informativeness connected such sentiments to pessimism regarding an offender's treatability, exhibition of positive traits, or ability to live a productive life. Judges commented that an offender's mental disorder with known genetic influences informs them to how likely a person may be unable to control behavior. For example, one judge commented that, “There may be tendencies or…impulses that may not necessarily be able to be turned off…or deliberated in [the same] way by a person not having a [mental disorder with genetic influences]” (Judge 39). Similarly, another judge stated, “I definitely think it does affect their ability to make choices. I think that they are hardwired to behave in a certain manner.” (Judge 25).

Dangerousness: Twenty-eight judges who exhibited informativeness connected their views on how the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder informs them on potential dangerousness related to public safety and containing future offending. For example, one judge stated that “[genetics] might make me be more concerned about public safety because…I would draw the inference that the defendant might not have as much control over the mental illness” (Judge 49). Judges also commented that genetic influences also inform them that an offender may pose a danger to himself, which often can go hand-in-hand with public safety concerns. For example, one judge stated, “I would have to say there are times I do not put bail on somebody because of their condition…they got to stay somewhere and it's for safety…I think there's not only society but they're safer in jail than they are outside” (Judge 20).

Family Stigma: Twenty-two judges who exhibited informativeness discussed how knowing that an offender's mental disorder is genetically influenced informs them about the families of these offenders and how they may have similar anti-social outcomes. Particularly, this idea of family stigma extended to perceptions on offenders' future children, including informing judges on future generations' likelihood for criminality. Judges vocalized such sentiments with responses like the following: “You see several generations of [offenders with mental disorders] around us where obviously there is huge genetic component that passes through the family and you can't help but occasionally ask that question, ‘why are we allowing those people to have children and continuing on to the next generation?…We combat that and say there got to be a better way. But it's a temptation that comes into play I think with every judge” (Judge 46).

Uniformity

Twenty-eight judges discussed how offenders with similar types of mental disorders known to be genetically influenced have similar character and behavioral attributes, based on the fact that individuals with similar genetic characteristics are similar to each other. “The older I get, I see confirmed that the apple doesn't fall far from the tree. It's kind of a layman's assessment. But I think it explains a lot of things, especially mental health” (Judge 21), one judge commented. Similarly, one judge stated “I think the genetic component is life…We all can see that. With multi-generational families, you will see lot of the same characteristics” (Judge 13). Judges also grouped offenders with similar mental disorders with similar genetic influences by pronouns such as “they” and “them,” and discussed uniform outcomes for these offenders: “I think it makes them more inclined…to come into the justice system…and that much harder for them to leave our criminal justice system.” (Judge 8).

Judges grouped offenders with perceived similar genetic influences to their mental disorders into a uniform group with similar characteristics. For example, one judge stated, “There are some people that have a diminished capacity [due to genetic influences]…they are the ones who're getting to the most trouble and cause the most problems in our community, and it's not entirely fair to lump them in the same category with somebody who would consciously choose to do an evil act. But on the practical side of things, even if we shouldn't say that they're bad people, we need to make sure that society is safe from them because they are an increased danger” (Judge 1).

Stigmas arising from Uniformity.

Pessimism: Twenty judges who exhibited sentiments related to uniformity reported some degree of pessimism for any offender with a mental disorder known to be genetically influenced, as individuals with similar genetic characteristics are similar to each other. Judges particularly commented on how similar negative life outcomes are expected for the majority of offenders with genetically influenced mental disorders, focusing on how the genetic influences to disorders affect the potential treatability regardless of the exact diagnoses. For example, one characteristic response was the following: “We can figure out if this person has this illness that is genetically-based. But unfortunately, there is no way to lessen the effects of it on the individual and change the individual's actions on society” (Judge 52).

Dangerousness: Eighteen judges who exhibited uniformity in their responses connected such sentiments to fears that genetic influences to offenders' mental disorders, regardless of the specific diagnosis, helps to provide information on the potential dangerousness of offenders and ways to prevent future offending. Judges not only focused on regulation by incarceration, but other methods such as civil commitment. Judges particularly focused on disentangling if and how much they can attribute genetic influences as an underlying, dominant reason for an offender's behavior, regardless of other offender characteristics. For example, one characteristic response stated, “If genetics is the main player in determining why somebody commits a crime, that it would seem to me that in those situations we should be focusing on civil commitments where nobody's saying the person is bad…we're saying the person is dangerous” (Judge 1).

Family Stigma: Thirteen judges who exhibited uniformity discussed how knowledge that an offender's mental disorder is genetically influenced affects how they view the background of that individual's entire familial lineage, because of their shared genetics background. One characteristics response related to these sentiments is as follows: “I've seen the same families for twenty-five years coming through the system. I had the grandfather, the son and then I had the grandchild for a crime. Clearly, genetics play a vital role in how people interact with the criminal justice system: I can see the same families over and over…part of that is they're predisposed…from their genetics” (Judge 22).

Effects on Sentencing/Punishment

All 59 judges exhibited three types of effects on their sentencing and punishment views when discussing the relationship between sentencing offenders with mental disorders and known genetic influences to mental disorders; these themes were identified during open coding and organized during axial coding (Table 4). These effects on sentencing and punishment, discussed below, include negative, positive, and no effects.

Table 4. “Effects on Sentencing/Punishment” Coding Category

Negative

Twenty-four judges discussed how the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder would in some way negatively affect their views on sentencing. These judges primarily focused on discussing sentencing as a way to protect the public from the potential dangerousness of an offender related to their pessimism on treatment amenability associated with the perceived immutability of his mental disorder's genetic influences. Judges discussed making sentencing more restrictive for these offenders to contain dangerousness. For example, one judge stated, “The person may not have the ability to rehabilitate themselves…if it's something which poses a threat to the community, then my sentencing might be more restrictive because if it's a genetic problem then maybe nothing that I do in terms treatment is going to change their behavior” (Judge 3). Judges also discussed their increased concerns on regulating an offender's behavior to protect the public if they know his mental disorder diagnosis has genetic influences as related to family stigma. For example, one judge, discussing how more restrictive punishments may be warranted for those with mental disorders with genetic influences, stated, “If you have a family that has a mentally ill parent or mentally ill child…we kind of know going forward when the case comes in that this person came from that tree and there is a good chance that they have some genetic predisposition that warrants handling the case a little differently than ‘kicking them in the ass’ with fines” (Judge 14).

In these discussions regarding protection of the public, judges who exhibited negative effects on their sentencing views largely focused on increased emphasis regarding potential deterrence and incapacitation of offenders with mental disorders known to be genetically influenced. Regarding deterrence, 19 judges discussed using sentencing to deter future recidivism in order to protect the public by focusing on more restrictive policies to prevent offending: “My initial reaction to finding out that…their disorder is caused by genetics…[is I would] empathize a little more but my main concern would be public safety and making sure that they won't make the same mistake twice…being genetically predisposed, it would have much of a bearing on my decision” (Judge 53). Regarding incapacitation, 15 judges discussed potentially needing to incapacitate offenders away in order to protect the safety of the community: “It is what it is and I still would just look at the danger to the community and the chance for…medication and rehabilitation…protecting the community is always of the utmost importance…It's something that we use in considering whether to release someone back into the community” (Judge 15).

Positive

Thirteen judges discussed how the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder would positively affect their views on sentencing, largely associated with wanting to use sentencing to provide treatment opportunities, access to rehabilitative sentencing, and to help minimize future contact with the justice system. As one characteristic response, one judge said, “Sometimes when there is awareness that there is a genetic influence, there may be some treatment possibilities for the person that the person hasn't tried yet, so I suppose if I knew that then I would enquire what…since we know this about this illness, what are the treatment possibilities for someone” (Judge 52). Judges discussed wanting to use community corrections, types of medical/psychological therapies, or other treatment-oriented sentences as a first line of defense in helping to curb reoffending of these offenders: “I think I'm a proponent of treatment no matter what…People that come in, especially in our system, in the criminal justice system, that do have diagnosable disorder…they're not receiving treatment. Treatment is better than no treatment. I think you have to start somewhere” (Judge 39). Judges also discussed their feelings of sympathy, which help to fuel their desire to search for treatment and rehabilitative opportunities for offenders with mental disorders known to be genetically influenced. For example, one judge stated, “We are not supposed to have sympathy. We are not supposed to have prejudice. But we are human” (Judge 13).

No Effect

Twenty-two judges discussed how the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder would have no effect on their views on sentencing or punishment. These judges described the origin or influences of the disorder as being unimportant to sentencing. One judge said, commenting how it may affect sentencing practices, said, “I'm not sure it does. It is what it is…no matter whether it's something that just happens because it's chromosomal or it's something that just happens because someone makes a conscious decision to alter reality, it happens” (Judge 15). Another judge, commenting about an offender's responsibility, stated, “I don't know that it changes a whole lot, only because people can do horrific things that they need to be held accountable for even though they're genetically predisposed to do it” (Judge 36).

Furthermore, these judges discussed how the genetics of a mental disorder are unimportant to how they view different aspects of punishment. For example, commenting on sentencing as a way to ensure public safety, “I'm not sure that that [genetics] really has a lot of bearing on the public safety question…whatever the cause of the illnesses, if the individual presents danger to others, we need to take that pretty seriously” (Judge 47).

Intervening Conditions

Three intervening conditions influenced if and how judges exhibited the model developed in this research: personal experiences with genetics, higher scientific determinism scores vs. free will scores, and no personal experiences with mental disorders. Particularly, these conditions influenced whether judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases resulted in either positive or no effects, rather than negative effects, on judges' sentencing views. Some judges exhibited more than one intervening condition.

Intervening Condition #1: Personal Experiences with Genetics

Sixteen judges reported that they had some personal experiences with genetics, which acted as an intervening condition; for example, five judges said that they undergone the process of genetic testing to see if they would inherit different disorders or genetic mutations. Another judge had a child with a genetic metabolic disorder. Another judge had worked previously as a pharmaceutical sales representative and had been educated on genetics through that experience. Another judge was married to a biomedical engineer who uses genetics in his/her research, while another judge has a child doing a doctoral degree in genetics.

Personal experiences with genetics were found to act as an intervening condition regarding whether or not these judges expressed negative views on sentencing and focused on deterrence or incapacitation (Figure 2). Judges who reported personal experiences with genetics in some context did exhibit the same stereotyping behavior as other judges in this research who did not have personal experiences with genetics. However, these personal experiences were found to act as an intervening condition that influenced if and how this stereotyping affected or led to judges' views on sentencing. Specifically, judges with personal experiences with genetics almost entirely exhibited positive, rather than negative, effects on their sentencing views regarding knowledge of genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder (with a few judges with personal experiences with genetics exhibiting no effects on sentencing). In fact, even while exhibiting these biases and stigmas, these judges largely focused on using sentencing to attain treatment for offenders, rather than other punishment objectives. Thus, personal experiences with genetics appears to be an intervening condition that may disrupt whether stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases leads to negative effects on punishment views.

Figure 2. The Role of “Personal Experiences with Genetics” Acting as an Intervening Mechanism Disrupting This Study's Developed Model.

Intervening Condition #2: Higher Scientific Determinism Scores vs. Free Will Scores

Judges' higher scores on items related to scientific determinism compared to items related to free will, as measured by administering selected items from the FAD-plus, acted as an intervening condition (Figure 3). Fourteen judges reported higher scientific determinism scores, measuring support on the extent to which biological forces are influential on behavior/outcomes, compared to their free will scores, measuring support on the extent to which people are in control of their own outcomes. Of these judges, all but two expressed that the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder would not affect their views on sentencing. Similar to judges with personal experiences with genetics, judges with higher scientific determinism scores also exhibited the stereotyping behavior that other judges did, meaning that they exhibited the same genetic essentialist biases and stigmas as judges in this research who reported higher free will scores (compared to their scientific determinism scores). However, judges with higher scientific determinism scores exhibited no effects on sentencing regarding the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder. Thus, judges' higher scores on items related to scientific determinism, compared to their scores on items related to free will as measured by the FAD-plus, appear to be an intervening condition that may disrupt whether stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases leads to negative effects on sentencing.

Figure 3. The Role of “Higher Scores on Scientific Determinism vs. Free Will” Acting as an Intervening Mechanism Disrupting This Study's Developed Model.

Intervening Condition #3: No Personal Experience with Mental Disorders

Not having personal experiences with individuals with mental disorders (i.e., in their own lives, families, friendships, or other personal contexts) was a powerful intervening condition that completely disrupted the model developed in this research from the beginning of the theoretical process (Figure 4). There were 17 judges who reported no personal experiences with mental disorders. Generally, these were the judges who exhibited little or no stereotyping, and correspondingly, exhibited no negative effects on sentencing. As noted above, 10 judges exhibited no genetic essentialist biases in their interviews, and 9 of those did not have personal experiences with mental disorders. Correspondingly, 12 judges exhibited no stigmatization (9 of them not having exhibited genetic essentialist biases), and 8 of those judges did not have personal experiences with mental disorders. Furthermore, only two of the judges with no personal experiences with individuals with mental disorders expressed negative sentencing views, while the remaining 15 expressed either positive effects or no effects on their sentencing views. Thus, not having personal experiences with mental disorders appears to be an intervening condition that can disrupt whether stereotyping is exhibited, and correspondingly, if judges express negative sentencing views from the beginning of the model developed in this research.

Figure 4. The Role of “No Personal Experiences with Mental Disorders” Acting as an Intervening Mechanism Disrupting This Study's Developed Model.

Discussion

The model developed in this research illustrates a process by which judicial stereotyping, arising from the relationships between genetic essentialist biases and stigmatization arising from such biases, may negatively affect sentencing views toward offenders with mental disorders known or thought to be genetically influenced. Previous literature has supported that judges exhibit stereotyping toward offender essential characteristics during sentencing, but this study offers the first empirical support of its kind suggesting that some judges may exhibit stereotyping toward certain essential characteristics when they are known to be genetically influenced and that such behavior has the potential to negatively affect sentencing, specifically related to deterrence and incapacitation.

Relatedly, as sanist decisionmaking in cases involving mental disorders is thought to reflect the same type of stereotyping behavior exhibited in cases involving other essential characteristics (Mossman 1999), this study also offers support that judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases might be thought of as a type of judicial sanism and how stigmatization associated with genetics may result in judges' negative treatment of individuals with mental disorders (Perlin 2013). However, one interesting point and potential departure of stereotyping associated with genetic essentialism from classic literature on sanism, positing that prejudice manifests through “ordinary common sense” about people with mental disorders (Perlin 1992), is the potential role of science in decisionmaking. Findings or knowledge related to genetic contributions to mental disorders are a result of scientific research, not social construction alone; this may be viewed as more objective or sound than “ordinary common sense” views surrounding mental disorders. Indeed, science, specifically genetics, invokes a mythology of truth when used by law compared to other knowledge bases or types of evidence (Aronson 2007). Thus, judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases may depart from sanism, in so that judges may feel more comfortable trusting what they perceive as their knowledge or views based on “science.”

Furthermore, although the process by which judges stereotype essential characteristics and how it affects sentencing is unknown, this research supports that judicial stereotyping, at least related to mental disorders and genetic essentialist biases, may fit the model of stereotyping essential characteristics provided by the social psychological literature (Heatherton 2003; Yzerbyt et al. 1997). As this literature suggests, judges in this research exhibited stereotyping behavior by linking the relationships between biases toward mental disorder diagnoses with known genetic influences and stigmas arising from such biases. This then led to judges' increased discrimination and punishing behavior, in the form of negative influences on their views on sentencing, toward offenders with that essential characteristic.

In addition, during stereotyping, judges appear to exhibit similar kinds of genetic essentialist biases and stigmatization toward mental disorders as those often exhibited by the general public (Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011; Phelan 2005; Phelan et al. 2002). The three main genetic essentialist biases (immutability, informativeness, and uniformity) and stigmatization (dangerousness, pessimism, and family stigma) exhibited by judges have been discussed by Haslam and Ernst (2002) and Haslam (2011) as those commonly exhibited by the lay public toward mental disorders. Although supported in the literature, judges' focus on family stigma was a more surprising finding than the other two stigmas, which are considered main dimensions of stigmatization elicited by genetic essentialist biases (Haslam 2011). Judges' discussions of family stigma, particularly the few judges who vocalized thoughts on whether offenders with genetic characteristics related to mental health should have children, touched upon aspects of the eugenics-based arguments put forth in Buck v. Bell (1927). This landmark case permitted compulsory sterilization of the “feeble-minded” and has been seen as an attempt to improve the human race by eliminating “defectives” from the gene pool (Lombardo 2008). Although eugenics-based arguments have been since discredited (Lombardo 2008), these results suggest that aspects of such beliefs may still be held by certain members of the judiciary.

Regarding views on punishment, research has supported that judicial stereotyping of offender essential characteristics often affects sentencing by influencing attributions of two criteria: blameworthiness and community protection (Hartley et al. 2007). These two criteria, respectively, reflect the principles of retributivism and utilitarianism in sentencing (Steffensmeier et al. 1998). In this research, without the effects of the intervening conditions, stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases negatively influenced judges' views on community protection and more support for restrictive sentencing, deterrence, and incapacitation that could potentially curb dangerousness and recidivism. Conversely, judges in this study generally did not discuss how the genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder would negatively (or even positively) affect perceptions of an offender's blameworthiness for his crimes.

Thus, these data suggest that the effects of judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders may primarily negatively influence judges' sentencing views on community protection (rather than their views on blameworthiness), and, therefore, principally influence their utilitarian, rather than retributivist, sentiments regarding sentencing. Indeed, utilitarianism often focuses on sentencing goals related to incapacitation and deterrence if an offender is perceived to be potentially dangerous in order to protect the public (Ulmer 1997), which echoes judges' views expressed in this research. Retributiveness, in which punishment views are affected by perceptions of an offender's blameworthiness for his past actions (Steffensmeier et al. 1998), was not found to be affected in this developed model, either positively or negatively. Although this research only examines mental disorders, it is possible that adding genetic knowledge to essential characteristics may primarily negatively affect judges' utilitarian sentiments regarding sentencing (Albonetti 1991; Hartley et al. 2007). Future research should examine if adding knowledge of genetic influences to other essential characteristics may influence judges' utilitarian or retributivist views on sentencing.

One other interesting thing to note is that these findings also provide perspective on how knowledge of genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder could positively affect judges' utilitarian sentiments. Several judges, particularly those with personal experiences with genetics and/or no personal experiences with mental disorders, commented on how such knowledge would positively affect their support for treatment opportunities to rehabilitate an offender in order to prevent recidivism. Community protection is often associated with deterrence and incapacitation, but also reflects the goal of rehabilitation in which judges use sentencing to protect society by preventing offending via treatment of an offender's behavior rather than traditional policies (Steffensmeier et al. 1998). Thus, these data suggest that judges' perceptions of community protection related to rehabilitation, and correspondingly utilitarianism, have the potential to be positively affected by knowledge that an offender's mental disorder diagnosis has genetic influences.

The intervening conditions observed to influence the exhibition of the model presented in this study also provide valuable data on judicial characteristics that appear to affect whether judges express negative influences to their sentencing views. Judges who had personal experiences with genetics, although still exhibiting stereotyping behavior associated with genetic essentialist biases, almost universally demonstrated positive effects on sentencing and a focus on treatment, rather than negative effects and a focus on deterrence and incapacitation. This lends support to the idea that experiences that increase knowledge on genetics and genetics-related research may counteract some of the negative effects of genetic essentialist biases, even when they are exhibited (Condit et al. 1998; Dar-Nimrod and Heine 2011), as well as help to alter the focus of specific punishment philosophies.

Furthermore, it was surprising that judges' higher scores on items related to scientific determinism, compared to their scores on items related to free will, acted as an intervening condition in this research. Of course, views measured by the administration of items from the FAD-plus do not take into account the potential intervening effects of judges' beliefs on other concepts, such as social determinism, which may also be influential on overall punishment views. However, these results suggest that stronger beliefs toward scientific determinism may be able to disrupt negative sentencing views specifically related to deterrence and incapacitation, even when judicial stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases is exhibited, in cases involving mental disorders. Deterministic views of outcomes of those with mental disorders are known to be intrinsically intertwined with the negative effects of genetic essentialist biases (Wachbroit 2000). Thus, it was unexpected that judges with stronger beliefs toward scientific determinism would show no effects on their punishment views regarding offenders with mental disorders with known genetic influences. Indeed, when an individual believes that an offender's behavior is affected by some kind of “deterministic influences,” such as genetics, this often leads to more support for utilitarian punishments based on deterring future transgressions (Weiner et al. 1997). This study does not support this previous literature.

Why this may be the case should be systematically examined in future inquiries, but there is one potential possibility. As noted above, these data indicate that negative effects on punishment primarily surround utilitarianism and community protection, and it is possible that judges with stronger beliefs toward scientific determinism may hold some negative views on utilitarianism and community protection (Weiner et al. 1997). However, judges also may have separate beliefs on the utility or fairness of retributive punishments for these offenders, even though not explicitly discussed during this research. Specifically, judges who subscribe to stronger beliefs toward scientific determinism may be more likely to believe that an offender with a mental disorder is less blameworthy because he is unduly influenced or “determined” by the genetics of his disorder, which may mean his punishment should be mitigated. This would align with literature reporting that when individuals perceive an offender to have a lower degree of free will, it often leads them to render less retributive punishments (Clark et al. 2014). Therefore, it is possible that these judges may hold some negative views on community protection, as well as some mitigated perceptions on retributivism of offender responsibility, and that these views might be producing countervailing effects. This may help to explain why judges with stronger beliefs toward scientific determinism generally reported that a mental disorder's genetic influences would lead to no effects on their punishment views.

That fact that judges' lack of personal experiences with mental disorders acted as an intervening condition that disrupted the entire model developed in this research was also a surprising finding. Judges' personal experiences with mental disorders have been shown to often positively affect their views and decisions in legal contexts related to sympathy toward diagnosed offenders (Berryessa 2014). Thus, having personal experiences with mental disorders might have been anticipated to be an intervening factor that would have hindered stereotyping and negative effects on sentencing. It is possible that judges with no personal experiences with mental disorders may be exhibiting certain biases or stigmas, but they may not be those identified in this research. Nonetheless, future research should examine why no personal experiences with mental disorders might hinder stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases.

This research does have limitations. The sample size is large for qualitative research, but still does not allow for generalizability of these results to all Pennsylvania or U.S. judges. There are also certain characteristics of the Pennsylvania judiciary which may affect whether these views could be seen as typical of other judicial populations. For example, although judges in Pennsylvania were sampled in order to maximize participation, it is possible this may have affected judges' views or what judges responded. In addition, Pennsylvania judges are elected and such views may be different from judges who are appointed, as judges who are elected may be more likely to take public opinion into account in sentencing due to fears related to reelection (Burnside 1999). Pennsylvania is also a sentencing guidelines state; judges in jurisdictions with untrammeled discretion may have other views (Commonwealth v. Sessoms 1987). Finally, in Pennsylvania, judges who have not previously served as lawyers may sit on misdemeanor cases in the Minor Courts (Crane 2015). In this sample, eight judges without Juris Doctorates on the Minor Courts participated in this study. Although this difference in training did not have any bearing on the results, this demographic difference from other judicial populations should be noted.

In addition, it is important to note that biases and stereotyping behavior are among the most human of attributes and common psychological practices that transcend cultural, social, and other backgrounds (Norenzayan and Heine 2005). Therefore, judges should not be villainized for exhibiting stereotyping related to genetic essentialist biases. Instead, the fact that these biases exist and may affect interactions in the legal system should be acknowledged and understood.

Ultimately, this research represents implications related to genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders in the legal system, specifically for “therapeutic judging” associated with the therapeutic jurisprudence movement. The law, particularly punishment, has often had detrimental consequences for defendants with mental disorders, including marginalization and oppression (King et al. 2014). The therapeutic jurisprudence movement has attempted to remedy this in part by trying to help judges counteract their stereotyping and sanist tendencies in order to acknowledge that defendants with mental disorders have unaddressed problems of which they can be helped to “overcome” with attention and therapeutic treatment provided by the court (Hunter et al. 2016). Rather than believing the defendant should attune their behavior to regulations set by punishments based on traditional social-control, therapeutic judges must motivate offenders to engage in treatment and develop therapeutic plans to reduce criminal behavior (Wiener et al. 2010).

However, this study suggests that knowledge on genetic influences to an offender's mental disorder diagnosis might undermine the goals and ability of therapeutic jurisprudence to improve the treatment of those with mental disorders. Although the views of some judges in this research were positively affected by this knowledge, particularly related to rehabilitation, these data support that genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders may lead many judges to consider more regulatory punishments associated with incapacitation and deterrence. Judges' consideration of these punishments appears to be based on assumptions that such offenders are more dangerous and less likely to be successfully treated or helped to “overcome” their behavior due their mental disorders' immutability. Instead of helping judges to acknowledge and accept that offenders with mental disorder diagnoses should be therapeutically treated by the court, such knowledge of genetics may in fact increase perceptions that traditional regulatory punishments are warranted to prevent reoffending. As punishment has historically had harmful and oppressive consequences for offenders with mental disorders (King et al. 2014), this study suggests that genetic essentialist biases in judicial decisionmaking could be a new mechanism by which the law plays a role in the negative treatment and marginalization of offenders with mental disorders, potentially leading to support for longer and more restrictive sentences and less focus on rehabilitative sentencing options.

As this research suggests that knowledge on genetic influences to mental disorders has the potential to produce anti-therapeutic effects counter to the goals of therapeutic jurisprudence, illuminating ways to both integrate and counteract genetic essentialist biases into “therapeutic judging” is imperative. First, one such way to integrate such biases into therapeutic judging may be reorienting the concept of therapeutic jurisprudence as a form of social control to judges. Although therapeutic jurisprudence implicitly adopts a model of an offender being “sick” and requiring treatment provided by the court, this authority is still based on social control, while also providing treatment (Hunter et al. 2016). The treatment provided within the therapeutic process still operates as a form of regulation over the offender's criminal behavior by understanding and treating such behavior through a judge's legal authority (Moore 2006). If the principles of therapeutic jurisprudence are framed not only as treatment, but also as effective modes of exercising social control through treatment, judges may be more likely to utilize therapeutic judging in cases involving offenders with mental disorders known to be genetically influenced because it is not perceived to compromise the potential for social control.

Finally, in order to counteract genetic essentialist biases, this research can be used to develop “therapeutic interventions” and training opportunities for judges. Kaiser and Holtfreter (2016) argue that if a positive therapeutic shift is to occur to reduce stereotyping behavior and discrimination of those with mental disorders in the legal system, it first requires an understanding of such behavior. The current study helps to provide some initial understanding of how judicial stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases may produce harmful outcomes for offenders with mental disorders. By developing such knowledge, therapeutic interventions to disrupt this behavior can be identified in order to potentially help judges better understand the complexities of genetic influences on behavior, reduce anti-therapeutic outcomes for offenders with mental disorder diagnoses, and help judges reflect on their own unconscious biases to disrupt stereotyping behavior and mitigate subsequent negative effects on punishment that may be elicited by genetic essentialist biases. Indeed, a main objective of therapeutic jurisprudence is that judges must become aware that their actions have therapeutic or anti-therapeutic consequences for diagnosed offenders (Wexler 2000). For example, workshops may want to provide lectures or educational materials on mental disorders by psychologists, psychiatrists, or other behavioral health professionals that specifically discuss false “myths” on the informativeness, uniformity, and immutability of genetic contributions to mental disorders in order to counteract judicial biases.

Furthermore, by identifying intervening conditions that influence how and why judges exhibit these biases and their effects on sentencing, therapeutic training methods tailored to judges with certain backgrounds, or methods utilizing certain types of learning materials, can also be formulated to help judges confront their own unique “psycho-judicial soft spots” and prevent sentencing disparities that might result from them (Wexler 2000). For example, as personal experiences with genetics were shown to hinder the negative effects of stereotyping associated with genetic essentialist biases on sentencing views, bolstering judges' knowledge on genetics through personal stories, and through other educational sources, may help judges better understand the complexities of genetic influences on human outcomes. In doing so, this might help mitigate the negative implications of genetic essentialist biases toward mental disorders during sentencing.