Social justice is turning into an international concern. This development is a response to the continuous rise of socioeconomic inequality – the gap between the rich and the poor –growing in several OECD member states since the 1970s. International human rights law (IHRL) presently only establishes a weak normative framework regarding social justice. This article argues that the full potential of this framework has still not been activated by international human rights adjudication. There are several reasons for this: a complex history of ideas suggesting little common understanding of the notion of social justice, the focus of international human rights adjudication on individual rather than constitutional justice, and the priority of liberty rights over equality rights. Yet, the domination of the liberal over the social in international human rights adjudication has started to change. The article shows how the social justice concern is beginning to be incorporated into IHRL by judicial interpretation of international equal protection and non-discrimination law (international equal protection law, IEPL). Integrating the social justice concern into IEPL is a legitimate yet transformative step as it increases judicial discretion at the international level. More than many other human rights, socioeconomic equality is highly context-specific and depends on a complex factual assessment of the local circumstances. This exacerbates the institutional legitimacy challenge levelled against international human rights courts. However, the article argues that the legitimacy challenge can be alleviated by focusing more on procedural rather than a substantive international review.

Around a century ago, Zhou Wei became the first Chinese francophone international lawyer. Yet his contributions to international law are often overlooked in academic literature even though he was the first Chinese member of the renowned Institute of International Law, and he had proposed a nascent concept of a ‘League of Nations’ even before Woodrow Wilson did. However, there has been no study on Chinese members of the Institute of International law, and even less research about Zhou. This article aims to piece together his life and work. It begins with a detailed account of Zhou’s education and work from Beijing to Paris, Geneva, and Fribourg. It then uncovers how he managed to shatter the racial ‘glass ceiling’ by being elected to the Institute while China was still a geopolitically weak country, shackled by numerous ‘unequal treaties’. It also recounts his contributions to the study and development of international law. Above all, this article argues that Zhou’s career epitomized the pioneering spirit of his generation of Chinese international lawyers who put their legal and foreign language skills to the benefit of China, and assiduously guarded against any encroachment of Chinese sovereignty. This article will examine and assess Zhou’s two most significant contributions to public international law.

This article argues that international law and the literature of civil war, specifically the narratives from the Philippine communist insurgency, present two visions of the child. On the one hand, international law constructs a child that is individual and vulnerable, a victim of violence trapped between the contending parties. Hence, the child is a person who needs to be insulated from the brutality of the civil war. On the other hand, the article reads Filipino writer Kris Montañez’s stories as revolutionary tales that present a rational child, a literary resolution of the dilemmas of a minor’s participation in the world’s longest-running communist insurgency. Indeed, the short narratives collected in Kabanbanuagan (Youth) reveal a tension between a minor’s right to resist in the context of the people’s war and the juridical right to be insulated from the violence. As their youthful bodies are thrown into the world of the state of exception, violence forces children to make the choice of active participation in the hostilities by symbolically and literally assuming the roles played by their elders in the narrative. The article concludes that while this narrative resolution appears to offer a realistic representation and closure, what it proffers is actually a utopian vision that is in tension with international law’s own utopian vision of children. Thus, international law and the stories of youth in Kabanbanuagan provide a powerful critique of each other’s utopian visions.

This article argues that the operational logic of international investment law, in part, is to tame states by legally requiring that they behave as if they were profit-seeking enterprises. This is suggested by a small set of awards, arising out of contractual disputes, that work a binary between normal contractual behaviour and sovereign acts of public authority behaviour. Non-contractual behaviour is deemed ‘political’ and likely to give rise to liability under investment law strictures. This complements well Hayek’s approach to the rule of law, where, outside of their ‘framework’ functions, states are expected to behave ‘in the same manner as any private person’. In an age of ever-increasing disparity, this renders it more difficult for states and citizens to take up measures that Polanyi associates with the protective counter movements, shielding citizens from the deleterious effects of free markets.

The structure of the global governance system has undergone significant changes in the past few years. From a system governed primarily by global public law institutions established through multilateral treaties, it has metamorphosed into a hybrid field in which a plethora of public, private, and semi-public institutions interact in various ways. The shift to a hybrid global governance architecture presents a complex challenge for legal and political theory, with immense policy implications. In the present article, I respond to this challenge by developing a new model of transnational legal authority, which conceptualizes it as an emergent, network-based phenomenon. According to this model, the emergence of transnational networked authority is dependent on the existence of a multi-layered structure of strongly connected transnational regimes. Key factors in the emergence of networked authority are the normative and compliance synergies that arise through the densification of links across the network. I examine in this context the linkage between the sociological and the jurisprudential aspects of the authority of private transnational regulatory regimes, and develop the idea of ‘network grounding’, which emphasizes the relational structure of private transnational legality. I illustrate the thesis by reviewing findings from a network analysis of transnational corporate social responsibility networks.

While the founder of international law was long considered to be Hugo Grotius, attempts were made in the late 1920s and early 1930s to dethrone him in favour of the Spanish theologian Francisco de Vitoria. This took place as the professionalization of the field of international law was reaching its golden age both in Europe and the Americas. Leading this case were the prominent US jurist James Brown Scott, one of the founders of the American Society of International Law, and the Spanish jurist Camilo Barcia Trelles. But why did they decide to revive Vitoria then, and why would they couch him specifically as the founder of international law? This article focuses on the intellectual history of the canonization of Vitoria in the context of the formation and consolidation of a continental Pan-American ideal and network of American international law in the Americas. Particular attention is paid to the American Institute of International Law, presided by Scott, and the formation of a Spanish Americanist cultural tradition in Spain. The latter deeply influenced Barcia, who developed a profound interest in Latin American questions, notably around the Monroe Doctrine. The article argues that these geopolitical Pan-American and Spanish-Americanist anxieties of re-unifying the Americas and Spain/America strongly influenced the depiction of Vitoria as a new founding father of international law and allowed Scott and Barcia to elevate themselves as Vitoria’s heirs.

The world’s cultural heritage is vulnerable to numerous types of risks, ranging from climate crisis to pandemics and wars. In the face of both current and future threats, states have the power to choose which cultural items should be conserved and which can be allowed to be destroyed. Consequently, there are legal provisions in place to safeguard the chosen pieces of cultural heritage as World Heritage for future generations. This article explores the essence of World Heritage as a legal phenomenon within the body of international cultural heritage law, applying a human rights perspective and taking in distinctive features of Nordic law. Using the framework developed by Wesley Newcomb Hohfeld, the article outlines theoretical guidelines for locating and examining World-Heritage-related legal relations. This theoretical Hohfeldian approach is combined with practical examples from the Finnish World Heritage Site of Old Rauma, among others. The article argues that World Heritage is currently threatened for reasons typical of capital-centric society. The related threats are not adequately recognized, nor are they appropriately addressed by either state authorities or the law. To prevent conflicts from arising in relation to the safeguarding of World Heritage, this article emphasizes the importance of fostering resilience through elastic legal mechanisms, as exemplified by the Nordic right to roam.

The concept of jurisdiction is a relatively undertheorized category of international law. Mainstream international law scholarship advances an ahistorical and asocial account of the rules of jurisdiction in international law. The present article contends that any serious understanding of the categories and rules of jurisdiction, in particular that of extraterritorial jurisdiction, calls for deep appreciation of the evolving material structures over time. It argues that the key factors that have influenced the evolution and development of the doctrine, rules, and practices of jurisdiction are the emergence of the modern state, capitalism, and imperialism. In order to appreciate this contention there is a need to undertake on the one hand a genealogical analysis of modern state and capitalism and on the other hand problematize the categories ‘territory’ and ‘extraterritorial’. The internal relationship between capitalism and imperialism has meant that, despite the territorial organization of the international system, a process of harmonization of legal rules has taken place across geographical spaces in both colonial and postcolonial eras. The outcome is a critical loss of policy and legal space for nations of the Global South. In the colonial era the outcome was achieved through legislation in the instance of colonized nations and through capitulation regimes in the case of semi-colonies. The strategy of advanced capitalist states in the postcolonial era for achieving harmonization of laws has been multi-layered and multi-dimensional. The article concludes by touching on two models of reform of the rules and practices of jurisdiction viz., liberal and subaltern internationalism.

This article engages with the history of international investment law in the first half of the twentieth century. It traces how international lawyers inscribed their vision of an international legal order protecting private property of Western companies against attempts at nationalization in the wake of socialist revolutions and the decolonization of large parts of the world. The article focuses on the role of ‘general principles of law as recognized by civilized nations’ as building blocks for an international legal order today called international investment law. Rather than describing a direct line between contemporary standards of protection and the invocation of general principles, the article develops conditions of possibility for the emergent field of international investment law. These conditions are located both in arbitral practice, as well as in international legal scholarship of the early twentieth century. Based on the analysis of such arbitrations over disputes resulting from concession agreements and scholarly writings in the interwar period, the contribution draws out the modes of authorization upon which the legal claims advanced by international lawyers rested. At the heart of the vision were ideas of ‘modernity’, ‘civilization’, ‘equity’, and ‘justice’ that enabled a hierarchization of difference, locating Western claims to legality above rivalling claims of socialist and ‘newly independent’ states. These ideas ultimately constituted the paradox of a ‘modern law of nature’ that claimed timeless universality while authorizing the ordering of foreign property in line with Western conceptions of modernity.

The ‘question of labour’ and its exploitation in the Third World has not been given ample consideration by contemporary international legal scholars in their historical examinations of the making of the international order. This article revisits the history of the interwar institutions of the League of Nations, particularly the International Labour Organization (ILO), to argue that international law reformulated imperialism through its re-articulation of labour relations, beginning with its quest to suppress slavery and ultimately regulate forced labour in Africa. International institutions contributed to the valorization of ‘free wage labour’ in Africa and the Third World through its international ‘native labour’ policies, the development of international labour standards, and especially the passing of the 1930 Forced Labour Convention. The article argues that international institutions safeguarded the processes of capitalist racial/colonial accumulation and labour exploitation by ideologically dis-embedding the violence of slavery and forced labour from ‘free wage labour’, veiling the structural unity and totality of the international legal order with racial capitalism. Drawing on the ‘Black radical/internationalist tradition’, I propose an expansive critique of the international order as a form of ‘enslavement’ to the structures of capitalism, so as to adequately expose international law’s structural embeddedness with labour exploitation, white supremacy, and racial capitalism.

G. W. F. Hegel is one of the most significant philosophers in history yet the reception afforded to him in International Relations (IR) does not compare with his peers, most notably Immanuel Kant. Although by no means absent from IR he cannot be described as a canonical figure. Given his stature in philosophy this comparatively minor interest in Hegel prompts investigation into his failure to enter the pantheon of ‘Great Thinkers’ in IR. The critical-historical investigation of Hegel’s reception in IR undertaken in this article reveals that Hegel, unlike Kant, was cast as an intellectual villain – a blood-soaked Priest of Moloch, whose demonic ideology of state-worship led to the slaughter of the First World War, the rise of the Nazis, and the catastrophe of the Second World War. Condemned by an array of leading intellectuals from John Dewey to Karl Popper, Hegel was side-lined and erased until his work was reconsidered by revisionist scholarship in philosophy and – eventually – in International Relations. From the 1980s, a number of hotly contested, decidedly uncanonical ‘Hegels’ have found expression in IR, from a ‘realist’ Hegel to a postcolonial Hegel. Ultimately, the article argues that the treatment of Hegel reveals that the formation of the IR canons was not an innocent, dispassionate process but rather was imbricated in the great ideological and military conflicts of modernity.

The quantity of man-made space objects, ranging from abandoned launch vehicle stages to fragmentation debris, is remarkable. At the time, the drafters of the Outer Space Treaty did not (and perhaps could not) anticipate how great the problem of debris in outer space would one day become. As a result, they only drafted general provisions for the protection of the space environment which are generally deemed insufficient. This article aims to demonstrate that both general rules of international law and the UNCOPUOS Debris Mitigation Guidelines come to the rescue in addressing the space debris issue as they complement and complete the general obligations contained in the Outer Space Treaty. Particular attention is paid to anti-satellite weapon tests, which have catastrophic consequences in terms of creating debris but nonetheless continue to be carried out. Finally, it ascertains whether an obligation on states to actively remove their space debris exists.

The Supreme Court of the Netherlands construed the state’s positive human rights obligations as requiring a 25 per cent reduction of its greenhouse gas emissions by 2020 compared with 1990 levels. This article explores how judges can decide the level of state effort required to mitigate climate change. To date, judges have predominantly approached this issue by seeking to identify an elusive benchmark, either by deduction from global objectives or induction from state conduct. This article shows that the judicial assessment of a state’s requisite efforts inevitably relies on equity infra legem. Acknowledging this, judges could learn from the international courts’ experience with establishing clarity in the midst of vague legal rules.

This article examines when states are allowed to use force against neutral merchant ships outside territorial waters. This is regulated by both international humanitarian law and the prohibition of the use of force, which apply concurrently to naval warfare. The prohibition of the use of force imposes narrower limits than international humanitarian law, in the sense that certain actions that have traditionally been permitted under international humanitarian law are contrary to the prohibition of the use of force. The prohibition of the use of force exempts uses of force based on UN Security Council resolutions, consent and self-defence. Where there is no UN Security Council resolution or consent, self-defence remains the only option, and self-defence does not give a right to direct the use of force towards third states or their ships. Therefore, the right to self-defence does not permit blockades outside territorial waters or visit and search operations that are not founded on specific suspicions against individual ships, even though such operations may be permitted under international humanitarian law. These conclusions are supported by an examination of state practice and opinio juris, where the few relevant instances that do exist have met with widespread protests from other states.

Individuals have long occupied a precarious position within international law. Historically, conceived as the relation between states, international law rarely saw a need to consider individual claims; it was, instead, the role of states to bring claims on behalf of their nationals. As international law has become increasingly fragmented, however, globalization has thrust the individual onto the international legal plane.

Within this landscape, we briefly consider individuals’ claims across three separate international regimes: (i) the International Court of Justice, (ii) investment treaties, and (iii) the World Trade Organization. We find that barriers for individuals’ recognition as rights holders persist across each. First, jurisdictional barriers remain fundamentally problematic for recognizing individuals’ claims. Second, the longstanding focus on treaty interpretation techniques has yielded little, if any, demonstrable impact on recognizing individuals’ rights. Third, mere reliance on reflecting human rights values, rather than specific and concrete structural reforms, has proven incompatible with realizing individuals’ rights within these three systems.

Individuals qua rights holders have, rather acutely, recently experienced deeply troubling human rights violations on several fronts. Fundamentally, international law must protect human rights. This moment invites us to consider the systems on the international legal plane for individuals to seek such remedy and what barriers must be addressed to further such efforts.

The main query of this contribution concerns the circumstances and conditions under which the concept of jus gentium as it existed in Roman law is included in or excluded from the historical canon of international law. Paradoxically, according to the major twentieth-century handbooks on the history of international law the term ‘law of nations’ derives from the Latin jus gentium. However, historians of international law tend to indicate the jus gentium does not amount to any ‘international law’ in the modern sense. The contribution argues that the idea of the Roman jus gentium as equivalent to our modern international law was rediscovered in the 1930s and 1940s, first by a group of leading Roman law scholars who were ousted from Germany by the Nazi regime, and second by a larger group of thinkers and academics they came into contact with in their new academic surroundings. The reason for this rediscovery is a change in the definition of ‘international law’ especially beyond legal positivism, to encompass two qualities the Nazis despised: individualism and universalism. The purpose of the contribution is to show an instance of a change in canon due to the political circumstances, one with consequences for the formation of actual institutions in international law.