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R (Hodkin) and another v Registrar General of Births, Deaths and Marriages

Administrative Court: Ouseley J, 19 December 2012 [2012] EWHC 3635 (Admin)Scientology chapel – registration of marriages

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  10 April 2013

Ruth Arlow*
Affiliation:
Chancellor of the Diocese of Norwich
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Abstract

Type
Case Notes
Copyright
Copyright © Ecclesiastical Law Society 2013

Ms Hodkin and her fiancé, both Scientologists, wished to marry in a Church of Scientology chapel that was not registered under section 2 of the Places of Worship Registration Act 1855 as a ‘place of meeting for religious worship’. It was not, therefore, a ‘registered building’ within section 26(1)(a) of the Marriage Act 1949 and no application could be made under the 1949 Act for it to be registered for the solemnisation of marriages. The Registrar General had refused to register the chapel under the 1855 Act on the grounds that it was not, in fact, a place for ‘religious worship’ because in R v Registrar General ex parte Segerdal [1970] 2 QB 697 the Court of Appeal had upheld the rejection of an application to register another such chapel precisely on the grounds that the activities carried on within it did not constitute ‘worship’.

The claimants argued that the understanding of Scientology as a religion had developed since 1970; that the meaning of a place ‘for religious worship’ in what was now a more obviously multi-faith society had broadened; that the effect of the Human Rights Act 1998 and the Equality Act 2010 meant that the distinction drawn by the Court of Appeal in Segerdal between Scientology and a non-theistic religion such as Buddhism was no longer tenable; and that the current practice of registering Buddhist and Jain temples as places of religious worship while refusing to register Scientologists’ chapels was discriminatory. Ouseley J dismissed the claim, primarily because he regarded himself as bound by Segerdal, but suggested that his decision might properly be appealed: ‘Forty years on from Segerdal, the Court of Appeal may find the route at least to reconsider its decision in Segerdal with the fuller material now available.’ [Frank Cranmer]