Responding to the death of Victoria Climbié in 2003, the Laming Report stated that cultural differences should never again be a factor in inadequate child protection. Yet since that time there have been further deaths of children involving exorcism and allegations of witchcraft, based in part on particular understandings of Christianity. Situations resulting in forced marriage, cliterodectomy, ‘honour’ killing and corporal punishment are practices often perceived as arising from religious belief, both by those who defend them and by critics. This article explores practices perceived as grounded in religious belief or culture that conflict with current child protection practice and norms about what is harmful to children. The role of religious education, rights to manifest religious belief and different understandings of adoption are also considered as examples of religious difference in understandings about children. Engagement with religious difference through a defence of children's rights and autonomy are proposed as one means to resolve conflicts between religious worldviews and what it means to protect children. The aim is to identify and foster reflection and debate about different understandings of what constitutes harm, in order to enhance consensus over child protection where views of what is harmful differ radically.1

It is widely recognised that the process of secularisation takes place differently in different parts of the world. Less often appreciated is the wide variety of ‘secularities’ (and indeed of ‘secularisms’) that emerge as a result. This article will look at this question systematically, and will try to identify at least some of the factors that must be taken into account if we are to understand unbelief as well as belief. In so doing it builds on the author's earlier work relating to patterns of religion in modern Europe.1

There has been much talk of constitutional reform in recent years, but the changes that have actually been taking place have often differed markedly from those that the Government has professed to espouse and have shaken the foundations of the previous system without following any coherent overall plan. Written constitutions are not without shortcomings; the conventions that held the old British constitution in place are in any case difficult to codify or enforce. But a pressing problem with an unwritten constitution is that there is no special mechanism for constitutional change. Recent reforms have therefore become associated with short-term political expediency and spin. The cure is not simple.1

As a tribute to Professor Sir John Baker QC, who has served as a member of the Editorial Board since the Ecclesiastical Law Journal's foundation and energetically continues to do so,2 I am pleased to reproduce the lightly edited text of his British Academy Maccabbaean Lecture.3 Delivered in 2009, though still topical today, it provides a cautionary critique of the direction of travel in the evolution of the United Kingdom's unwritten constitution which I hope will serve as a prelude to an occasional series of articles and comment in the pages of this Journal considering the role of the spiritual within the constitution and the established nature of the Church of England in the twenty-first century. Matters that have been ignored or marginalised in the recent constitutional revolution include the role of the Prime Minister in the appointment of bishops and archbishops and the ecclesiastical patronage exercised by the Lord Chancellor. [Editor]

There exists a substantial body of legal and historical research on the case of Fendall v Wilson, in which the Privy Council famously ‘dismissed Hell with costs’. However, the case has never been examined in the context of Anglican debate over Hell and the Last Judgment in the second half of the nineteenth century. Despite its remarkable parallels with Fendall, Jenkins v Cook has been forgotten by most modern lawyers and has never been examined in parallel with Fendall. This article analyses the parts of the two cases that deal with Hell, the Last Judgment, and the Devil in the context of mid-nineteenth-century Anglican doctrinal litigation, and of the controversy over Hell in general and Essays and Reviews in particular. It also reconstructs some of the important factual elements of Jenkins that were not recorded in the first instance or appellate judgments. The contextual analysis of the judgments and unrecorded facts shows some surprising and evasive judicial responses to the doctrinal questions of whether Hell and the Devil exist and if so in what form. The article suggests that religious politics, rather than ecclesiastical jurisprudence, are the likelier cause of those responses. The article provides a historical contribution to the growing body of research and comment on the interplay of law and religion, in particular exemplifying some of the difficulties that arise when issues of religious doctrine are brought before purportedly secular courts.

In its recent judgment in Hosanna-Tabor Evangelical Lutheran Church and School v EEOC, the United States Supreme Court held that the First Amendment precludes the application of anti-discrimination law to the employment relationship between a church and its clergy. In 2005 the House of Lords had reached the opposite conclusion, ruling, in Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland, that the decision to dismiss an ordained minister was not a spiritual matter falling outside the scope of anti-discrimination legislation. This article argues that Percy largely neglected important aspects of church autonomy and that the reasoning in Hosanna-Tabor offers an opportunity to rethink whether secular law should be allowed to affect a religious group's decision to appoint or dismiss a minister.

Religion law – the law of the state on religion – has been taught for generations in the law schools of continental Europe, though its introduction in those of the United Kingdom is relatively recent. By way of contrast, within the Anglican Communion there is very little teaching about Anglican canon law. The Church of England does not itself formally train clergy or legal officers in the canon and ecclesiastical laws that they administer. There is no requirement that these be studied for clerical formation in theological colleges or in continuing ministerial education. The same applies to Anglicanism globally – though there are some notable exceptions in a small number of provinces. This is in stark contrast to other ecclesiastical traditions: the Catholic, Orthodox, Lutheran, Methodist, Reformed, Presbyterian, Baptist and United churches all provide training for ministry candidates in their own systems of church law, polity or order. However, no study to date has compared the approaches of these traditions to the teaching of church law today. This article seeks to stimulate an ecumenical debate as to the provision, purposes, practices and principles of the teaching of church law across the ecclesiastical traditions of global Christianity. It does so by presenting examples of courses offered (institutions, purposes, subjects, methods and levels), the educative role of church law itself, requirements under church law for church officers to study the subject, and parallels from the secular world in terms of debate in the academy and practice on the nature of legal education, particularly the role played in it by the Critical Legal Studies movement.1

Are the University of Cambridge and its colleges peculiars? The university has always claimed independence from episcopal authority for itself and its colleges. A struggle was resolved in 1434 by a tribunal set up by the Pope, in which the Prior of the monastery of Barnwell heard both sides and decided that the University and its colleges were to be exempt from the supervision of the Archbishop of Canterbury and of the Bishop of Ely, in whose diocese the University was situated. This became known as the Barnwell Process. It established the University and it colleges as peculiars defined as having an Ordinary other than the diocesan bishop. Colleges founded later but before the Reformation claimed the same privileges. At the Reformation, the authority of the Pope was replaced by that of the King and the Archbishop of Canterbury, but the privileges that the University and its colleges enjoyed continued to apply. Post-Reformation foundations of colleges tended to claim the same exemptions from episcopal jurisdiction, but without documented evidence. This article argues that the continued acceptance by the Bishop of Ely of the University and its colleges as extra-diocesan confirms them to be peculiars within the legal definition.

In this article we discuss the recent history of the failed draft Bishops and Priests (Consecration and Ordination of Women) Measure, situating this within the broader context of the ordination of women and debates around the Equality Act exceptions for an organised religion. We aim to provide an account of the ways in which equality rights have been implemented in the relevant law; how the Church of England is responding to these rights; and how broader society understands the importance of gender equality and reacts to Synod's rejection of the draft Measure. We analyse these with reference to theories of heteronormativity and scholarship of human rights. In doing so, we aim to explain what is happening in the Church of England and broader society, and draw some conclusions about the current opportunities open to the Church and the state in matters of rights and equality.1

The use of Islamic norms in the determination of arbitration in England and Wales has become a source of great controversy. Concerns are raised for the human rights of vulnerable parties who may be pressured into arbitrations and who may not be treated fairly under the agreed rules of arbitration or by arbitrators themselves. The Arbitration Act 1996 limits the ability to appeal arbitration decisions and as such does not safeguard the rights of these parties. As a signatory to the European Convention on Human Rights the UK is under an obligation to uphold human rights standards domestically, and it is argued that the way in which arbitration on religious norms is currently regulated does not comply with this obligation. This article considers some of the possible adaptations or alterations that could rectify the situation, improving parties' experience of religious arbitration and ensuring that the system remains compatible with international human rights obligations.

During the course of 2012 two significant developments occurred in Germany that are of wider interest for those who study law and religion internationally. This brief note draws attention to a decision from Cologne that was probably wrongly decided, the effect of which will be reversed by amended legislation, and to a directive from the Catholic Bishops' Conference concerning the excommunication of those Catholics who decline to pay their church tax.

The issue of whether or not a minister of religion is an employee or an office-holder came before the Supreme Court in an action for unfair constructive dismissal against the Methodist Church. The Court held by a majority of four to one that, on the basis of the Church's Deed of Union and Standing Orders, the terms of engagement of ministers were not contractual for the purposes of employment law and that a minister's duties were not consensual. The judgment moderates somewhat the impact of the earlier judgment of the House of Lords in Percy v Board of National Mission of the Church of Scotland – and makes the employment status of ministers even more sensitive to the facts of the individual case than it was before.1

The Second Vatican Council is recognised by the Roman Catholic Church as the twenty-first ecumenical council. The largest in terms of participants and one of the longest-running, it also covered the widest range of topics and produced the largest volume of documents and decrees. This article, based on the text of the ninth Lyndwood Lecture, examines a number of characteristics of Vatican II in comparison with previous councils, arguing that, while in many ways Vatican II was novel, in its composition, agenda, influence and reception one can discern parallels with past councils back as far as the first ecumenical council at Nicea in 325.1

The Queen remains in robust health but, inevitably, as she gets older there is speculation about the form and content of the next coronation service, whenever it may be needed.

The biennial Lyndwood Lectures are a significant ecumenical joint commitment by the Canon Law Society of Great Britain and Ireland and the Ecclesiastical Law Society. The Canon Law Society, as host, selected Professor Norman Tanner SJ to deliver the 2012 lecture1 and as is customary it fell to me, as chairman of the guest society, to conclude the event with comment and thanks.

The implementation of Article 17(3) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (TFEU) has always been one of the central topics of discussion for legal scholars analysing the relationships between religious groups and European institutions. According to Article 17, the European Union shall maintain an open, transparent and regular dialogue with churches, religious associations or communities, philosophical organisations and non-confessional organisations. In the case in hand, the complainant, the European Humanist Federation (EHF) decided to lodge a complaint before the European Ombudsman when the European Commission rejected the proposal for a dialogue seminar.

This Comment asks whether, in the light of early parliamentary proceedings, the Succession to the Crown Bill risks any untoward, unintended practical consequences, and considers what, if any, may be among the longer-term, less direct implications for Church establishment in England.