Although elected officials have the final say over pensions, boards of trustees also influence plan governance. Not a great deal is known about boards or how they shape policies. Boards are composed of politically and nonpolitically appointed members, as well as active and retired employees. Plan active-employee size turns out to be the best predictor of membership, suggesting that employee voice expands as plans cover more workers. Using both fixed effects and instrumental variables approaches, I show how boards shape plans’ policies and funded levels. Active and retired members shape discount rates, whereas active membership is positively associated with funded ratios. Interestingly, gridlock is also associated with higher discount rates. However, I find that plans’ actual investment returns are poor predictors of expected returns, irrespective of board composition. Although boards offer a venue through which states can manage funds, they are not suited to solving pensions’ governance challenges alone.

As collaborative governance processes continue to grow in popularity, practitioners and policy scholars alike can benefit from the development of methods to better analyse and evaluate them. This article develops one such method by demonstrating how collaborative governance theory can be integrated with the Advocacy Coalition Framework (ACF) to better explain coalition dynamics, policy-oriented learning and policy change in collaborative contexts. I offer three theoretical propositions that suggest alternate relationships among ACF variables under collaborative governance arrangements and illustrate these propositions using interview data from an original case study of a collaborative governance process in Colorado, USA. The integration of collaborative governance theory with the ACF improves its application in collaborative contexts and provides new theoretical insights into the study and practice of collaborative governance.

The EU infrastructure policy has relied on Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs) as a means to successfully deliver infrastructure of benefit for the EU. To reach its infrastructure policy objectives, the EU has implemented support mechanisms aimed at facilitating the delivery of PPPs. This article is aimed at evaluating to what extent these mechanisms have actually contributed to improving the economic performance of PPPs. To that end, we have selected the case of Spanish road PPPs for empirical analysis. The main result shows that EU support positively influences the economic performance of PPP projects. This is caused by the fact that the EU conditions its financial support on a project’s meeting a set of requirements that help assure the success of the project. From this result, we obtain a set of conclusions that may be generalised to other cases, and provide a contribution to the body of knowledge on PPPs.

Rulemaking gives agencies significant power to change public policy, but agencies do not exercise this power in a vacuum. The separation of powers system practically guarantees that, at times, agencies will be pushed and pulled in different directions by Congress and the president. We argue that these forces critically affect the volume of rules produced by an agency. We develop an account of agency rulemaking in light of these factors and test our hypotheses on a data set of agency rules from 1995 to 2007. Our results show that even after accounting for factors specific to each agency, agencies do, in fact, adjust the quantity of rules they produce in response to separation of powers oversight. Further analysis shows that the president’s influence is limited to those agencies that he has made a priority.

The Pivotal Politics model (Krehbiel) has significantly influenced the study of American politics, but its core empirical prediction – that the size of the gridlock interval is negatively related to legislative productivity – has not found strong empirical support. We argue that previous research featured a disconnect between the exclusively ideological theory and tests that relied on outcome variables that were not purely ideological. We remedy this by dividing landmark laws (Mayhew) into two counts – those that invoke ideological preferences and those that do not – and uncover results consistent with Pivotal Politics’ core prediction: the size of the gridlock interval is negatively related to the production of ideological legislation. We also find that the size of the gridlock zone is positively related to the production of nonideological legislation. These results hold up in the face of various sensitivity analyses and robustness checks. We further show that Pivotal Politics explains variation in ideological legislation better than alternative theories based on partisan agenda control.

Given pervasive gridlock at the national level, state legislatures are increasingly the place where notable policy change occurs. Investigating such change is difficult because it is often hard to characterise policy change and use observable data to evaluate theoretical predictions; it is subsequently unclear whether law-making explanations focusing on the US Congress also apply to state legislatures. We use several measures of state policy outcomes to examine lawmaking in state legislatures across nearly two decades, and we argue for using simulation studies to connect theoretical predictions to empirical specifications and help interpret the theoretical relevance of estimated correlations. Doing so reveals that the observed law-making outcomes we study are most consistent with law-making models emphasising the importance of the chamber median and the powers of the governor rather than those that focus on the preferences of the majority party.

What explains national preferences concerning international and regional financial regulation? This article focusses on one of the main financial jurisdictions worldwide, the United Kingdom (UK). It is puzzling that since the crisis this jurisdiction has pursued stringent harmonised regulation in certain areas (banking), but not others (capital markets). We explain this in terms of how the demands of powerful economic interests are mediated by the political process and regulatory institutions. In banking, there was strong political pressure to restore financial stability, and regulatory institutions were significantly strengthened. This enabled UK regulators to resist industry lobbying and pursue more stringent harmonised rules at the international and European Union levels (“trading up”). In the case of capital markets, by contrast, UK regulators lacked political support for tougher regulation and were institutionally much weaker. As a result, the industry was far more effective in shaping UK preferences aimed at protecting the sector’s competitiveness (“trading down”).