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How cultural framing can bias our beliefs about robots and artificial intelligence
Published online by Cambridge University Press: 05 April 2023
Abstract
Clark and Fischer argue that humans treat social artifacts as depictions. In contrast, theories of distributed cognition suggest that there is no clear line separating artifacts from agents, and artifacts can possess agency. The difference is likely a result of cultural framing. As technology and artificial intelligence grow more sophisticated, the distinction between depiction and agency will blur.
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- Copyright © The Author(s), 2023. Published by Cambridge University Press
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Target article
Social robots as depictions of social agents
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Author response
On depicting social agents