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The Not So Brilliant Future of International Cartels

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  17 August 2021

Alain Verbeke*
Affiliation:
University of Calgary, Canada Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium University of Reading, UK
Caroline Buts
Affiliation:
Vrije Universiteit Brussel, Belgium
*
Corresponding author: Alain Verbeke ([email protected])

Abstract

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Type
Article Commentary
Copyright
Copyright © The Author(s), 2021. Published by Cambridge University Press on behalf of The International Association for Chinese Management Research

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Footnotes

accepted by Editor-in-Chief Arie Y. Lewin

References

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