Social Security benefits may be commenced at any time between ages 62 and 70. As individuals who claim later can, on average, expect to receive benefits for a shorter period, an actuarial adjustment is made to the monthly benefit to reflect the age at which benefits are claimed. We investigate the actuarial fairness of that adjustment in light of recent improvements in mortality and historically low interest rates. We show that delaying is actuarially advantageous for a large number of people, even for individuals with mortality rates that are twice the average. At real interest rates closer to their historical average, singles with mortality that is substantially greater than average do not benefit from delay, although primary earners with high mortality can still improve the present value of the household's benefits through delay. We also investigate the extent to which the actuarial advantage of delay has grown since the early 1960s, when the choice of when to claim first became available, and we decompose this growth into three effects: (1) the effect of changes in Social Security's rules, (2) the effect of changes in the real interest rate, and (3) the effect of changes in life expectancy. Finally, we quantify the extent to which the gains from delay can be expected to increase in the future as a result of mortality improvements.

Labor force participation among Mexican males in their early retirement years (60–64 years of age) has decreased in recent decades, from 94.6% in 1960 to 65.2% in 2010. Similar trends are evident elsewhere in Latin America, and have occurred in the developed world. Such trends pose challenges to the financial sustainability of social security systems as working-age populations decrease and those in retirement increase both because of demographic trends and decisions to take early retirement. In this study, we find that the Mexican social security system provides incentives to retire early. The retirement incentives of the Mexican social security system affect retirement behavior, and may be one of the main contributors to early retirement decisions, particularly for lower-income populations. We simulated the effect of the reform from a pay-as-you-go to the new Personal Retirement Accounts (PRA) system and we find that the PRA system also provides incentives for early retirement. Further analysis is needed to assess the financial sustainability of the social security system and financial security in old age for the largest cohorts in Mexico that will begin to retire by 2040.

We analyse the impacts of changing employment patterns and pension reforms on the future level of public pensions across birth cohorts in Germany. The analysis is based on a microsimulation model and a rich data set that combines household survey data from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP) and process-produced microdata from the German pension insurance. We account for cohort effects in individual employment and unemployment affecting earnings over the life cycle as well as the differential impact of recent pension reforms. For individuals born between 1937 and 1971, cohort effects vary greatly by region, gender and education, and strongly affect life cycle earnings profiles. The largest effects can be observed for younger cohorts in East Germany and for the low educated. Using simulated life cycle employment and income profiles, we project gross future pensions across cohorts taking into account changing demographics and recent pension reforms. Simulations show that pension levels for East German men and women will fall dramatically among younger birth cohorts, not only because of policy reforms but also due to higher cumulated unemployment. For West German men, the small reduction of average pension levels among younger birth cohorts is mainly driven by the impact of pension reforms, while future pension levels of West German women are increasing or stable due to rising labour market participation of younger birth cohorts.

Collective pension schemes are the dominant form of saving for retirement in the Netherlands. We investigate the introduction of individual choices into a collective pension system without affecting the generally accepted advantages of a collective agreement. Increasing individual choices can be beneficial, as it prevents pension plans from making decisions for the average plan participant that may not be optimal for individual participants. We argue for a system in which individuals choose from a set of low-cost balanced index funds, together with a level of intergenerational guarantees that are exchange-traded. This system maintains the two primary advantages of collective agreements: risk sharing and low implementation costs, while facilitating different risk taking behavior at the individual level. To facilitate individual choices within collective pension schemes, it is important to enhance the transparency associated with intergenerational guarantees to all participants in the scheme, both in terms of their price and quantity. We argue that the current system, in which long-term guarantees are given by the young to the old within a specific fund but not across pension funds, is not transparent and we argue that it can be suboptimal. We propose a system of Pension Guarantee Exchanges (PGEs) that increase transparency and allow pension funds with different age distributions to trade with each other. Knowing the price of such guarantees facilitates the introduction of individual portfolio choices within collective pension schemes.