On first approaching Chinese immigration in the Nanyang, namely the Southern Sea, i.e., the vast Southeast Asian region stretching from Vietnam to the Philippines including Thailand, the Malacca Peninsula, Sarawak, Brunei, Sabah, and the Indonesian archipelago, one might tend to view the many communities as a single diasporic entity, rather homogeneous both socially and culturally. This viewpoint, however, would be very inaccurate and may rightly be identified as a methodological nationalism (Reference Wimmer and Glick SchillerWimmer and Glick Schiller, 2002: 30 ff.), i.e., an essentialist slant by which continental and immigrant Chinese have always been considered a single unit.
Through the analysis of our long-term field observations in Penang, together with the extensive historical and socio-anthropological literature regarding this seaport on the northern access to the Strait of Malacca, we will illustrate the social and cultural complexity of the Chinese community, which to this day still represents the majority of the population on the island of Penang.
From a theoretical point of view this entails accurately pinpointing the notion of diaspora since its definition is often taken for granted, thus often applied uncritically or inconsistently. On this point, we need only mention the more widely known though not always congruent or univocal conceptions of diaspora (Reference SafranSafran, 1991; Reference CohenCohen, 1997; Reference CliffordClifford, 1994: 302ff.; Reference TölölyanTölölyan, 1991; Reference TölölyanTölölyan, 2007: 647ff.; Reference PrévélakisPrévélakis, 1996).
Instead of dwelling on the system of representations and ethical-religious symbolic aspects, this article, therefore, will focus on forms of social organization created over the longue durée (Reference Braudel and HoneggerBraudel, 1977: 47ff.) by the Chinese communities in the Nanyang. Accordingly, we will show how their social organization, according to the distinction put forward by a number of representatives of the Manchester School founded by Max Gluckman (Reference MitchellMitchell, 1969), is essentially based on corporate groups, i.e., formal and institutionalized associations, factions, i.e. conflictual coalitions, and on extended networks, i.e., more informal, flexible, and dynamic personalized configurations. These organizational elements have turned out to be a crucial resource for the undisputed economic success of the Southeast Asian Chinese diaspora which gave rise to many animosities and envies in the other native and immigrant ethnic groups with whom it was in close proximity from a territorial point of view as well. It is a well-known fact that the Chinese success in this region led to bloody persecutions culminating in full-fledged pogroms as in the May 13, 1969 incidents in Malaysia and tragic events in Indonesia despite this country's renowned tolerance in terms of ethno-cultural diversity.
Ethnicity and urban territorial organization in Penang's society
George Town, by now known as Penang, was founded for strategic reasons by the British East India Company in 1786 on the island of Pulau Pinang (at the northern passage of the Strait of Malacca). During the entire colonial period the British encouraged immigration from various continents (Chinese, Indians, Burmese, Malay, Thai, Javanese, Bugis from Sulawesi, Aceh from Sumatra, Arabs from Hadhramaut, as well as Armenians, Jews etc.). Consequently, speaking about past and current Penangite society in terms of a society of diasporas is certainly accurate. Despite this impressive ethno-cultural diversity, from the onset the Chinese have been the numerically most relevant community in George Town's urban area.
Relations between the various groups were chiefly dictated by economic interests. Up until the end of the 19th century, the feeling of belonging to a specific ethnic group was barely unfolding. Ever since the founding of Penang in 1786, the British colonial empire had based its domination policy on the divide et impera doctrine by encouraging divisions amongst the various ethnic groups of Pulau Pinang's society and George Town in particular.
This separation policy was matched by the communities’ territorial segregation, each one living in its own district managed by a kapitan who was overseen by colonial authorities and belonged to the corresponding ethnic group. Of either Chinese, Indian, or Malay origin, the kapitan was very familiar with the situation within his own territory and acted as liaison officer between colonial powers and the community. In the end, he was also a representative of the Crown within the social and physical sphere of which he was in charge.
Therefore, Penang's socio-economic and cultural configuration had the following characteristics:
• a spatial separation among the system's various groups, each with its institutions and infrastructures within a specific territory;
• a division of labor on an ethnic basis that corresponded to social inequality among individuals. Especially in British Malaya and in the Straits Settlements, there was a strong correlation between ethnic belonging, social status, and economic standing (Reference Shamsul and GladneyShamsul, 1998: 142).
Chinese cultural complexities in Penang
Chinese immigrants to Penang came mainly from regions more or less associated with the southern coast of the vast empire. Yet, upon arriving in Penang, their cultural and especially linguistic differences were highly noticeable and to a lesser degree still are to this day.
Nowadays, besides social disparities within the community that sprang from different causes linked both to their time of arrival and to their previous status in their society of origin, George Town Chinese belonged to five creeds (Buddhist, Taoist, Confucian, Muslim, and Christian), and at least eight linguistic groups (Reference KüchlerKüchler, 1968: 89).
In fact, there are at least five, better yet six major groups that to this day constitute Penang's Chinese diaspora. First of all, there are the Hokkien from the southern part of the Fujian province who became and still are the largest group by far in Penang. Being Hokkien means being regarded as Han, i.e., an ethnic Chinese, but also one who speaks a specific language, distinct from Mandarin Chinese and from the neighbouring vernacular idioms of the other groups that make up the Penangite diaspora. The written characters of everyday expressions, too, are not identical to Mandarin Chinese ones.
The second group in terms of numbers and economic importance in Penang's Chinese community is the Cantonese one. Actually, the term Cantonese is improper since they came not only from Canton but also from the entire province of Guangdong whose capital and most important city is Canton. Though unanimously regarded as ethnic Han, their language is not Mandarin Chinese, but a specific vernacular practically unintelligible to the other groups including the Hokkien. In short, communication between Penang's two most important Chinese groups is not that simple. If a Hokkien and a Cantonese wish or need to communicate, they will not be able to use Mandarin Chinese, unless they attended the more or less private schools where this language is taught. Communication will be in English or in Bahasa Malaysia, the two languages learnt at the public schools. Clearly, English will be the language of choice, probably with a Manglish (Malaysian English) connotation.
Linguistically speaking, the Teochew, originally from Chaoshan, a region in eastern Guangdong bordering with Fujian, are closely related to the Hokkien, although understanding each other may be difficult especially since current Hokkien is peppered with Malay expressions. In this case as well, the language commonly used to communicate with other groups is chiefly English. The Teochew are especially proud of their specific culture, which they regard as distinct from that of the other components of the Chinese community. Accordingly, they emphasize the characteristics of their opera compositions, music, gastronomy, embroidery etc. As with all the other groups, the Teochew display a strategy aimed at creating distinctions within the Chinese community via language and culture.
The Hakka may be regarded as migrants par excellence. The denomination Hakka itself points to this specific status since it means visitor and/or wayfarer. Originally from northern China and settling first in central China, through a series of migrations they reached southern China. From here, some moved on to the Nanyang thus arriving to Penang where they set up their own community. In fact, though the Hakka are regarded as ethnic Han, they have their own vernacular that is not understood by the other groups of Penang's Chinese community. They, too, have their own cultural specificities since the Hakka were chiefly farmers, an activity they continued to practice in Penang as well in accordance with their own traditions and customs. As migrants in the Guangdong, relations with the Cantonese had always been problematic and tense, although these frictions appear to be somewhat inconsequential in Penang. Some Hakka decided not to be farmers and went on to become successful merchants.
At this point we also need to mention the Hainanese who at one time were fishermen along the coasts of Guangdong and Fujian and settled on Hainan Island. Despite their initial proximity with the Hokkien, Cantonese, and Teochew, their vernacular is unintelligible to these three groups. Renowned for their excellent culinary traditions, they were employed by the colonial elite as cooks and restaurateurs. To this day, Hainanese cuisine is highly regarded in Penang.
Finally, to this tentative classification of Chinese diversity in Penang we ought to add the Peranakan or Baba Nyonya. While the term Baba Nyonya is specific, Peranakan has more than one meaning. On the one hand it indicates the Straits Chinese or the Chinese of the Nanyang, while on the other hand it can simply indicate the first Chinese emigrants to the British colonies in the Strait of Malacca. In this context we will use the narrower definition of Peranakan, i.e., as synonymous of Baba Nyonya. The first Chinese emigrants to Penang, i.e., the Baba, were chiefly young single men who married Malay women, i.e., the Nyonya, who were often of Muslim faith. These intermarriages generated a creolized cultural complex in which Chinese culture blended with the Malay one. Verbal expressions, culinary traditions, and attire are only the more noticeable expressions of the blending of these two cultures. Having achieved a significant economic success, the Baba Nyonya or Peranakan became a highly elite group with a cosmopolitan lifestyle quite different and distinct from that of the, so to speak, average Chinese. Nowadays the Baba Nyonya are very proud of their specificity and diversity with reference to both the Chinese and the Malay culture, yet they acknowledge an undeniable kinship.
Several incidents confirm that relations between the various Chinese communities were frequently problematic, at times discordant, and generally strained. The following example is emblematic. Up to the late 19th century there was a harsh commercial rivalry between Chinese clans from the Hokkien province and those from Canton. This brought on recurrent conflicts, violent ones as well, between the two groups that disrupted public order in George Town's city center and caused quite a few headaches to the British colonial administration. Moreover, the historical fact is that during these out-and-out wars between Chinese clans the Aceh merchants repeatedly sided with the Hokkien entrepreneurs simply because the two groups shared well-tested commercial relations that guaranteed steady dealings between Arabia and China, i.e., the vital cornerstone of this small Malay community's economic prosperity. Linguistic, religious, and overall cultural differences were certainly not negligible, but were left in the background. In any case, the Buddhist-Taoist Chinese from Hokkien had no qualms about joining forces with Muslims from Aceh to foil the loathed and likewise Buddhist-Taoist Cantonese, who responded however in kind.
Social organization of the Chinese diaspora in Penang: corporate groups, factions, and networks
Given the still existing significant sociocultural differentiation, several characteristics of diasporic phenomena as defined by the most qualified experts can hardly be detected nowadays in Penang's Chinese community.
In fact, speaking about a traumatic dispersion from a place regarded as one's homeland towards two or more foreign countries would be excessive (Reference CohenCohen, 1997: 26). Present-day Chinese do not perceive their ancestors’ emigration to Penang as the result of a violent persecution associated with a possible genocide threat. The current generations, on the contrary, retain an historical memory of a by now very remote emigration due mainly to economic reasons, which is both rather indistinct and rarely expressed, except by those specialists engaged in reconstructing the past. The Chinese community tends, instead, to underscore its subaltern political status compared with the Malays’ within the current Federation of Malaysia. Yet, this discrimination is accepted, albeit grudgingly, by virtue of the social contract and identity bargaining on which the current balance of power between the various ethnic communities that form this nation of nations is based. We need to add, though, that after all the prime minister of the State of Penang is Chinese.
Penang's Chinese are conscious of their origins, thus, under this aspect, they also share a collective memory especially about their region (Fujian, Guangdong, Hainan etc.) and village of origin (Reference CohenCohen, 1997: 26). Yet, any reference to a myth and idealization of one's fabled or actual homeland would be a gross exaggeration. Therefore, there is no commitment to maintain, restore, safeguard, and enrich it. For many generations Penang has been the Chinese community's true homeland, as proven by the latter's endeavours to have George Town with its magnificent Chinatown inscribed in UNESCO's World Heritage List in 2008.
Amongst the various components of Penang's Chinese community there is no trace of a plan for a collective return to the homeland (Reference CohenCohen, 1997: 26). After the transition in the People's Republic from Maoist communism to a capitalist free-market economy, trips to this country are at most temporary and aimed at profitable business, with the advantage over others of knowing some of the local idioms (Mandarin Chinese, Hokkien, Cantonese etc.).
In Penang, as elsewhere, the Chinese certainly share a long-standing collective consciousness sustained by a feeling of distinction and the awareness of a common history and fate (Reference CohenCohen, 1997: 26). Yet, Chineseness is displayed essentially at a national level, especially in the political sphere, in order to underscore differences with the Malays or the other ethnic groups that make up Malaysia. On these occasions, belonging to the Chinese community is expressed via a hyphenated identity, i.e., with the term Malaysian-Chinese, thus underscoring not only one's Chinese descent, but also that one considers oneself a Malaysian citizen (Reference FarkasFarkas, 2009: 122) At a local level, instead, the tendency is to demonstratively stage regional differences from the Hokkien, Cantonese, Teochew etc.
Penangites are undoubtedly aware of a kinship with Chinese in other immigration countries, yet this doesn’t necessarily imply a transnational feeling of empathy and solidarity (Reference CohenCohen, 1997: 26). As an example, Singaporean-Chinese are regarded as being very different and are perceived as conceited, probably due precisely to their commercial success.
Finally, Penang's Chinese are alive to their cultural richness that finds expression both in architectural forms such as the clan temples and shophouses and in ancestral traditions such as New Year's celebrations as well as the Hungry Ghost Festival with its picturesque performances in George Town's various districts. They also take pride in their various traditional medicine practices showcased in a special museum. Therefore, they are aware of the specific enrichment they bring to Malaysian society, which, in turn, by defining itself as multicultural and multiethnic, cannot but be attuned to tolerance towards diversity and cultural plurality. And yet, relations between the Malay majority and the Chinese minority are riddled with constant tensions, especially at a national level. Despite these troubled relations, Penang's Chinese community does not feel threatened by possible devastating events such as forced expulsion, ethnic cleansing or, worse still, physical annihilation (Reference CohenCohen, 1997: 26).
The Chinese community in Penang is a sui generis diaspora especially because of its internal diversity. Therefore, we shall now focus on its specific social organization by drawing upon the theoretic and conceptual notions developed at the Manchester School (Reference MitchellMitchell, 1969; Reference Boissevain and MitchellBoissevain and Mitchell, 1973; Reference BoissevainBoissevain, 1974). Examining the social organization is, however, tantamount to drawing attention to differentiations within a community.
In the past as well as in the present, this Chinese diaspora is characterized essentially by three types of social organization: corporate groups, factions, and personalized networks. Clearly, in a specific configuration a single actor could belong to all three since they intersect each other; therefore, all three types can be isolated solely in terms of ideal type.
In the past and to this day, Penang's Chinese have had an amazing number of powerful corporate groups represented by the sworn brotherhoods often located within or adjacent to individual temples. Whereas colonial power rightly or not regarded these associations as secret societies and European observers equated them to Western Freemasonry, they actually played a crucial economic role in the Chinese diaspora, even after British colonial administration formally abolished them in 1890 yet never truly succeeded in stamping them out. Strictly speaking, they did not disband but rather changed form (Reference DeBernardiDeBernardi, 2009; Reference MusaMusa, 2007). In fact, in the 1960s Wilfred Blythe still noted that it was practically impossible to eradicate the sworn brotherhoods by law since they are too deeply embedded in the Chinese cultural background (Reference BlytheBlythe, 1969: 11). This opinion is possibly too radical and Orientalistic, yet the fact remains that the sworn brotherhoods changed their names into associations whose members had clanic or regional ties (Reference TanTan, 2007: 47). Although no longer as secretive as before, some of these corporate groups still play a considerable economic role in the Chinese diaspora, especially in the management of the lucrative business relations with China following the end of the Maoist era and the advent of a capitalist market economy.
Historically speaking, Penang's sworn brotherhoods appeared with the arrival of the first Chinese immigrants, since there is evidence that the first of these corporate groups was formally founded in 1801 (Reference DeBernardiDeBernardi, 2009: 57). These associations were established for charity purposes, self-defense and protection, as well as against the possible threat of evil spirits (Reference DeBernardiDeBernardi, 2009: 56). Soon enough, though, these secret societies started to operate also in Penang's economic sphere, especially by controlling illegal activities such as those linked to gambling, prostitution, and later on to opium and alcohol trafficking as well. Consequently, the sworn brotherhoods were also linked to the world of contraband. In time, some of these secret societies turned into outright criminal associations, rightly or not regarded as akin to Mafia organizations (Reference DeBernardiDeBernardi, 2009: 77).
Yet, these corporate groups should not be regarded as being active solely in the field of illegality since their main concern was in very diversified transnational commercial dealings, aside from the illegal ones, which, however, were not all that marginal.
Some authors have highlighted that during the 19th century and in the first decade of the 20th century along with economic activities there were also political ones with an anti-dynastic and anti-imperial agenda clearly aimed at the ruling Qing dynasty in China (Reference Murray and QinMurray & Qin, 1994: 142ff.). Giving too much relevance to the Chinese secret societies’ rebellious trait, however, would be a sheer exercise in methodological romanticism since they were definitely less politicized than other similar organizations. Yet, a closer look at the more recent political role of the sworn brotherhoods reveals that after World War II they had political ties with the nationalist Kuomintang or with the Malayan Communist Party, thus substantiating that Penang's Chinese diaspora was ideologically divided (Reference Leong and GuanLeong, 2009: 224ff.).
But the main interest of the sworn brotherhoods was achieving economic prosperity, not necessarily via lawful means alone. Actually, in Penang these associations have been the means to amass considerable fortunes, especially for some of their most prominent members.
These corporate groups were associations, which, as Max Weber would say, were just barely open towards the outside (Reference WeberWeber, 1956, 1: 26). Full-fledged affiliation to a sworn brotherhood was preceded by complex initiation rituals characterized by gruelling night-time ceremonies so that the newcomers would be awed into respecting both the group's behaviour code and the leaders’ seemingly divine authority (Reference DeBernardiDeBernardi, 2009: 79). Being a member of a sworn brotherhood implied total obedience, though in return one could rely on a convenient safety net if need be. It is a known fact that ever since the first half of the 19th century these corporate groups arrogated to themselves the privilege of passing judgment on cases involving their own members. This led to an actual situation of legal pluralism, much to the legal authorities’ disapproval.
These brief notes on the activities and social practices of the sworn brotherhoods illustrate that these associations undeniably played a key role in Penang's Chinese diaspora since due precisely to their strong internal social cohesion and their rigorous patriarchic discipline rooted in Confucianism they turned out to be a crucial resource for this community's enduring economic success. Along with the sworn brotherhoods, nowadays in Penang other corporate groups, such as the powerful Chinese Chamber of Commerce, for example, also play a crucial role in the economic activities of the Chinese (Reference TanTan, 2007: 49). The Chinese diaspora's economic success had been noticed by observers ever since colonial times and construed with a derogatory connotation. Thus Penang's Chinese were portrayed as greedy capitalists willing to do any type of business, who, due to their hedonism, lacked the ethical substratum of Protestant asceticism (Reference DeBernardiDeBernardi, 2009: 68ff.). The other ethnic communities that make up Penang's society, however, still have this negative perception, especially the Malays who as Muslims have rigorous business ethics, in principle at least.
Yet, we should not assume that relations among Penang's various sworn brotherhoods were harmonious; on the contrary, between some of them there were fierce rivalries and at times out-and-out conflicts. This is why with good reason we need also mention factions along with the sworn brotherhoods as important forms of social organization within Penang's Chinese diaspora. In line with Boissevain's conceptions, a faction may be defined as a temporary alliance between unconnected people or groups for finite purposes also in terms of time (Reference BoissevainBoissevain, 1974: 171). Accordingly, a faction is a specific type of coalition mustered by one or more notables for reasons strictly related to a political or economic conflict against rivals with a more or less equal social status. As a rule, the factions that emerged in Penang, primarily revolving around acknowledged leaders of the sworn brotherhoods, were extensions of the latter with a sheer economic purpose.
The personalized recruitment on behalf of the notables, who are also pivotal and influential characters within the faction, occurs chiefly in accordance with various criteria, which include family relationships (clanic in Penang), neighbourhood and friendship relationships (if need be solely instrumental), and economic partnerships (Reference BoissevainBoissevain, 1974: 192). All these forms of social relationships have been extremely significant in the formation of Penang's Chinese coalitions in conflict. Finally, we need to mention the strongly personalized hierarchic ties between a faction's leader and his followers by which the latter are willing to mobilize the support of friends and acquaintances of their own network of relationships. Therefore, relations between faction-leaders and their acolytes are chiefly transactional, though moral-based ties are not uncommon (Reference BoissevainBoissevain, 1974: 192).
The factions’ role within the Chinese diaspora would come glaringly to the fore especially in times of open conflicts that jeopardized law and order. This occurred during the Penang riots in 1864 when the age-old enmity and permanent tension between two sworn brotherhoods escalated into an armed conflict together with mutual acts of retaliation such as torchings, thefts, robberies, and even beheadings (Reference MusaMusa, 2007: 67). Yet, it was not a confrontation between two corporate groups, but rather a conflict between factions. The adversaries, in fact, included not only members of the two sworn brotherhoods, but also members of rival Malay secret societies who took an active part in the riots in coalition with members of one or the other Chinese associations. Still, the conflict between factions that emerged during the riots is representative of the ongoing rivalry between the Hokkien (with part of the Hakka as allies) and the Cantonese (Reference MusaMusa, 2007: 68).
Finally, we will touch on the role of personalized networks as the third essential type of social organization of Penang's Chinese diaspora. By networks we mean a system of social relationships beyond the confines of corporate groups, which instead are governed by strict membership criteria and clear-cut boundaries between members and non-members. A network has a more flexible structure, probably more temporary, thus less institutionalized in which, thanks to their chiefly personal links, the single actors generally trade information and carry out various types of transactions (Reference Mitchell, Boissevain and MitchellMitchell, 1973: 23ff.). Yet, networks and corporate groups are not necessarily mutually exclusive (Reference Mitchell, Boissevain and MitchellMitchell, 1973: 34). In fact, there can very well be specific networks within a corporate group, while a network can link together a number of corporate groups, for example via relationships between their leaders or emissaries.
As far as Penang's Chinese diaspora is concerned, Wong Yee Tuan has accurately shown how it was integrated into a very complex system of regional and likewise transnational networks, that was highly efficient in terms of commercial dealings (Reference WongWong 2007: 106ff.; Reference Wong2008: 1ff.). The basis of these networks is clanic affiliation in the first place, in this case affiliation with the five most powerful Hokkien clans in Penang, still known as the big five. These were the Khoo, Cheah, Yeoh, Lim, and Tan clans together with their counterparts located in the vast region that from the Strait of Malacca stretched northeast of Sumatra (now Indonesia), southwest of Siam (now Thailand) to the southern part of Burma (now Myanmar), and last but not least to the small sultanates along the western coast of the Malay Peninsula. Though vying with each other, these networks are known to have practically controlled commerce in the entire region, amassing considerable economic fortunes. The presence of these networks, however, has also helped and continues to significantly help keep alive the Hokkien cultural specificities in this region.
Conclusion: on the usefulness of the notion of diaspora
The notion of diaspora is currently widely popular, thus generating some confusion since it is often overtly or covertly tagged with both negative and positive ideological connotations. This article, instead, aims to show that the term diaspora may be very useful with a diversified conception. The almost classic example of a Chinese community, in this case Penang's community in Malaysia, helps to draw attention especially to its complex social organization, which internally is highly differentiated and not without tensions, rivalries, and even open and at times enduring conflicts. Thus, the article avoids an essentialist vision based on a uniformity and cultural unity of these immigrant communities. An analysis free from conceptual mystifications, however, can be achieved solely with longue durée ethnographic research, since at first glance these diasporas, including the Chinese one, may appear to be strongly united communities characterized by social and cultural homogeneity. Empirical data, instead, confirms that this initial impression is deceptive if not indeed mendacious.
Funding
This article is based on empirical research supported by a Marie Curie International Research Staff Exchange Scheme Fellowship within the 7th European Community Framework Programme (grant no: PIRSES-GA-2012-318961).
