This paper pushes against the successful rhetoric of formal equality by which same-sex couples are the same as different-sex couples and opening existing regimes of marriage to them best recognises their equal moral worth. Drawing on social science research that indicates differences in the economic organisation of same-sex couples, the paper explores the possibility that a different marriage regime for the spouses' reciprocal duties might combine recognition of their equal moral worth with sensitivity to their needs. The study sharpens the understanding of contemporary investments in marriage law for everyone and offers a better justification for formal equality: same-sex couples may be treated identically to different-sex couples not because they are the same, but despite their differences.

The idea of ‘human dignity’ is, notoriously, as ambiguous as it is compelling. Notwithstanding the absence of any clear or settled definition of human dignity, either in the abstract or in terms of what it means in practice, it is an idea which takes pride of place in international legal documents, in judicial reasoning, and in scholarship across a range of disciplines, where it seems, particularly in recent years, to have become the focus for an explosion of academic interest and an accompanying proliferation of literature. Much of the existing literature attempts to uncover the meaning, or multiple meanings, of ‘human dignity’, focusing on the uncertainty surrounding the substance or content of the idea and trying to compose a catalogue of use-types. In this paper, my primary aim will be to address another type of uncertainty, namely uncertainty about the role, function or status within legal frameworks of the ‘dignity norm’ – the norm requiring respect for human dignity. I want to explore several possibilities: first, that the dignity norm is simply a proxy for respect for autonomy; second, that it is a right in the sense that we can speak of a specific ‘right to have dignity respected’; and third, that it is a legal principle. Having problematised each of these in turn, I will contend that the function of the dignity norm is best captured by describing it as the ‘substantive basic norm’ of the legal systems wherein it appears.

The goal of this paper is to demonstrate the viability and potential of conceptual analysis as a methodological tool. It is argued that conceptual analysis represents a flexible and open method for connecting public law with analyses that are different, and even incommensurable with its own epistemology. The particular area that this paper seeks to connect public law with is that of feminist critiques. It is a journey that does not occur without some difficulty. Conceptual analysis is unknown within public law and therefore the notion requires defining and explaining. Public law has also been particularly resistant to the inclusion of feminist critiques and therefore the task of identifying suitable concepts is not straightforward. The outcome is, however, not only the identification of a new methodological tool for public lawyers but the capacity to broaden the range of material that can be incorporated within their analyses.

A woman's freedom to develop her personality or identity as she sees fit is supposed to be legally protected in twenty-first century Europe. The European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) provides a right to respect for one's private life in Article 8 which has been judicially interpreted to provide a right to identity or personality development. Additionally, Article 14 provides for non-discrimination and Articles 9 and 10 for freedom of expression, including that which is religious. Arguments are examined of some different interpretations of the overall purpose of human rights law − to respect human dignity and human freedom. These are examined by reference to the recent criminalisation of wearing face coverings in public places in certain European countries where the intention is to prevent the wearing of the Islamic full-face veil.1 It is argued that each woman's identity is legally recognised when the concepts of human dignity and human freedom are interpreted as empowering and self-determining rather than constraining and paternalistic. Legally banning full-face veils, in liberal democracies in situations where an adult woman says she has freely chosen to wear such a garment, misrecognises her and disrespects her identity or personality: as a human being, as a member of a religious or cultural group and as an individual person capable of subjectively interpreting her own identity or personality as she sees fit.

This paper examines the regulation of ‘personhood’ through the granting or denying of legal capacity. It explores the development of the concept of personhood through the lens of moral and political philosophy. It highlights the problem of upholding cognition as a prerequisite for personhood or the granting of legal capacity because it results in the exclusion of people with cognitive disabilities (intellectual, psycho-social, mental disabilities, and others). The United Nations Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD) challenges this notion by guaranteeing respect for the right to legal capacity for people with disabilities on an equal basis with others and in all areas of life (Article 12). The paper uses the CRPD to argue for a conception of personhood that is divorced from cognition and a corresponding recognition of legal capacity as a universal attribute that all persons possess. Finally, a support model for the exercise of legal capacity is proposed as a possible alternative to the existing models of substituted decision-making that deny legal capacity and impose outside decision-makers.

Asylum applicants in the UK must show, to a ‘reasonable degree of likelihood’, a well-founded fear of persecution, on the basis of race, religion, political opinion or membership of a particular social group, in the event of return ‘home’. This requirement presents myriad challenges both to claimants and decision-makers. Based on findings from a three-year national study, funded by the Nuffield Foundation, this paper explores those challenges as they relate to women seeking asylum in the UK whose applications include an allegation of rape. The study explored the extent to which difficulties relating to disclosure and credibility, which are well documented in the context of women's sexual assault allegations in the criminal justice system, might be replicated and compounded for female asylum-seekers whose applications include a claim of rape. Findings suggest that the structural and practical obstacles faced in establishing credibility, and the existence of scepticism about rape claims and asylum-seeking more generally, mean that decision-making can often be experienced as arbitrary, unjust, uninformed or contradictory, making it difficult for women asylum applicants who allege rape to find refuge in the UK.