Should churches, to the extent that they have economic muscle, use it to attack specific social evils and to support specific ethical ideals? The deepening involvement of religions bodies in social problems has brought them face to face with an old quandry in a new guise.’ Are there really two realms, God's and Mammon's, or is there only one a kingdom of heaven on earth to be established at least in part by judicious combinations of moral right and economic might?

In the current wave of conscientious objection, draft refusal, pacifism, crypto-pacifism and simple concern with war and morality, it is noteworthy that informed discussion of “just war” theory has been at a minimum, Tiiis fact is worth examining within a somewhat wider philosophical dimension than is perhaps customary.

The notion of “just war” represents an aspect of classical, even Hellenic ethical theory. In it the emphasis is macrocosmic, taking as its starting point the community considered as an organic whole, and seeking the “common good” of that community. This search for “common good” necessarily entails a balancing of claims, rights and needs. Historically, such a calculus has for its goal a benevolent reasonableness in the society, a quality that has generally been termed justice.

"Christ, to be sure, gave His Church no proper mission in the political, economic, or social order, The purpose which He set before her is a religious one." This is a formulation which the Bishops of the Catholic Church asserted in the Conciliar document The Church in the Modern World in the chapter devoted to "The Fostering of Peace and the Promotion of a Community of Nations." From this statement one should not conclude to the political irrelevance of religion. Rather, he should seek further for the precise mode of that relevance; he will find it, I believe, in the religiously enlightened person acting politically.

When I was passing through England not long ago, a news photo in the Daily Telegraph caught my attention. The front page showed a picture of English students, the Cambridge Peace Action Group, carrying a sign before the married quarters area of the United States Air Force Base in Suffolk. “Wars will cease,” the banner logically proclaimed, “when men refuse to fight.”

Today, of course, when we see signs advising men to refuse to fight, we are almost always talking about the war in Vietnam. A good deal of information about the war in Vietnam, its history, its circumstances, and its problems is available to the general population. Everyone is aware of the Green Beret, of French colonialism, General Giap's theory of guerrilla warfare, the Seventh Fleet, Ho Chi Minh, napalm, Madam Nu, burning Buddhists, the bomb, the Gulf of Tonkin, General de Gaulle's theories, Dien Bien Phu, the Oakland Army Base, Cam Ramh Bay, the black market in Saigon, Viet Cong assassinations, the thousands of American dead, Senator Fulbright's Hearings, the elections in South Vietnam, the Geneva Conference, the 325th Division of the North Vietnamese Army, the Demarcation Zone, and General Ky's black flying suit with the purple scarf. These and a host of other images are never far from our Vietnamese reflections.

This winter the Council for Christian Social Action of the United Church of Christ opened an office for international development in Washington, D. C.—thc first such function to be sponsored by a Protestant denomination. The new office, established for the purpose of interpreting international development issues to the churches and educating them about the problems involved, will strive for further engagement of the churches in international development projects on three continents. The move reflects a growing trend among religious groups in this country to relate their commitments io organized efforts in international affairs and to take independent concrete actions, where necessary, in the interests of social justice.

This triple-authored, triple-published polemic against the war in Vietnam, shared by a Protestant, Jew and Catholic, is an attempt to rally the organized churches and synagogues of America to lead condemnation of what the writers consider an unequivocally immoral role the U.S. plays in this Southeast Asian conflict. As spokesmen for Clergy and Laymen Concerned About Vietnam, the arguments generally sum up the sense of “a clergy mobilization” by the group in Washington last January and February. Lots of people come away from Washington with odd impressions. After visiting government officials and legislators at that time, the authors came away with the impression that these policymakers would like to “engage in bold initiatives for a negotiated peace” but they were afraid to do so because they weren't sure public opinion “as a whole” would back them.

Accounts of litigations and debates over conscientious objection frequently mentioned the precedent of the Nuremberg and other war crimes trials. It is argued that if men may be tried and executed for participation in aggressive wars and illegal wartime acts there must be a moral right and duty to refuse such participation. Indeed, there should be a right to avoid possible trial as a war criminal, I will attempt to assess the validity of this argument generally and its relevance to the Freedom House characterization as a “fantasy” of individual interpretation of the prerogative of conscientious objection.

In support of its current policies in Vietnam, the American government submits its youthful male citizens to the classic demands of the nation-state at war: it demands that they be prepared to die for their country and that they be prepared to kill for their country. At die same time many of these young men face, in the college classroom, the demand that they analyze critically their nation's policies in Vietnam. How many young men are able to acknowledge the possibility that they may face death in Vietnam and at the same time are able to analyze critically the policies that lead to that possibility?

“Is military service in this country's armed forces an option exercisable solely at the discretion of the individual?”

A quick answer to this question would be to say: “That depends on his discretion.”

This is to say that whether an individual is apt rightfully to exercise the choice extended him by a system of optional service would depend on how his conscience — his discretion — has been formed and informed. Moreover, whether any government in securing the political common good could ever grant armed service at the discretion of individuals depends on whether the citizens of a nation are more like Socrates, who while suffering imprisonment and death for conscience's sake still effectually acknowledged “the conscience of the laws,” than they are like Sophists putting in individualistic claims that their own subjective opinion is the measure of truth.