It has been persistently demonstrated that militarily superior states that are engaged in wars with militarily inferior ones may end up on the losing side. Unlike the processes by which military capabilities are converted into control over resources, the so-called “paradoxical conflict outcomes” phenomenon is more severe than a lack of correspondence between control over resources and control over outcomes. The paradox of power involves cases in which increased control over resources actually causes reduced control over outcomes. Several of the theoretical examples of this paradox are taken from social choice theory. These examples are applied to the analysis of the outcome of the Balkan Wars of 1912–1913 and of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon in 1982. The implications of the power paradox for theories of international politics are briefly discussed.

Despite the past resilience of Mexico's authoritarian regime, the severity of the country's post-1982 economic crisis raises major questions concerning the future direction of Mexican politics. This review examines recent developments affecting two key members of the governing revolutionary coalition, the political elite and organized labor. The political elite's unity is potentially threatened by shifts in education and recruitment patterns, and widespread uncertainty regarding Mexico's economic future has produced the most serious intra-elite division since the early 1950s. Prolonged economic crisis has also placed severe strains on state-labor relations, and the government's implementation of a new development strategy may lead to a substantial redefinition of organized labor's overall position in the Mexican regime. These changes pose significant challenges to the political elite's ability to preserve a broad-based governing coalition and political openness while managing the economic crisis and conflicting development priorities.

Studies of state institutions in socialist countries demonstrate the inadequacy of current paradigms of the state. Political reforms within these states—like those examined in the works on Yugoslavia that are under review—present opportunities to develop new approaches. Arguments about the democratizing pressures of economic reform or the attempts to legitimize the state by resolving the national question are contrasted to a view of the state as primarily managing its international boundary. Leaders respond to changes in foreign finance, trade, and security with policy shifts that are institutionalized by altering budgetary jurisdictions and rules about spending decisions in both state and economy. The ensuing political conflicts are bounded by the leaders' Marxian project to socialize the state as well as capital, in effect reducing the scope of the federal budget.