The purpose of this article is, first, to analyze certain of the obstacles JL that have principally impeded progress on the subject of disarmament over the past fifteen years and more; secondly, to suggest that these difficulties may be less likely to frustrate the conclusion of limited agreements in the field of conventional weapons alone than of the more comprehensive type of agreement that has been chiefly discussed; thirdly, to try to demonstrate that, so long as comprehensive disarmament remains unattainable, progress in regard to conventional weapons is not only more easily to be achieved but more valuable than progress in other spheres; and, finally, to discuss some of the particular fields in which it might be possible to reach useful agreements within this sphere.

EVER since the Berlin blockade of 1948–1949, the author has been asked on a number of occasions to explain how the zonal boundaries in Germany came to be drawn and why Berlin was left as an island in the Communist sea. A brief and simple answer was found to be impossible for several reasons: First, the Department of State does not have all the pertinent records, since the Department was not included in all of the negotiations on this subject. Second, some parts of the story do not seem to be documented adequately in any official records, with the result that certain aspects of the subject are open to controversial interpretations. Third, not only is the story of these negotiations complicated in itself, being woven from several separate strands, but it can only be explained in the larger framework of the overall planning for the occupation of Germany. Despite these many limitations and difficulties, the author has felt that he should attempt to set down as complete and objective an answer as he could to the persistent queries which this subject has evoked. The result is the present article.

This article represents an attempt to describe Soviet society, and JL particularly the Soviet political system, in terms of a typology of society based on modes of coordinating social activity. It is felt that this approach may be of value in pointing up both some of the similarities and some of the differences between Communist and non-Communist industrialized societies.

In A television interview not long after the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962, President Kennedy observed that both the United States and the Soviet Union had made serious miscalculations in the Cuban affair. “I don't think we expected that he [Khrushchev] would put the missiles in Cuba,” he said, “because it would have seemed such an imprudent action for him to take He obviously thought he could do it in secret and that the United States would accept it.”

In the classical literature of diplomatic history, the balance-of-power concept occupies a central position. Regardless of one's interpretation of the term or one's preference for or antipathy to it, the international relations scholar cannot escape dealing with it. The model is, of course, a multifaceted one, and it produces a fascinating array of corollaries; among these, the relationship between the number of actors and the stability of the system is one of the most widely accepted and persuasive. That is, as the system moves away from bipolarity toward multipolarity, the frequency and intensity of war should be expected to diminish.

The success of the European Economic Community often has been hailed as the most important development of international relations in the West in the last century. Even if the EEC does not progress beyond the point it has already reached, it is probably the most integrated union ever to have been formed among nation-states. Moreover, observers have been impressed by the momentum the EEC has had until recently, leading most of them to expect that its level of integration will continue to rise and its scope of unification to grow. Much of the credit for the success of the EEC is often attributed to “background” factors, to the fact that the member countries share the same European tradition, have a sizable Catholic population, are in a similar stage of economic development, have a similar civilization, and so forth.

This article introduces a functional typology of political orientations. The term “political orientations” is used here to refer to politically relevant symbols, whether cognitive, evaluative, or affective. It is equivalent to any one or any combination of the value, belief, and expressive symbol components of Parsons' cultural system that have political relevance. 1 The typology is not concerned with the specification of the substance or components of political orientations. Rather, it represents an effort to identify their functional significance.

“As an orchestra conductor sees to it that all the instruments sound harmonious and in proportion, so in social and political life does the Party direct the efforts of all people toward the achievement of a single goal.

Is regional cooperation feasible within Southeast Asia? The idea continues to have vitality, although most of the attempts to make use of the concept in this area have so far met with little apparent success. The Colombo Plan, SEATO, and the Bandung Conference are reminders only of the most prominent efforts to apply "regionalism" to the area. As early as 1947, the Burmese nationalist, Aung San, urged greater cooperation among Southeast Asian states, but his ideas had no lasting effect. And despite the many more formal proposals made since 1947, the area continues to be Balkanized. Yet today regional proposals seem to be proliferating and, for this reason, it is important that the obstacles to regional cooperation in Southeast Asia should be well understood. In 1961, the Association of Southeast Asia (ASA) was established, and the Malaysia plan, incorporating Malaya, Singapore, and the British Borneo territories, was put into effect in September 1963. In addition, and largely as a result of problems connected with the Malaysia proposals, "Maphilindo" was formed during June and July 1963. This is a loose consultative grouping of Malaya, the Philippines, and Indonesia. On a wider scale, there have been some proposals to organize an Asian Common Market; and the United Nations, through its Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East (ECAFE), seems to be urging certain forms of regional economic cooperation in Southeast Asia.1

KTO KOVO?” asked Lenin. “Who governs?” echoes a contemporary American political scientist. The question is of perennial interest. The “who's” have the capacity to influence the behavior of others. They include political leaders, who customarily exercise power through public or governmental bodies, and non-political leaders, who may exercise power through the command of other values, such as wealth, income, expertise. Political leaders and non-political leaders together constitute the elite; they lead the masses, who, needless to say, greatly outnumber the elite.

The nature of modern society, the quality of the modern social, civil, and moral order, has been in the forefront of sociological thought and inquiry since the very beginning of sociology. This interest has been greatly reinforced by the growing preoccupation with the extension of the processes of modernization beyond their initial place of origin in Western Europe and the United States to Eastern Europe and later to Asian and African countries. The continuous processes of modernization in these societies have greatly added to the store of knowledge about the nature and variety of modern society, and they also have enabled us to reformulate many of the most crucial problems in this area.

Official economic doctrine in the Soviet Union continues to hold fast to the view that growth conquers everything. A rapid rise in the level of economic output remains the magic key to the solution of all problems facing the Soviet Union, large and small alike. First of all, of course, economic growth at the highest possible rate remains an indispensable goal, in the official viewpoint, if the USSR is to be assured a firm position in the forefront of major world powers. There was surely no doubt in Stalin's mind that only a forced pace of growth in the economic capabilities of the Soviet state could prevent a dangerous backward drift in the international power position of Soviet Russia. This theme, as we know, was utilized by the former dictator to the hilt in his fierce drive to mobilize the physical and human resources of his country, and to motivate the political elite, for an all-out campaign against the strategic threat to the survival of the state that he considered to be inherent in economic backwardness.

The emergence of the Yugoslav commune is a significant aspect JL of the distinctive political system that has been developing in Yugoslavia since 1950. The Serbian term opština—općina in Croatian—historically referred to a specific area, defined by the collectivity or commonalty of the land and the inhabitants' use thereof. In the prewar period the term lost this meaning and signified only an administrative unit, such as a borough, district, municipality, or community.

After an eclipse of nearly two centuries, the ancient doctrine of Yst war has received renewed attention and interest in the twentieth century, primarily as the result of two conditions in the contemporary world. First, a new international system has come into being, replacing the European balance-of-power system of the recent past; and, secondly, modern technology has created military weapons without precedent in destructive capabilities, thereby radically altering the techniques and even the rationale of warfare. It will be the purpose of this article to examine the current status of the doctrine of just war to determine its viability for modern international politics and law. Specifically, the intent is to determine how relevant the doctrine may be to the two characteristic political conditions of our era just noted. A very brief historical review of the doctrine's development and demise will permit a fuller discussion of modern attitudes toward the subject.1

A Striking feature of politics in Indonesia, as in some other new states, is the great importance of the government's symbolic activity—gestures, ceremonial, and ritual on the one hand, propaganda and indoctrination on the other. The Indonesian government of the post-1958 period allots immense resources to creating and maintaining particular attitudes and states of mind, in ways which often detract greatly from the effectiveness of its administrative and economic performance. This article describes this symbolic activity and suggests some hypotheses which may help to account for its importance.

Many primitive peoples have political systems which are very much like the international political system. If the characterization of world politics as mere “anarchy” is an exaggeration, surely anarchy moderated or inhibited by a balance of power is a fairly accurate description of the rivalry between sovereign nation-states. The Nuer, a primitive African people, have been described as living in an “ordered anarchy” which depends on a “balanced opposition of political segments.” It is commonplace to describe the international system as lacking a government, so that “might makes right.” “In Nuerland legislative, judicial and executive functions are not invested in any persons or councils”; hence, throughout the society, “the club and the spear are the sanctions of rights.”

In an era that takes matters of religious faith lightly, it becomes difficult to consider thoughtfully a man who is suspected of saintliness. The task is particularly vexing for Americans, who have no feudal historic memories to remind them that saints were once important people. The obvious solution is to avoid the issue of saintliness altogether—to avoid, for example, questions about whether Gandhi's political shrewdness was compatible with the essential innocence of heart that one asks of saints; above all, to avoid trying to satisfy a generation of ambivalent skeptics who in one breath deny that saints exist and in the next maintain that Gandhi could not have been one because he did not meet such and such criterion of saintliness. The issue of saintliness is a diversion from a serious consideration of Gandhi's contribution.

Chinese Communist military policy significantly affects our preparations for war and hopes for peace. However, we have few public studies of Chinese military policy and the reasoning on which it rests.1 This article tries to set forth the calculus or rationale which Peking employs to select military strategy and tactics. In other words, it makes no attempt to attack or defend Chinese military policy or to appraise that policy's specific strengths and weaknesses. It does try to locate the important factors that operate in the minds of Chinese decision-makers and Peking's perception of the consequences of different tactical choices. When we say that the Chinese have a calculus for military policy, we do not mean to imply that it works well or badly. We do imply that the Chinese have a military calculus which imposes a predictable pattern on their military policy. Obviously, an identical military calculus does not operate in the minds of all Chinese leaders. Accordingly, “Peking thinks” is shorthand for the “averaged” views that can be induced from the public record of Chinese words and acts.