Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-r5fsc Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-28T01:23:37.263Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false

The Functions of Political Orientations: A Typology*

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Young C. Kim
Affiliation:
Political Science at Hobart and William Smidi Colleges
Get access

Extract

This article introduces a functional typology of political orientations. The term “political orientations” is used here to refer to politically relevant symbols, whether cognitive, evaluative, or affective. It is equivalent to any one or any combination of the value, belief, and expressive symbol components of Parsons' cultural system that have political relevance. 1 The typology is not concerned with the specification of the substance or components of political orientations. Rather, it represents an effort to identify their functional significance.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1964

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Parsons, Talcott and Shils, Edward A., eds., Toward a General Theory of Action (Cambridge, Mass., 1951), 78, 21–22, 55, 66–67CrossRefGoogle Scholar. For recent reformulations in Parsons' concept of a cultural system, see Kroeber, A. L. and Parsons, T., “The Concepts of Culture and of Social System”, American Sociological Review, XXIV (October 1958), 582–83Google Scholar: Parsons, T., “A Rejoinder to Ogles and Levy”, American Sociological Review, xxiv (April 1959), 246–50Google Scholar: Parsons, T., “The Point of View of the Author”, in Black, Max, ed., The Social Theories of Talcott Parsons (Englewood Cliffs 1961), 342–56Google Scholar; Parsons, T. and others, eds., Theories of Society (New York 1961), n, 979–80.Google Scholar

The term “political orientations” corresponds roughly to the technical meaning given the term “political culture” by Almond and Beer. In this connection, see Young C. Kim, “The Concept of Political Culture in Comparative Politics”, to appear in the May 1964 issue of Journal of Politics.

2 Blumer, Herbert, “Sociological Analysis and the ‘Variable’”, American Sociological Review, xxi (December 1956), 683–90.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

3 Bales, Robert F. and Strodtbeck, Fred L., “Phases in Group Problem Solving”, in Cartwright, Darwin and Zander, Alvin, eds., Group Dynamics (Evanston 1953), 386400.Google Scholar

4 Easton, David and Hess, Robert, “Youth and the Political System”, in Lipset, S. M. and Lowenthal, Leo, eds., Culture and Social Character (New York 1961), 229–51.Google Scholar

5 A collectivity as well as an individual may become the object of orientation.

6 This is an adaptation of Deutsch's usage; cf. Deutsch, Karl W., Nationalism and Social Communication (Cambridge, Mass., 1953).Google Scholar

7 The term is used in a narrower sense than Erickson's concept of identity, in that the dimension of deliberateness is injected here. See Pye, Lucian W., “Personal Identity and Political Ideology”, in Marvick, Dwaine, ed., Political Decision-Makers (New York 1961), 290311Google Scholar. For the distinct usage of the term “identification” in psychoanalytical literature, see U. Bronfenbrenner, “Parsons' Theory of Identification”, in Black, ed., 191–213. The usage is not unrelated to identification as used here, in that a state becomes a model or object of generalized cathectic attachment.

8 Identification orientations become attachment orientations through the passage of time. At a particular time when an observer is considering the dimension of deliberateness, the distinction is useful.

9 Shils, Edward and Young, Michael, “The Meaning of the Coronation”, in Lipset, S. M. and Smelser, N. J., eds., Sociology: The Progress of a Decade (New York 1961), 220–23.Google Scholar

10 Brinton's reference is primarily to regime orientations rather than to state orientations. Moreover, the dimension of deliberateness is not entertained by Brinton; cf. Brinton, Crane, The Anatomy of Revolution (New York 1952), 4253.Google Scholar

11 This is broader than Lasswell's “political doctrine”, which is equated with Merriam's “credenda.” “Doctrine” as used here embraces “miranda.” It is transformed into ideology as the stability of a political system increases.

12 Kim, Young C., “On Political Thought in Tokugawa Japan”, Journal of Politics, XXIII (February 1961), 127–45.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

13 Franz Neumann's “alienation” and Robert Lane's “disidentification” are similar to “illegitimation”, particularly “Utopia.” Lane, Robert E., Political Ideology (New York 1962), 161–64.Google Scholar

14 Beer, Samuel H. and Ulam, Adam B., eds., Patterns of Government (New York 1958), 510–18.Google Scholar

15 In adopting the concept of multiple publics, Almond, Snyder, and Rosenau have been followed. A public refers to a particular aggregate of people relevant to a particular issue. Almond, Gabriel A., The American People and Foreign Policy (New York 1960), 136–57Google Scholar; Rosenau, James N., Public Opinion and Foreign Policy (New York 1961), 2773Google Scholar; Snyder, Richard C. and Furniss, Edgar S., American Foreign Policy (New York 1954), 525–40.Google Scholar

16 Key, V. O., Public Opinion and American Democracy (New York 1961), 2740Google Scholar; Cohen, Bernard C., Foreign Policy and Political Process (Princeton 1957), 2962.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

17 Orientations in this category represent articulated interests, expectations, and demands that are brought to bear by a public on its relations vis-à-vis the decision-makers. E and F together constitute the substance of Easton's “inputs.” It will be noted that G and H are particularly relevant to Almond's analysis of institutional interest articulation, while F corresponds roughly to the substance of orientations characteristic of Almond's associational interest groups. “Non-associational” and “anomic” interest articulation are largely covered by E.

A sharp distinction between E and F is not always feasible. F1 for example, may represent E1 in an intense form. However, it is useful to distinguish between the two according to the dimension of deliberateness, for decision-makers will find it more difficult to formulate and execute policies that are incompatible with deeply internalized or articulated orientations. It does not appear to be useful to set up a counterpart to E2 with a deliberate dimension.

18 This is not to deny the existence of Eg with regard to this issue.

19 Aspaturian, Vernon, “Soviet Foreign Policy”, in Macridis, Roy C., ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs 1962), 141–42Google Scholar: Boulding, Kenneth, “National Images and International System”, in Rosenau, James N., ed., International Politics and Foreign Policy (New York 1961), 391–98.Google Scholar

20 Holsti, O. R., “The Belief System and National Images: A Case Study”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, vi (September 1962), 244–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

21 This is somewhat equivalent to Katz's “knowledge function” and what Smith, Bruner, and White call “object-appraisal”, though the deliberate dimension is emphasized here. Katz, Daniel, “The Functional Approach to the Study of Attitudes”, Public Opinion Quarterly, xxiv (Summer 1960), 163204CrossRefGoogle Scholar: Smith, M. Brewster and others, Opinions and Personality (New York 1956), 41.Google Scholar

22 Janis's comment on modes of resolving postdecisional conflicts is pertinent here. Janis, I. L., “Motivational Factors in the Resolution of Decisional Conflicts”, in Jones, Marshall R., ed., Nebraska Symposium on Motivation (Lincoln 1959), 198231.Google Scholar

23 In this connection, see Gordon, Raymond L., “The Effect of Attitude Toward Russia on Logical Reasoning”, Journal of Social Psychology, XXXVII (February 1953), 103–11.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

24 The psychoanalytic concept of rationalization emphasizes a reduction of the actor's consciously unacceptable motives by invoking consciously acceptable motives. Sarnoff, J., “Psychoanalytic Theory and Social Attitudes”, Public Opinion Quarterly, xxiv (Summer 1960), 251–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

25 Verbal behavior of high-L subject—in the terminology of Himmelstrand—belongs to this category. Ulf Himmelstrand, Social Pressures, Attitudes and Democratic Processes (Stockholm 1960), 4970, 76–89, 263–302.Google Scholar

26 This is consistent with the view of Malinowski and Homans that magic and religion function to reduce anxiety.

27 A concept that links the three categories of government orientations relevant to four different sets of relations is that of role. A role is constituted of norms of behavior associated with a given position. The subcategories of government orientations specified above subsume the components of Professor Wahlke's role concept. His core-role sector would be equivalent to the normative aspect of scope orientations (dd), and his clientele-role sector to the normative aspect of scope orientations (dp), and so forth. Wahlke, John C. and others, The Legislative System (New York 1962), 328.Google Scholar

The self-conception of a role entertained by the occupants—say, the decision-makers—may or may not be congruent with the norms and expectations that a public has of a position. A challenging question for political scientists is to identify the factors associated with the different modes of resolving such an incongruity.

28 Political scientists have long been aware of the relationships between attitudes and inner motivational dynamics; e.g., Lasswell, Harold, Psychopathology and Politics (Chicago 1930).Google Scholar

29 Sarnoff, 267–69. For example, orientations of certain Indian leaders regarding Communist China—namely, their refusal to perceive a stimulus that had threatening implications—may have been a function of denial. Festinger's theory of dissonance reduction is relevant here. Festinger, Leon, A Theory of Dissonance (New York 1957); and Janis, 204–10.Google Scholar

30 See Hadley Cantril's study of protest voters, The Politics of Despair (New York 1958), 2876.Google Scholar The hypothesis seems consistent with findings of the studies of prejudice by Campbell, Bettelheim, Janowitz, and Shils.

31 In addition to the voting studies of the Survey Research Center, see Milbrath's sociality-dominance-esteem syndrome and its correlation with political participation. Milbrath, L. and Klein, W., “Personality Correlates of Political Participation”, Acta Sociologica, VI (1962), 5366CrossRefGoogle Scholar. See also a preliminary report of a study by Almond and Verba for the relationship between political participation and what they call “subjective competence.” Sidney Verba, “Political Participation and Strategies of Influence: A Comparative Study”, ibid., 22–42.

32 See Hypothesis 7.

33 At the sublevels of E (pd) and F (pd), the decision-makers would prefer some affective, diffuse, and particularistic elements, though the democratic theory and rationality of bureaucracy presuppose universalistic, specific, and affectivity-neutral orientations.

34 Parsons, T., “A General Theory in Sociology”, in Merton, R. K. and others, eds., Sociology Today (New York 1959), 416Google Scholar; Parsons, “The Point of View of the Author”, in Black, ed., 311–63; Parsons, “An Outline of the Social System”, in Parsons and others, Theories of Society, 1, 30–79.

35 Spiro's four phases of flow of policy are identical with Parsons' four functional problems. When considered in terms of Parsonian terminology, Spiro's categories (flexibility, efficiency, effectiveness, and stability) become more readily comprehensible. Spiro, Herbert, “Comparative Politics”, American Political Science Review, LVI (September 1962), 577–95.CrossRefGoogle Scholar