What is the effect of the process of modernization on political stability? That is the question I want to explore theoretically. I will suggest that there are no plausible reasons for the expectation that the process of modernization is destabilizing, and also that there is no problem of political instability in transitional societies or anywhere else. Let us begin by examining some of the arguments used to support the thesis that modernization causes political instability.

Each of the books listed above is concerned in some way with problems of tradition and modernity. The extent to which tradition is still an influential force in Japan; the compatibility and/or incompatibility of tradition and modernity; the present functions of tradition in Japanese society, polity, and economy; and the future prospects for tradition in modern Japan—all these are matters of concern to the authors, and together they may inform present intellectual discussions of traditionalism, modernization, and modernity.

It is both humbling and encouraging to recall notions that Americans once entertained of the British political system. Critics of F.D.R. looked enviously at the British Parliament for its reputed ability to hold the executive firmly accountable for its actions. Somewhat later, observers on both sides of the Atlantic supposed that Britain was blessed with an absence of pressure groups. Would-be reformers of the American party system further implied that British voters cast their ballots according to the content of party programs, and that party cohesion was the result of discipline imposed by a centralized party organization able to deny renomination to recalcitrant M.P.'s. Careful analyses of intra-party workings, pressure-group activity, and voting behavior have now dispelled these and other mistaken impressions, and it seems likely that the contours of our understanding of these subjects have now been established. However, additional frontiers of knowledge of the British political system remain to be charted; one of these is government at the local level.

“[Policy] is like a play in many acts which unfolds inevitably once the curtain is raised. To declare then that the performance will not take place is an absurdity. The play will go on, either by means of the actors... or by means of the spectators who mount the stage.... Intelligent people never consider this the essence of the problem, however. For them it lies in the decision whether the curtain is to be raised at all, whether the spectators are to be assembled, and in the intrinsic quality of the play….” With these words of Metternich, Dr. Henry A. Kissinger begins the chapter on the definition of the political equilibrium in his book on problems of peace in Europe between 1812–1822.

The term “political development” originated during the cold war. After World War II, the prevalent attitude in the United States toward the Third World resembled that toward Europe: Unless economic progress and political stability were encouraged by the United States, these areas would turn Communist. Underlying foreign aid was the sober calculation that communism would lose its appeal once men's bellies were full. Robert Packenham reports that when AID officials were asked in the mid-sixties how they viewed development, “one of the most common responses was, in effect, that political development is anti-Communist, pro-American political stability.”

No theory of world politics yet created is able to guide us into a new age, but scholars and statesmen persist in conceiving global designs that claim our attention. Many writers are tempted by a formidable problem: What is the “real” shape—or alternatively the preferred shape—of the world to come? The fruits they offer are varied in taste but often so appealing in appearance that students of international relations cannot refuse to try them.

The books that are the subject of this review share three important characteristics.

1. They deal exclusively, or at least predominantly, with the political experiences of some smaller European countries which have traditionally been terra incognita on the map of comparative politics. Most writing in the field of comparative politics has centered eidier on the larger developed countries or on the developing states in die Third World. The Scandinavian and Benelux countries, Austria, and Switzerland have eidier been neglected or treated as isolated phenomena, mainly of folkloristic interest. As a category, they have been written off (widi die exception of Austria) as “the sober parliamentary democracies,” or as examples (listed with a note of surprise) of “working multi-party systems.”