In this paper, I shall dispute the widely held belief that all effective sanctions would greatly hurt poor South African blacks. Rather, it is likely that bans on exports of high technology to South Africa and imports of South African gold and diamonds would cause labor-intensive sectors to expand, thereby limiting the impact of a general recession on unskilled nonwhites. Still, several types of sanctions, such as those on oil, would have a severe impact on poor nonwhites. In addition, forced divestment would result in windfall capital gains for white South Africans; such gains would not be realized, however, if the ban were on new investments only. Finally, I shall discuss the need for infrastructural aid to help South Africa's neighbors weather the storm. Judicious aid to these countries is also important in inducing both Western and South Africanowned investments away from South Africa.

The crisis of food production in Africa demands that social scientists devote attention to the agricultural policies of African governments. Hunger and famine derive not only from natural catastrophe but also from policy decisions that shape the opportunities faced by farmers. The prevailing view among economists is that the administrative determination of agricultural prices in Africa creates disincentives to production. It is now widely accepted that the overvaluation of national currencies encourages food imports, and that the provision of subsidies to urban consumers prevents the payment of attractive prices to rural producers. This pattern of policy choice results, according to some political scientists, from the exertion of influence by prominent social groups, usually an alliance among bureaucratic and industrial elites and urban consumers. The resultant regime of agricultural policies serves to undermine the basic interests of agricultural producers, largely because their voices are only weakly articulated into the policy process.

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, scholars in the fields of Soviet politics and comparative communism began to reexamine the political and social character of the Soviet Union and Soviet-type regimes in the wake of more than a decade of de-Stalinization. They questioned the validity of the totalitarian model (at least in its more rigid forms) that suggested a static image of politics and society in communist systems, and proposed concepts more cognizant of the dynamic nature of these systems. A prominent theme in much of this literature was that social differentiation resulting from economic development and the emergence of modern industrial society would prove incompatible with continued dictatorial rule by a “vanguard party” following a militant, Utopian ideology. In particular, the rise of a large elite stratum of skilled technical and professional personnel was expected to militate against the long-term viability of a revolutionary regime. Analysts proposed that, under pressure from this group, whose contributions are indispensable to economic growth and development, the party leadership would eventually be compelled to abandon radical social and economic restructuring through revolutions from above in favor of more legal-rational modes of operation, and see its own role as the balancer of the various interests typical of a modern society.

In this paper, I investigate why a bureaucratic-authoritarian (hereafter BA) regime emerged in South Korea during the early 1970s. The regime transition was the outcome of conflict among key political actors who were constrained, although not in a deterministic way, by the change in the Korean economic structure. It can be understood as the outcome of strategic choices made by key political actors among alternatives that satisfied structural constraints.

Experience shows that framing of a future, in some indeterminate time, may, when it is done in a certain way, be very effective, and have few inconveniences; this happens when the anticipations of the future take the form of those myths … which give an aspect of complete reality to the hopes of immediate action by which more easily than by any other method, men can reform their desires, passions, and mental activity. … The myth must be judged as a means of acting on the present; any attempt to discuss how far it can be taken literally as future history is devoid of sense. It is the myth in its entirety which is alone important.

NO country in Latin America, and few anywhere in the third world, was the subject of more social science writing during the late 1970sand early 1980s than Peru. Books, monographs, articles, and dissertations poured forth from Peru itself, from elsewhere in Latin America, and from the United States, Western Europe, and even the Soviet Union and Japan.