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Is the Soviet Present China's Future?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Constance Squires Meaney
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Extract

In the late 1960s and early 1970s, scholars in the fields of Soviet politics and comparative communism began to reexamine the political and social character of the Soviet Union and Soviet-type regimes in the wake of more than a decade of de-Stalinization. They questioned the validity of the totalitarian model (at least in its more rigid forms) that suggested a static image of politics and society in communist systems, and proposed concepts more cognizant of the dynamic nature of these systems. A prominent theme in much of this literature was that social differentiation resulting from economic development and the emergence of modern industrial society would prove incompatible with continued dictatorial rule by a “vanguard party” following a militant, Utopian ideology. In particular, the rise of a large elite stratum of skilled technical and professional personnel was expected to militate against the long-term viability of a revolutionary regime. Analysts proposed that, under pressure from this group, whose contributions are indispensable to economic growth and development, the party leadership would eventually be compelled to abandon radical social and economic restructuring through revolutions from above in favor of more legal-rational modes of operation, and see its own role as the balancer of the various interests typical of a modern society.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 39 , Issue 2 , January 1987 , pp. 203 - 230
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1977

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References

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12 A Public Broadcasting System special by “Adam Smith” in June 1985 expressed this view. In the PBS series, “The Heart of the Dragon” (Part 5, “Working,” June 24, 1985), the bonus system was treated as a radical change.

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33 Shandong Provincial Service, January 18, 1984; FBIS, January 20, 1984, p. O2.

34 Hubei Provincial Service, January 25, 1984; FBIS, January 27, 1984, p. P4; Fujian Ribao, January 20, 1984, p. i;FBIS, February 2, 1984, p. O1.

35 “Bo Yibo Talks About the September Party Representative Meeting …,” Ta Kung Pao, February 2, 1985; FBIS, February 7,1985, pp. W10–12.

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46 Xinhua Domestic Service, February 28, 1978 (report on a Renmin Ribao article, n.d.); FBIS, March 3, 1978, p. El.

47 “Communique of the Third Plenary Session …” (fn. 9).

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49 Beijing Ribao, August 23, 1979, p. 1.

50 “Bo Yibo Talks …” (fn. 35).

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54 Reported by Xinhua Hong Kong Service, February 26, 1984 (quoting an article in Liaowang); FBIS, February 27, 1984, p. K.2.

55 Renmin Ribao, February 1, 1984, p. 1; FBIS, February 7, 1984, p. K34.

56 Beijing Ribao (fn. 49).

57 Dazhong Ribao, January 17, 1985, p. 4; FBIS, February 5, 1985, p. O2.

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61 Xinhua, February 7, 1985; FBIS, February 15, 1985, p. K2–6.

62 Ibid.

63 This picture of the typical personnel cadre emerged from interviews.

64 China Daily (fn. 59).

65 Renmin Ribao (fn. 51).

66 Jilin Provincial Service, February 3, 1985; FBIS, February 5, 1985, p. S2.

67 Good examples of this genre may be found in Link (fn. 58).

68 See Bo Yibo's comments on the objective of keeping the “three kinds” out of the third echelon in “Bo Yibo Talks …” (fn. 35).

69 Tsou (fn. 9), 56–57.

70 See Medvedev and Medvedev (fn. 23).

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74 Lowenthal (fn. 2), 77.

75 Ibid., 58–59; Bailes (fn. 7), 161–87.

76 Henan Provincial Service, January 17, 1984; FBIS, January 23, 1984, p. P2; Shandong Provincial Service, January 23, 1984; FBIS, January 24, 1984, p. O5; Hubei Provincial Service, December 18, 1983; FBIS, December 19, 1983, p. P4.

77 Beijing Domestic Service, February 6, 1985; FBIS, February 12, 1985, p. Kn.