Traditional theory of international politics maintains that, other things being equal, a multipolar balance-of-power system. Arms-control theory, on the other hand, generally contends that an increase in independent nuclear powers is a direct threat to the stability of the international system. is more stable than a bipolar system. A bipolar nuclear deterrent relationship is believed to be inherently more stable than one in which equilibrium is maintained among several nuclear powers in independent or alliance relationships. Though the relatively greater stability of a bipolar system may be preferred, its stability is, nevertheless, contingent. Maintaining the stability of mutual nuclear deterrence while restraining aggression is the primary goal of arms control.

Functionalism has assumed an important role in the behavioral sciences in recent years, but the employment of this method of analysis is fraught with difficulties. Some of the logical problems of functionalism are reviewed in this article in the form of a critique of Gabriel A. Almond's introduction to The Politics of the Developing Areas, entitled “A Functional Approach to Comparative Politics.” This article focuses attention upon the weaknesses of the approach. In doing so, it is exclusively negative and critical, and is not an attempt at a rounded characterization.

Ever since all the king's horses and all the king's men were unable to put Humpty Dumpty back together again, poets and scholars have often believed that biological, social, and political wholes are somehow greater than the sum of their parts. Most severely criticized among the king's men for their lack or misuse of the relevant surgical skills have been policy scientists using the logical tools of mathematics and the research procedures of the behavioral and social sciences. As world politics has increasingly influenced both individual and national destinies, the analytical and synthetical skills of quantitative international relations theorists, in particular, have come into dispute.

The consequences that flow from the collapse of empires have never been easily predicted. Seldom, however, has the demise of an imperial system been accompanied by as many systematic analyses and projections as has the current period of decolonization. Much of the recent discussion concerning the newer members of the international system has made reference to their so-called artificial political boundaries. It has been predicted, among other things, that the political boundaries of Asia and Africa, by virtue of their presumed artificiality, harbor the seeds of “many a troublesome irredenta in the future.” Frequent references are made, in the growing literature on nation-building and political modernization, to the “natural” or “unnatural” qualities of these boundaries, and the absence of careful general studies of this topic has been noted. This article proposes to examine the dominant characteristics of African political boundaries and the circumstances under which disputes over their location have so far been generated, and to deduce some general propositions about their conflict potential. The thrust of the argument to be presented is that there is a low conflict potential in contemporary African boundaries and that earlier predictions of instability are not likely to be borne out.