This article proposes a model that provides a tool to gauge the preparedness of ethnic and other groups for political mobilization. It argues that successful ethnic mobilization requires a well-specified bundle of “mobilization prerequisites” that can be used to evaluate political and social movements in a variety of contexts. The model is applied to elucidate the East European Gypsy communities' modest success at ethnic political mobilization. The article assesses the explanatory power of the independent variables and explains Gypsy electoral politics and behavior.

Perhaps the most striking feature of the postcommunist transformation is the tremendous variation in rates of economic growth across countries. To account for these differences, this article develops an alternative to the J-curve and partial reform views that currently dominate discussions of the politics of economic reform. This approach treats economic performance as a political struggle between excommunist and anticommunist factions engaged in a war of attrition over economic and political resources. Using a pooled time-series analysis of economic growth across twenty-five postcommunist countries for the period 1990–98, it finds that political polarization between ex-communist and anticommunist factions has had a devastating effect on economic growth. Where these competing factions have had roughly equal power and have struggled over the economic rules of the game—as in Bulgaria or Ukraine—economic growth has been slow. In contrast, where either excommunist or anticommunist factions have dominated the political scene—as in Estonia or Uzbekistan—economic performance has been much better. In addition, economic growth has followed the electoral calendar in polarized countries. As elections approach and the odds of a change in economic policy increase, growth rates have plummeted in polarized countries. These findings have implications for studies of the postcommunist transformation, the political business cycle, and the politics of economic reform more generally.

Most theories that seek to explain democratization look to changes in the economy as the precursor to significant political liberalization, locating the main causal factor in either severe economic crisis or rapid economic growth. In the Chinese context, by contrast, the Communist Party has extricated itself from the socialist social contract with the urban working class without losing its grip on political power. Moreover, China has maintained a rapid pace of economic growth for over twenty-five years without significant political liberalization. Comparative analysis of China's post-1978 reform policies yields insights both across types of socialist transition, comparing China with Eastern Europe and Russia, and across time, comparing China with other high-growth East Asian economies. A key factor in China's ability to reform the economy without sacrificing political control is the timing and sequencing of its foreign direct investment (FDl) liberalization. There are two key variables that are important to this comparative analysis: China's pattern of ownership diversification and China's mode of integration into the global economy. The article relates these two variables to the success of economic change without political liberalization, in particular, how FDI liberalization has affected relations between workers and the ruling Communist Party. “Reform and openness” in this context resulted in a strengthened Chinese state, a weakened civil society (especially labor), and a delay in political liberalization.

This article reviews the literature on the “smart sanctions” approach developed in the late 1990s in response to the failure of conventional sanctions and questions the efficacy of this instrument. Smart sanctions modify the conventional sanctions tool by targeting the culpable political elites by means of arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and travel restrictions and by cushioning vulnerable groups (children, women, the infirm, and the elderly) by exempting specified commodities such as food and medical supplies from embargoes. This two-pronged sanctions approach is designed to hit the real perpetrators directly and spare potential innocent victims, thus leading to the speedier change of sanctionee behavior. Although the special design of smart sanctions may seem logically compelling and politically attractive, this article argues that the numerous operational problems involved, combined with the intricacies of the political processes of the UN Security Council, will make a smart sanctions regime difficult to establish and enforce effectively.