Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-gvvz8 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T04:18:57.670Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Are Smart Sanctions Feasible?

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Arne Tostensen  and
Beate Bull
Get access

Extract

This article reviews the literature on the “smart sanctions” approach developed in the late 1990s in response to the failure of conventional sanctions and questions the efficacy of this instrument. Smart sanctions modify the conventional sanctions tool by targeting the culpable political elites by means of arms embargoes, financial sanctions, and travel restrictions and by cushioning vulnerable groups (children, women, the infirm, and the elderly) by exempting specified commodities such as food and medical supplies from embargoes. This two-pronged sanctions approach is designed to hit the real perpetrators directly and spare potential innocent victims, thus leading to the speedier change of sanctionee behavior. Although the special design of smart sanctions may seem logically compelling and politically attractive, this article argues that the numerous operational problems involved, combined with the intricacies of the political processes of the UN Security Council, will make a smart sanctions regime difficult to establish and enforce effectively.

Type
Review Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 54 , Issue 3 , April 2002 , pp. 373 - 403
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2002

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 Cortright, David and Lopez, George A. (with Conroy, Richard W., Dashti-Gibson, Jaleh, and Wagler, Julia), eds., The Sanctions Decade: Assessing UN Strategies in the 1990s (Boulder, Colo.: Lynne Rien-ner, 2000)Google Scholar.

2 The targets are normally states. Only rarely have sanctions been imposed on nonstate actors, such as UNITA (in Angola in 1997) and the Taliban (in Afghanistan in 1999).

3 For a critique of U.S. sanctions practices, see Haass, Richard N., “Sanctioning Madness,” Foreign Affairs 76 (November-December 1997).Google Scholar

4 See, for example, Griinfeld, Frederik, “Human Rights Violations: A Threat to International Peace and Security,” in Castermans-Holleman, M., van Hoof, F., and Smith, J., eds., The Role of the Nation-State in the Twenty-first Century: Human Rights, International Organisations and Foreign Policy: Essays in Honour of Peter Baehr (The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 1998).Google Scholar

5 The position of the South African liberation movement in favor of sanctions, regardless of the hardship inflicted, no doubt lent credence to this assumption. The saying that “sanctions hurt, but apartheid kills” captures this attitude very well. For a broader discussion of this issue, see Weiss, Thomas G., Cortright, David, Lopez, George A., and Minear, Larry, eds., Political Gain and Civilian Pain: Humanitarian Impacts of Economic Sanctions (Lanham, Md.: Rowman and Littlefield, 1997).Google Scholar

6 For a discussion of ethical issues, see Hazelzet, Hadewych, “Assessing the Suffering from 'Successful' Sanctions: An Ethical Approach,” in van Genugten, Willem J. M. and de Groot, Gerard A., eds., United Nations Sanctions: Effectiveness and Effects, Especially in the Field of Human Rights—A Multidis-ciplinary Approach (Antwerp: Intersentia, 1999)Google Scholar.

7 Note verbale dated January 29,1996, from the Permanent Mission of the Republic of Iraq to the United Nations Office at Geneva addressed to the Centre for Human Rights (E/CN.4/1996/140), Impact of the Economic Embargo on the Economic, Social and Cultural Situation in Iraq, paras. 19 and 20. In a letter dated December 28, 2001, to the UN secretary-general, Iraq has adjusted its estimated death toll upward to 1.6 million.

8 Galtung, Johan“On the Effects of International Economic Sanctions, With Examples from the Case of Rhodesia,” World Politics 19 (April 1967)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

9 Pape, Robert A., “Why Economic Sanctions Do Not Work,” International Security 22 (Fall 1997).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

10 Peter A. G. van Bergeijk, “Economic Sanctions: Why Do They Succeed; Why Do They Fail?” in van Genugten and de Groot (fn. 6), 106.

11 See Knorr, Klaus, The Power of Nations: The Political Economy of International Relations (New York: Basic Books, 1975)Google Scholar, esp. chap. 6; and Baldwin, David A., Economic Statecraft (Princeton: N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1985)Google Scholar.

12 See the extensive bibliography in Weiss et al. (fn. 5), 247—68. A recent collection of critical articles can be found in van Genugten and de Groot (fn. 6).

13 Hufbauer, Gary Clyde, Schott, Jeffrey J., and Elliott, Kimberly Ann, Economic Sanctions Reconsidered: History and Current Policy, 2d ed. (Washington, D.C.: Institute of International Economics, 1990)Google Scholar. This relatively positive conclusion has been severely criticized on the grounds that the success criterion was “too generous,” and that the distinction was not properly drawn between the effects attributable to economic sanctions and those attributable to the threat or use of military force.

14 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), chap. 11.

15 See Ullman, Richard H., “Human Rights and Economic Power: The United States versus Idi Amin,” Foreign Affairs 56 (April 1978)CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

16 United Nations, Committee on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Comment No. 8 (E/C.12/1997/8), The Relationship between Economic Sanctions and Respectfor Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, December 12, 1997.

17 The reports are available on the Internet at http://www.smartsancions.ch; this website also contains useful links to other sources of information.

18 Koenraad Van Brabant, “Can Sanctions Be Smarter? The Current Debate” (Report of a conference held in London, December 16-17,1998, May 1999); also available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch. “The full report with submitted papers is available on the Internet at http://www.bicc.de, including a number of links to additional sources of information. The contributions to these conferences and the reports of the intervening working group sessions have since been published in Brzoska, Michael, ed., Smart Sanctions: The Next Steps — The Debate on Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions within the 'Bonn-Berlin Process” (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2001)Google Scholar.

20 Biersteker, Thomas J., Eckert, Sue E., Romaniuk, Peter, Halegua, Aaron, and Reid, Natalie, Targeted Financial Sanctions: A Manualfor Design and Implementation — Contributionsfrom the Interlaken Process (Providence, R.I.: Watson Institute for International Studies, 2001).Google Scholar

21 See Haass (fn. 3); van Genugten and de Groot (fn. 6), chap. 8; and Cortright and Lopez (fh. 1), chap. 12.

22 United Nations, Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (OCHA), Coping with the Humanitarian Impact of Sanctions:An OCHA Perspective (New York: OCHA, 1998)Google Scholar. See also Strem-lau, John, Sharpening International Sanctions: Toward a Stronger Rolefor the United Nations (New York: Carnegie Corporation of New York, 1996)Google Scholar.

23 Minear, Larry, Weiss, Thomas G. (and associates), Towards More Humane and Effective Sanctions Management: Enhancing the Capacity of the United Nations System (New York: UN Department of Humanitarian Affairs, 1997)Google Scholar, chap. 2; available on the Internet at http://www.reliefweb.int.

24 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 228.

25 Minear et al. (fn. 23).

26 Burns, R. D., ed., Encyclopedia of Arms Control and Disarmament, vol. 3 (New York: Charles Scrib-ner's Sons, 1993), 1409—10Google Scholar. For historical background on arms embargoes, see Knight, W. A., The United Nations and Arms Embargoes Verification (Lewiston, N.Y.: Edwin Mellen Press, 1998)Google Scholar.

27 Randy Rydell, “Monitoring United Nations Arms Embargoes” (Paper presented at the First Expert Seminar: Smart Sanctions—The Next Step, Bonn, November 21-23, 1999), 3; also available at http://www.bicc.de.

28 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 242.

29 Rydell (fn. 27), 11.

30 Margaret Doxey, “United Nations Sanctions: Lessons of Experience” (Paper presented at the Second Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations Financial Sanctions, March 29—31,1999); also available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch.

31 The illicit supply of arms was amply documented by the UN sanctions committee in the case of sanctions against UNITA. Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1) refer to the UN International Commission of Inquiry in Rwanda (UNICOI), which was created in September 1995 to investigate the violations of the arms embargo on the Hutu rebels responsible for the Rwandan genocide (p. 243). UNICOI produced several useful reports documenting embargo violations and recommending improved enforcement.

32 Annan, Kofi, “Freedom from Fear,” in Millennium Report 2000 (New York, 2000) 50–51Google Scholar; also available at www.un.org/millennium/sg/report.

33 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 242.

34 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1196, September 16,1998.

35 United Nations, Executive Office of the Secretary-General, Strategic Planning Unit, “UN Sanctions: How Effective? How Necessary?” (Paper presented at the Second Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations Financial Sanctions, March 29-31, 1999), 113; also available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch.

36 Between 1914 and 1998 there were 170 cases of sanctions in one form or another, 132 of which included financial sanctions, and in more than 40 percent of these cases they were applied alone.

37 Carim, Xavier, Klotz, Audie, and Lebreu, Olivier, “The Political Economy of Financial Sanctions,” in Crawford, Neta C. and Klotz, Audie, eds., How Sanctions Work Lessons from South Africa (London: Macmillan, 1999)Google Scholar.

38 Swiss Government, “Introductory Statement,” in Report of the Second Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations Financial Sanctions, March 29-31, 1999;Google Scholar available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch.

39 Elliot, Kimberley A., “Analysing the Effects of Targeted Financial Sanctions” (Paper presented at the Second Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations Financial Sanctions, March 29-31, 1999), 189Google Scholar; also available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch.

40 Strategic Planning Unit (fn. 35), 113.

41 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1173, June 12,1998, operative para. 11.

42 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution S/RES/917, May 6,1994, para. 4.

43 See http://www.oecd.org/fatf.

44 Financial Action Task Force on Money Laundering, Review to Identify Noncooperative Countries or Territories: Increasing the Worldwide Effectiveness of Anti-Money Laundering Measures, Paris, June 2001;Google Scholar also available at http://www.oecd.org/fatf/FATDocs_en.htm#Non-Cooperative.

45 “Working Group 1: The Targeting of Financial Sanctions, Annex 2: Offshore Centres” (Findings presented at the Second Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations Financial Sanctions, Switzerland, March 29-31,1999), 23; also available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch.

46 Elliott (fn. 39).

47 This is based on the work of the “Working Group I: The Targeting of Financial Sanctions” (Findings presented at the Second Interlaken Seminar on Targeting United Nations Financial Sanctions, Switzerland, March 29-31,1999), 17-28; also available at http://www.smartsanctions.ch.

48 Ibid., 17.

49 Ibid.

50 Cf. Biersteker et al. (fn. 20).

51 See United Nations Security Council Resolutions S/RES/1127, August 28,1997 (Angola/UNITA); S/RES/1132, October 8,1997 (Sierra Leone); S/RES/1137, November 12,1997 (Iraq); S/RES/1171, June 5,1998 (Sierra Leone); and S/RES/1267, October 15, 1999 (Afghanistan/Taliban).

52 Richard Conroy, “Implementation Problems of Travel Bans: Practical and Legal Aspects” (Paper presented at the First Expert Seminar: Smart Sanctions—The Next Step, Bonn, November 21-23, 1999). 11; also available on the Internet at http://www.bicc.de.

53 Ibid., 12. The difficulty in identifying individuals may be illustrated by the efforts of national immigration authorities to establish familial relationships of asylees in family reunion cases, involving even DNA testing.

54 Conroy (fn. 52), 2.

55 Ibid., 3.

56 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1267, October 15,1999, para. 4.

57 In fact, taking photographs was officially forbidden.

58 United Nations, Sanctions Secretariat, Department of Political Affairs, “The Experience of the United Nations in Administering Arms Embargoes and Travel Sanctions” Paper presented at the First Expert Seminar: Smart Sanctions—The Next Step, Bonn, November 21-23,1999), 25; also available on the Internet at http://www.bicc.de.

59 Richard Conroy, “UN Travel Sanctions: An Evaluation with Policy Recommendations” (Paper presented to the UN Symposium on Targeted Sanctions, New York, December 7,1998).

60 See United Nations, Security Council, Note by the President of the Security Council: Work of the Sanctions Committees, January 1999.

61 Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of Two-Level Games,” International Organization 42 (Summer 1988), 434.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

62 Preeg, Ernest H., Feeling Good or Doing Good with Sanctions: Unilateral Economic Sanctions and the U.S. National Interest (Washington D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 1999).Google Scholar

63 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 3.

64 The two-level, game-theoretical approach could be applied at the sanctionee end as well, although the nature of the games would probably be different.

65 In some cases, arms embargoes are imposed on already warring parties in an attempt to reduce their capability to continue military operations.

66 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 6.

67 Ibid., chap. 12; Willem van Genugten, Gerard de Groot, and Saskia Lavrijssen, “Guidelines on the Future Use of Sanctions: An Evaluation,” in van Genugten and de Groot (fn. 6).

68 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 222.

69 Ibid., 231-32.

70 Crossete, Barbara, “Effort to Recast Iraq Oil Sanctions is Halted for Now,” New York Times, July 3, 2001.Google Scholar

71 The main elements of a new sanctions regime are spelled out in Cortright, David, Millar, Alistair, and Lopez, George A., Smart Sanctions: Restructuring UN Policy in Iraq (Goshen, Ind.: Fourth Freedom Forum, 2001)Google Scholar; see also Khalaf, Roula, “Struggling with Sanctions,” Financial Times, May 28, 2001.Google Scholar

72 United Nations, Security Council, Resolution S/RES/1360, July 3,2001.

73 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 237.

74 Hengeveld, Richard and Rodenburg, Jaap, eds., Embargo: Apartheid's Oil Secrets Revealed (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press, 1995).CrossRefGoogle Scholar

75 Cortright and Lopez (fn. 1), 241.

76 Ibid., 242.

77 van Genugten et al. (fn. 67), 148-49.