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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
Before our entry into the First World War American policy was labeled as one of neutrality, which implied that the proper measure of relations with the belligerents was to be found in international law and, more particularly, in the rules of maritimewarfare. The content of that policy failed to correspond with its label, for actually it was sharply inclined to the side of Great Britain. However, the Administration refrained from acknowledging the fact that British naval actions were not being scrupulouslysubjected to the test of the rules of maritime warfare. Freedom of the seas and support of Great Britainwere quite different points from which to proceed.Each might have been used as the basis of separate phases of a changing policy. In fact, however, they were employed simultaneously. Since they not only failed to complement each other but were actually contradictory, the result was to subject American policy toa terrific internal tension.
1 Anderson MS, Library of Congress.
Anderson's viewpoint is also expressed in a memorandum, dated October 21, 1914, which he prepared while still in the London Embassy: “For the United States it [British interference with theshipping of supplies to Germany through neutral countries] involves at most only a question of pecuniary damages; for Great Britain it involves possibly the question of national life or death and certainly the tremendous national loss both in blood and money attendant upon each day's prolongation of the war.” —Ibid.
2 Speech accepting the renomination, September 2, 1916. (The Public Papers of Woodrow Wilson, Baker, R. S. and Dodd, W. E., eds., New York, Harper, 1927, IV, 282.)Google Scholar Ray Stannard Baker pointsout that the argument that property rights could be vindicated by claims for damages was one persistently advanced by Hines, Walter Page. (Woodrow Wilson, Life and Letters, New York, Doubleday, Doran, 1937, VI, 326Google Scholar, footnote.) We have seen above that it was also the main point in Chandler P. Anderson's thesis. Anderson, a lawyer, was associated with Page in the London Embassy in the early formative months.
3 House to Wilson, April 25, 1916, Wilson MS.
Writing to House on July 14, 1916 Bernstorff said “… you and I have already agreed that there is no hope of England giving up her violations of International Law out of deference to the United States as we gave up our reprisals for that reason. It might, however, relieve the situation, if at least a new protest were made, even if nothing came of it. That would help our Government a great deal without doing any harm here.” —Ibid.
Earlier, concerning a conversation with Bernstorff on December 16, 1915, House reported to the President: “I let him know that there was a feeling among Americans that if Germany was successful, she would finally quarrel with us, with or without provocation; and if this feeling could be overcome, and it could be by the elimination of militarism, the hostility would immediately die out. He admitted this.” —Seymour, Charles, Intimate Papers, New York, Houghton Mifflin, 1926, II, 106–07.Google Scholar
4 Page to Wilson, January 5, 1916, Wilson MS.
Page continues: “Austen Chamberlain told Mrs. Page a few nights ago that for sentimental reasons only he would be gratified to see the United States in the war along with the Allies, but that merely sentimental reasons were not a sufficient reason forwar—by no means; that he felt most grateful for the sympathetic attitude of the large mass of American people, that he had no right to expect anythingfrom our Government whose neutral position was entirely proper. Then he added, ‘But what I can't for the life of me understand is your Government's failure to express its disapproval of the German utter disregard of its Lusitania Notes.’”
5 House to Wilson, , January 7, 1916Google Scholar, Wilson MS.
6 House to Wilson, , January 13, 1916Google Scholar, Wilson MS.
Writing to Wilson almost a year later, House was in a different mood and charged the British with ingratitude: “I believe the submarine is a serious menace to them [the British] and that the main protection they have had has been the attitude of this country—an attitude which they in noway appreciate.” —House to Wilson, December 20, 1916, Ibid.
7 House to Wilson, January 13, 1916, Ibid Among the papers turned over to Wilson by House on his return from Europe in the first week of March 1916, were clippings if editorials which Househad inspired and of an interview given by House to an English correspondent on the subject of Wilson's foreign policy.
8 It is an amusing side light, and an interesting indication of the intimate personal relations among American and British leaders, that this characterization of Wilson's policy got to Theodore Roosevelt, who, with some asperity, reported itback to Plunkett. Here is that portion of Roosevelt's letter to Plunkett which is quoted by Plunkett in a letter of November 2, 1916, to House, a copy of which House forwarded to Wilson: “Two persons, one an American in England, the other an Englishman who said his information came indirectly from Mr. Asquith, had written me that you had told your Government that Mr. Wilson was friendly to England, that he was bringing the opinion of the Middle West round to the side of England, which I was powerless to do, and that England should recognize this inner meaning of Mr. Wilson's attitude. The Englishman wrote in joy at Wilson's supposed attitude. The American instanced your alleged statement as proof that it was a mistake on my part to have championed the cause of the Allies, that England would only respect people who opposed her, that Wilson had gained British good will precisely because he hadbeen lukewarm or hostile, and that I ought to learn the lesson and pay heed to German and Irish feeling.” —House to Wilson, November 20, 1916, Ibid.
9 Wilson MS. This memorandum isamong the papers contained in an envelope dated March 7, which were brought back from London by House.
10 Plunkett to House, March 7, 1916. Copy forwarded by House to Wilson, , March 20, 1916.Google ScholarWilson MS.
11 Plunkett to House, December 27, 1916Google Scholar, Wilson MS.
This letter contains an interesting passage on American policy toward the submarine, which omits any reference to the grounding of that policy in international law: “It has been stated in the press that he [pWilson] regards the submarine menace as so grave that he fears too openly friendly anattitude toward Great Britain might remove all restrictions upon submarine activity, and so, by inflicting a fatal blow upon British sea-borne commerce, do more harm to the Allies than even active American intervention on their side would do good. My considered opinion is that the straight forward comradeship of America would be a thousand times more valuable inthe eyes of the British people, no matter what its price in the extra dangers involved, than peace proposals which seem to be based upon a total failure to appreciate the fact that the British Democracy is upholding at an appalling sacrifice of blood and treasure, principles which it hitherto believed were identical with those upon which your Great Republic is founded.”
12 Internal evidence puts this memorandum in February or March of 1916. It may be found in box 111 of Series II of the Wilson Papers. Attached to the memorandum is this notation from Tumulty tothe President: “Dear Governor: —This memorandum prepared by Dave Lawrence. I think it worth reading … ” — Wilson MS.
13 Lawrence develops this thought further: “[Germany] knows … that England has pleaded ‘new conditions’ and has changed the law to suit her own convenience … She knows by this time that we have no serious intention of pressing England to a critical point … If the English blockade grows more effective,through our help, the people in Germany will themselves grow more desperate and anger toward the United States will grow to the point where public opinion will support the German Government in any course it may pursue ….
14 He says further of our relations with Great Britain: “It seems to me that much as we love Great Britain, much as we are her kinsman … [we] must live our own life. We must not depend on British sea power or allow the British to believe for a minute that they can dominate us… We are almost in the position of a vassal state”.
15 Lansing records the following with regard to Wilson's observations on the evening of January 31, 1917, shortly after the news of unrestricted submarine warfare had reached Washington: “The President … said that he was not yetsure what course we must pursue … that he hadbeen more and more impressed with the idea that ‘white civilization’ and its domination overthe world rested largely on our ability to keep thiscountry intact, as we would have to build up the nations ravaged by the War. He said that as this idea had grown upon him he had come to the feeling that hewas willing to go to any lengths rather than to havethe nation actually involved in the conflict.”—Lansing, Robert, War Memoirs, Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1935, p. 212.Google Scholar
The same thought was expressed by Wilson at the Cabinet meeting on February 2, 1917. According to David F. Houston, the President said that if, “inorder to keep the white race or part of it strong tomeet the yellow race—Japan, for instance, in alliance with Russia, dominating China—it was wise to do nothing, he would do nothing, and would submit to … any imputation of weakness or cowardice.”—Houston, David F., Eight Years with Wilson's Cabinet, New York, Doubleday, Page, 1926, I, 229.Google Scholar
16 Wilson MS. In his covering letter, Lippmann asks for an interview, for which thememorandum was designed as a basis. Lippmann states that he is speaking also for Herbert Croly and that the memorandum was prepared in consultation with House.
17 The same point was quite effectively made in a New Republic editorial six days later:
“The real weakness of the American position today is not the course of action we have adopted but the nature of the policy on which that action is based. … By obscuring the issue in legalism the administration is in the very great danger of making the conflict with Germany sterile and altogether meaningless.
“As the thing now stands it is made to appear as if we were fighting a duel of honor, or worse still, fighting for the profits of our export trade. If that is all that is at stake it is not worth the bones of a single American sailor, and the contention of Mr. Bryan is fundamentally sound.” — New Republic, March 17, 1917.
The fears of the New Republic were borne out after the ward when American intervention was portrayed as having resulted from quixotic legalism and opportunistic commercialism. This misreading of the earlier experience underlay the so-called neutrality legislation which falsely oriented the nation in relation to the European crisis of the 'thirties.