Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
The importance and political implications of the subject of unconventional warfare are well known and need not be elaborated upon here. At the present time, the three branches of the American military services are expanding their “special” forces, preparing for the eventuality of conflicts of smaller scope than conventional warfare. On the Soviet side, the theory of peaceful coexistence—i.e., the thesis that capitalism should be eliminated by popular movements rather than by foreign armies—was reasserted at the January conference of the S.E.D. in Berlin, by no lesser authority than Nikita Khrushchev himself.
1 Cf. Garthoff, Raymond L., “Unconventional Warfare in Communist Strategy,” Foreign Affairs, XL (July 1962), 567.Google Scholar
2 Yarborough, William P., “Unconventional Warfare: One Military View,” The Annals, CCCXLI (May 1962), 1.Google Scholar
3 J. K. Zawodny, “Guerrilla and Sabotage: Organization, Operations, Motivations, Escalation,” ibid., 8.
4 Salvko N. Bjelajac, “Unconventional Warfare: American and Soviet Approaches,” ibid., 74.
5 Russell Rhyne, “Unconventional Warfare—Problems and Questions,” ibid., 102.
6 Huntington, Samuel P., “Guerrilla Warfare in Theory and Policy,” in Osanka, Franklin M., ed., Modern Guerrilla Warfare (New York 1962), XV.Google Scholar
7 See Clausewitz, Karl von, On War, trans, by Graham, F. F. (London 1918), 11Google Scholar, chap. 26; and Blanqui, Louis Auguste, “Instructions pour une prise d'armes,” Archiv für die Geschichte der Arbeiterbewegung, XV (1930), 270–300.Google Scholar
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13 Quoted in Rossi, A. (Angelo Tosca), The Rise of Italian Fascism (London 1938), 258.Google Scholar
14 Cf. Tse-tung, Mao, Strategic Problems of China's Revolutionary War (Peking 1954), 75.Google Scholar
15 Clausewitz, as quoted in Paret, Peter and Shy, John W., Guerrillas in the 1960's (New York 1961), 13.Google Scholar
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17 ibid., 80.
18 Kvader, Dusan, “Territorial War: The New Concept of Resistance,” Military Review, XXXIV (July 1954), 46–58.Google Scholar
19 The “sufficiency” of space, of course, depends on the degree of absolute mobility, as determined by prevailing military technology. In the days of motorized troops and tanks, the space provided by Silesia or Hungary would not be sufficient for this type of mobile warfare.
20 Cf. Knorr, Klaus, “Unconventional Warfare: Strategy and Tactics in Internal Political Strife,” The Annals, CCCXLI (May 1962), 56Google Scholar; and Crozier, Brian, The Rebels: A Study of Post-War Insurrections (London 1960), 127–30.Google Scholar
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22 See, e.g., the insurrection in the Vendée, as described in Paret, Peter, Internal War and Pacification: The Vendée, 1792–1796, Research Monograph No. 12 (Princeton, Center of International Studies, 1961).Google Scholar The guerrilla movement of Andreas Hoffer in the Tyrol and the Spanish resistance to Napoleon also fell in this category.
23 Two perceptive analyses of the relation of political and military factors in unconventional warfare are Johnson, Chalmers A., “Civilian Loyalties and Guerrilla Conflict,” World Politics, XIV (July 1962), 646–61CrossRefGoogle Scholar; and Lindsay, Franklin A., “Unconventional Warfare,” Foreign Affairs, XL (January 1962), 264–74.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
24 Cf. Huntington, xix.