Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-dk4vv Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T02:53:49.875Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

Revolutionaries or Bargainers?: Negotiators for a New International Economic Order

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Harold K. Jacobson ,
Dusan Sidjanski ,
Jeffrey Rodamar  and
Alice Hougassian Rudovich
Harold K. Jacobson
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Dusan Sidjanski
Affiliation:
University of Geneva
Jeffrey Rodamar
Affiliation:
University of Michigan
Alice Hougassian Rudovich
Affiliation:
University of Geneva
Get access

Abstract

This interview-based study analyzes the attitudes and negotiating behavior of 80 individuals, principally from less developed countries (LDCs), who were participants in international economic negotiations in 1976. Some of the more important findings are: (1) negotiators' views are more diverse than analyses of roll-call votes would indicate; (2) the positions that countries take appear to be firmly grounded in national political processes and in pragmatic conceptions of their national interests; (3) negotiators from LDCs with higher per capita GNP are more likely than those from LDCs with lower per capita GNP to perceive the negotiations as being polarized, to regard social issues as important elements of development strategies, and to take advantage of regional cooperation in negotiating; they are less likely to have negative views toward transnational corporations.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 35 , Issue 3 , April 1983 , pp. 335 - 367
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1983

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 U.N. General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX).

2 They included one national from each of 38 states, 2 from 14 states, 3 from 2 states, and 4 from 2 states.

3 The distribution of the respondents among the five institutions is as follows:

The two respondents under “other” cannot be categorized by negotiations. One IGO employee had participated in several international economic negotiations, but had not participated in any in 1976, and one delegate had just taken up his post, but had not yet participated in a negotiation.

4 The World Bank divides LDCs into low-income countries (those with per capita GNP of $300 or less in 1979), middle-income countries (those with per capita GNP of more than $300 in 1979), and capital-surplus oil exporters (Saudi Arabia, Libya, and Kuwait). See IBRD, World Development Report, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1979).Google Scholar The distribution among the three categories of the 51 G-77 states that are included in this “opportunity” sample (39% low-income, 59% middle-income, and 2% capital-surplus oil exporters) almost exactly duplicates the distribution of the 95 states included in the World Bank's classifications (39%, 58%, and 3%, respectively). In its annual surveys, Freedom House categorizes states according to the economic ideology of their governments as capitalist, mixed, or socialist. (See Gastil, Raymond D., “The Comparative Survey of Freedom—VII,” Freedom at Issue, No. 39 [January–February, 1977], 5–15Google Scholar; criteria used for categorization are found on p. 12.) In this categorization, which reflects the situation in 1976, of the 104 countries that would be included among the LDCs as that term is used here (excluding Asian and Caribbean states with centrally planned economies), 48% had capitalist economic systems, 33% had mixed systems, and 19% had socialist systems. In our sample of G-77 states, 53% had capitalist economic systems, 31% had mixed systems, and 16% had socialist systems. In our sample, capitalist economic systems are thus slightly overrepresented, and mixed and socialist systems are slightly underrepresented. Because this sample contains multiple respondents from some states, the proportion of respondents falling in the several categories is different from the proportion of states. Thirty-seven percent of the respondents were nationals of low-income countries, 62% were nationals of medium-income countries, and 1% came from capital-surplus oil exporters. Fifty-six percent of the respondents were nationals of states with capitalist economic systems, 27% came from mixed systems, and 17% came from socialist systems.

5 See Jacobson, Harold K., “Deriving Data from Delegates to International Assemblies: A Research Note,” International Organization, XXI (Summer 1967), 592–613.CrossRefGoogle Scholar

6 The following answers are illustrative of those that were scored as indicating a perception of polarized bloc-to-bloc confrontation:

(Q17) With which country is your country most frequently aligned during this round of negotiations?

A. Group of 77 and all developing countries, or in the case of the ACP-EEC Council, ACP countries.

(Q6b) Why so these issues [mentioned in response to a preceding question] create greater divergences [in the negotiations]?

A. Developed and less developed countries can't agree; proposals by developed countries aren't acceptable to LDCs; developed countries want a bigger share of the market.

(Q17b) Which countries most frequently oppose the solutions sought by your country during this round of negotiations?

A. The U.S., the EEC, and Japan; the developed countries; OECD; some combination of EEC member states, the U.S., and Japan.

(Q6ac) Why do you think that these issues [mentioned in response to the preceding question] are not included [in this round of negotiations]?

A. Developed countries prevent their being discussed.

These questions are listed in descending order of the frequency with with which a polarization-perception type response was given. There were 39 such responses for the first question, 32 for the second, 20 for the third, and 8 for the fourth. Negotiators who gave polarization-perception responses to all four questions were given a score of 5; those with 3 such responses, a score of 4; with 2, a score of 3; and with 1, a score of 2. Negotiators who answered the questions but did not give any polarizarion-perception type response were given a score of 1. Those who did not answer any of the four questions were given a score of 0, and were excluded from subsequent analyses. Applying a Guttman scale to the four questions coded in this manner yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .917.

The application of a Guttman scale with the missing data and negative responses collapsed yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of .92. Jackson plus percentage ratios are, respectively, .73 and .75.

7 By using the respondents' positions on the polarization-perception index as the dependent variable, and the two components of role as independent variables, we arrive at the following least-squares regression results (n = 72)

Polarization perception = 1.21 + .72 Position + .56 Function (Standard error .21) (Standard error .20)

R square .20, standard error of estimate .83, level of significance .0004 (The partial coefficient is unstandardized.)

8 Source for per capita GNP data: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Bank Atlas 1978 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1978).Google Scholar

9 The figures for terms of trade were taken from International Bank for Reconstruction and Development, World Development Report, 1979 (Washington, D.C.: IBRD, 1979)Google Scholar, Table 8, “The Growth of Merchandise Trade,” 140–41. Index numbers in this table use the terms of trade for 1970 as a base. Countries with index numbers of less than 100 for 1977 were categorized as experiencing declining terms of trade, and those with index numbers of 100 or more were categorized as experiencing stable or increasing terms of trade.

10 For a description of the nature and institutional structures of many of these organizations, see Sidjanski, Dusan, Current Problems of Economic Integration: The Role of Institutions in Regional Integration Among Developing Countries (Geneva: U.N. Publication Sales No. E.73, II.D.10, 1974)Google Scholar; see also U.N. Document TD/13/609, Economic Cooperation and Integration Among Developing Countries (Geneva: UNCTAD, 1976)Google Scholar, Vols. I and II and Addenda Vols. 1–5.

11 The questions, and illustrative answers indicative of regional cooperation, are as follows:

(Q8) How does your country determine its position concerning the issues that are involved in the negotiations?

A. In consultation with members of the regional economic cooperation to which the state belongs; by persons in the national capital and in consultation with the members of the regional cooperation group.

(Q11) Are there countries or groups of countries which your country regularly consults concerning the issues that are involved in the negotiations? Which countries does your country consult with respect to which issues?

A. Name of the regional group or of countries that are members of the group.

(Q13) What importance do you attach to consultations with your country's partner countries in (name of the regional group to which the country belongs)?

A. Very important; important; of some importance.

(Q13C) Do the states involved in the consultations agree to coordinate negotiating positions?

A. Always; generally; occasionally.

(Q17) With which countries is your country most frequently aligned during this round of negotiations?

A. Mention of the regional group to which the country belongs or of individual members of the group.

Regional cooperation was indicated by 21% (n=10) of the responses to question 8; 28% (n=13) to question 17; 68% (n=32) to question 11; 83% (n=39) to question 13c; and 87% (n=41) to question 13.

12 Each question was weighted equally. For each, a response indicating regional cooperation was given a score of 3, making 15 the maximum possible. In cases where respondents could either mention the regional group or members of it (questions 11 and 17), respondents were awarded a score of 3 if they gave the name of the regional group, or scores of 1 for each individual member state; respondents could not receive more than 3 points, but they could receive 1 or 2 if they merely mentioned the names of 1 or 2 other members of the regional scheme. For questions 8 and 13, the scoring was either 3 or 0. For question 13c, responses of “always” or “generally” were scored 3, and responses of “occasionally” were scored 2. Applying a Guttman Scale to the five questions coded in this manner yielded a coefficient of reproducibility of 100.

13 The results of a least-square regression are (n=32):

Regional Group cohesion = 3.75 +.0003 Exports (Standard Error .00014)

R square .15, standard error of estimate 2.11, level of significance .03 (The partial coefficient is unstandardized)

14 Because of the distorting effects of petroleum export earnings on per capita GNP of Gabon and Venezuela, median per capita GNP seems to be a more appropriate measure than mean per capita GNP.

15 Using only the 56 responses that can be coded as negative, mixed, or positive, a least-squares regression of these views with the per capita GNP of the respondents' states produces the following results:

TNC Attitude = 2.37 + .0001 per capita GNP (Standard error .00004)

R square .10, standard error of estimate .62, level of significance .02 (The partial coefficient is unstandardized)

16 The results of the three least-squares regression are:

OECD Delegates (n=3) TNC Attitude = 2.29 + .0003 per capita GNP (Standard error .00055)

R square .23, standard error of estimate .72, level of significance .68

G-77 Nationals (n=41) TNC Attitude = 2.19 +.0001 per capita GNP (Standard error .00004)

R square .12, standard error of estimate .56, level of significance .03

G-77 Delegates (n=38) TNC Attitude = 2.18 +.0001 per capita GNP (Standard error .00004)

R square .14, standard error of estimate .55, level of significance .02 (The partial coefficients are unstandardized)

17 A least-squares regression using the number of nationalizations categorized as the dependent variable, and per capita GNP as the independent variable, resulted in the following equation (n=79):

Nationalize TNC = 2.51 − .0002 per capita GNP (Standard error .00007)

R square .07, standard error of estimate 1.16, level of significance .02

18 The relationship is:

19 Schmidt, , “The Struggle for the World Product,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 52 (April 1974), 437–51.CrossRefGoogle Scholar