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Parties and Pressure Groups in Weimar and Bonn

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Charles E. Frye
Charles E. Frye
Affiliation:
Bryn Mawr College
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Extract

In the last forty years, Germany has had three radically different political systems. In each case, the party system, better than any other single index, reflects the style of politics of that period. The highly splintered, multiparty system of Weimar mirrors perfectly the extreme ideological dissension and radicalism of postwar German politics. The one-party system of the Third Reich epitomizes the attempt to destroy the individual's traditional social ties and then to absorb him totally in a coordinated movement. Finally, the two-party system of Bonn reflects the growing social and political consensus concerning the more pragmatic and concrete political goals of postHitlerian Germany. Although these three political systems are intimately related, the main question for us is why the democratic party systems of Weimar and Bonn are so different. The party systems are unintelligible, however, without an understanding of the patterns of pressure-group politics as well.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 17 , Issue 4 , July 1965 , pp. 635 - 655
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1965

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References

1 For a general descriptive account of German parties since their beginnings, see Bergstraesser, Ludwig, Geschichte der politischen Parteien in Deutschland (10th ed., Munich 1960).Google Scholar

2 I consider the CDU and CSU as one party and for brevity's sake usually refer to it hereafter as the CDU.

3 Kitzinger's, U. W.German Electoral Politics (Oxford 1960)Google Scholar is a study of that election.

4 Reichslandbund, Bauernverein, and Bauernschaft. The best descriptive account of these and other pressure groups early in Weimar is Tatarin-Tarnheyden, Edgar, Die Berufsstaende (Berlin 1922).Google Scholar

5 “Around the political power potential which the Deutsche Bauernverband represents, there has gathered an economic concentration of power which in breadth, rationality, and certainty of achieving its goals has no equal in West Germany” (Pritzkoleit, Kurt, Maenner Maechte Monopole [2nd ed., Duesseldorf 1960], 61).Google Scholar

6 Kitzinger, 170–57, discusses the efforts of the minor parties in the 1957 election.

7 Compare Almond, Gabriel A., “A Comparative Study of Interest Groups and the Political Process,” American Political Science Review, LII (March 1958), 275–76.Google Scholar

8 For a statement of determinants of pressure-group politics, see Eckstein, Harry, Pressure Group Politics (Stanford 1960), 15–39.Google Scholar

9 See, for example, Bracher, Karl D., Die Aufloesung der Weimarer Republic (3rd ed., Villingen 1960)Google Scholar, esp. 65–69.

10 The Deutsche Allgemeine Zeitung, May 9, 1928, gives a list of the parties competing in the 1928 election.

11 Pollock, James K. Jr., “The German Party System,” American Political Science Review, XXIII (November 1929), 878–79.Google Scholar

12 Several people have commented upon this startling incongruity. Allan Bullock, for example, has written that “In Prussia … the State Government enjoyed a stability which made it the bulwark of democracy in Germany …” (Hitler: A Study in Tyranny [New York 1961], 121Google Scholar). See also Brecht, Arnold, Federalism and Regionalism in Germany (New York 1945), 20–23.Google Scholar But no one has adequately accounted for the disparity between Prussia's stability in Weimar and, despite its comprising such a large part of Germany, its instability in the Reich.

13 The SPD won the largest plurality of any democratic party in the Republic with 37.9% of the vote in 1919. It dropped to 21.6% in the next election and never again reached 30%.

14 Bracher, 199–200.

15 Saemisch, Ernst, “Wer vertritt das Volk?” Die Tat, XXI (March 1930), 932.Google Scholar

16 For an apt description by a contemporary of the tendency toward party isolation, see Schmitt, Carl, Positioner! und Begrifle im Kampj mit Weimar-Genf-Versailles 1923–1939 (Hamburg 1940), 189.Google Scholar

17 Werner Liebe states, for instance, that “Economic cross-ties, as with the Reichslandbund, the Reichsverband der deutschen Industrie and the Deutschnationalen Handlungsgehilfenverband … bound the National Populists more and more strongly to the German People's Party and to the Center party. It furthered the process of inner accommodation of the moderate circles on the right widi the bourgeois Republic” (Die Deutschnationale Volkspartei, 1918–1924 [Duesseldorf 1956], 105Google Scholar).

18 Weber, Max, “Parlamentarisierung und Demokratisierung,” Gesammelte politische Schriften (Tuebingen 1958).Google Scholar

19 Nipperdey, Thomas, Die Organisation der deutschen Parteien vor 1918 (Duesseldorf 1961), 281.Google Scholar

20 Ibid., 42.

21 Liebe, 30ff.

22 Nipperdey, 249.

23 Pollock, 865.

24 Compare Sultan, Herbert, “Zur Soziologie des modernen Parteiensystems,” Archiv fuer Sozialwissenschaft und Sozialpolitik, LV (1926), 109Google Scholar; Spengler, Oswald, The Decline of the West (2 vols., New York 1928), 11, 457Google Scholar; Buehler, Ottmar, Die Reichsverfassung vom 11. August, 1919 (2nd ed., Berlin 1921), 158.Google Scholar

25 See Kitzinger, who gives considerable weight to the local constituency in the all-important selection of candidates (p. 64).

26 Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties (New York 1954), 95.Google Scholar Perhaps in partial explanation of this disparity, Erich Reigrotzki has suggested that “The parties in Germany according to this [the frequency of membership in groups] have the character not of mass organizations, but much more so of local groups [or] clubs of notables …” (Soziale Verflechtungen in der Bundesrepublik [Tuebingen 1956], 191).Google Scholar

27 Rupert Breitling has pointed out in this connection that in general he believes the German groups, though less numerous, “have a higher degree of organization, a more monopolistic position, and are more privileged” than their counterparts in the United States (Die Verbaende in der Bundesrepublik [Meisenheim am Glan 1955]. 2Google Scholar).

28 Poetzsch-Heffter, Fritz, “Vom Staatsleben unter der Weimarer Verfassung,” Jahrbuch des oeffentlichen Rechts der Gegenwart, XIII (1925), 216.Google Scholar

29 Almond, 278.

30 Eckstein, 16.

31 Buchta, Bruno, Die Junker und die Weimarer Republik: Character und Bedeutung der Osthilfe in den Jahren 1928–1933 (Berlin 1959).Google Scholar

32 The Basic Law of Bonn broke with the German constitutional tradition in officially recognizing parties (Art. 21) as having a role in the formation of the will of the people. For a criticism of this change, see Weber, Werner, Spannungen und Kraefte im westdeutschen Verfassungssystem (Stuttgart 1951), 20–23.Google Scholar Also Leibholz, Gerhard, Der Strukturwandel der modernen Detnokratie (Karlsruhe 1952).Google Scholar

33 Pollock, 882.

34 Ritter, Gerhard A., Deutscher und britischer Parlamentarismus (Tuebingen 1962), 45.Google Scholar

35 Booms, Hans, Die Deutschkonservative Partei (Duesseldorf 1954), 7–8.Google Scholar

36 Although the data are now over twelve years old, useful in this connection is von der Heydte, Friedrich A. and Sacherl, Karl, Soziologie der deutschen Parteien (Munich 1955)Google Scholar, esp. 288–93.

37 Ellwein, Thomas, Klerikalismus in der deutschen Politik (Munich 1955), 99.Google Scholar

38 Poetzsch-Heffter, 131.

39 Poetzsch-Heffter, , “Uebersicht ueber die in den Jahren 1924–1928 gestellten Vertrauens- und Misstrauensantraege,” Jahrbuch des oeffentlicken Rechts der Gegenwart, XVII (1929), 106ff.Google Scholar

40 Poetzsch-Heffter, “Vom Staatsleben unter der Weimarer Verfassung,” 216.

41 Theodor Eschenburg discusses and denounces the increasing pressures upon the bureaucracy in Weimar and particularly in Bonn (Herrschaft der Verbaende [Stuttgart 1955]Google Scholar, esp. 13–16).

42 Ritter talks of “Die der Buerokratisierung der Politik parallel laufende Politisierung der Buerokratie …” (p. 51).

43 Almond, 275–76.

44 Conze, Werner, “Die deutschen Parteien in der Staatsverfassung vor 1933,” in Matthias, Erich and Morsey, Rudolf, eds., Das Ende der Parteien 1933 (Duesseldorf 1960), 9.Google Scholar

45 Neumann, Sigmund, Die deutschen Parteien (Berlin 1932), 10–11Google Scholar; Ritter, Gerhard, “Das politische Parteiwesen in Deutschland,” in his Lebendige Vergangenheit (Munich 1958), 63.Google Scholar

46 Lederer, Emil, “Das oekonomische Element und die politische Idee im modernen Parteiwesen,” Zeitschrift fuer Politik, V (1912)Google Scholar; van Calker, Fritz, Wesen und Sinn der politischen Parteien (Tuebingen 1928), 18.Google Scholar

47 Breitling, 91; Deutsch, Karl W. and Edinger, Lewis J., Germany Rejoins the Powers (Stanford 1959), 90Google Scholar; Stammer, Otto, “Interessenverbaende und Parteien,” Koelner Zeitschrift fuer Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie, IX (1957), 595.Google Scholar

48 See especially Eschenburg.

49 Mommsen, Wilhelm and Franz, Guenther, Die deutschen Parteiprogramme, 1918–1930 (Leipzig 1931).Google Scholar

50 For a comparison of elites, including political elites, in Weimar with those in Bonn, see Edinger, Lewis J., “Post-totalitarian Leadership: Elites in the German Federal Republic,” American Political Science Review, LIV (March 1960).Google Scholar

51 Liebe, 13.

52 In 1924, for example, the number of votes so lost was 710,000 and in 1928 it was 1,320,000 (Pollock, James K. Jr., “The German Elections of 1928,” American Political Science Review, XXII [August 1928], 700Google Scholar).

53 This process was only a part, but nevertheless a significant part, of the tendency throughout the Republic for more and more spheres of life and more and more People to be politicalized—art, theater, drama, the very old, and the very young. No activity and no person was immune from politicalization. See among others Wells, Roger H., German Cities (Princeton 1932), 93Google Scholar: “That city government is far more politicalized now than before the Revolution is generally admitted. …” Also Bertaux, Felix, A Panorama of German Literature (New York 1935), 216, 277.Google Scholar

54 “In almost every school class there are, five years after the revolution, even political parties among the children!” (Flitner, Wilhelm, “Der Krieg und die Jugend,” in Baumgarten, Otto, et al., Geistige und sittliche Wirkungen des Krieges in Deulschland [Stuttgart 1927], 304).Google Scholar

55 The DNVP, for example, had a Bismarckbund for youths of 18 and above; in each of its local organizations it had special committees to deal with men and women in different walks of life; and for the men, it had its own Kampfbund after 1930. Until then, the party had relied upon the closely akin Stahlhelm. Also very important were the party newspapers and motion pictures that were at the disposal of the DNVP through the Hugenberg combine. Hugenberg became the party leader in 1928.

56 See Posse, Ernst H., Die politischen Kampfbuende Deutschlands (2nd ed., Berlin 1931)Google Scholar; Waite, Robert G. L., Vanguard of Nazism (Cambridge, Mass., 1952).Google Scholar

57 Although it is not of major significance, one cannot discount completely the impact of the electoral laws upon the party system. Obviously, electoral laws have made it more difficult for minor parties to compete in Bonn. But as we saw above, the 60,000 vote minimum did not discourage minor parties in Weimar. For a description of the electoral laws in Bonn, see Kitzinger, ch. 2. For a discussion of the impact of electoral laws in general upon a party system, see Eckstein, Harry and Apter, David E., eds., Comparative Politics (Glencoe, Ill., 1963)Google Scholar, Part IV.

58 Neumann speaks of the lack of a “Wir-Bewusstsein” and “insufficient social homogeneity” in explanation of the party crisis (p. 106).

59 Schmitt, Carl, Stoat, Bewegung, Volk (Hamburg 1933), 23–27.Google Scholar

60 Brady, Robert A., The Rationalization Movement in German Industry (Berkeley 1933).Google Scholar

61 See Hass, Hermann, Sitte und Kultur im Nachkriegsdeutschland (Hamburg 1932), 141Google Scholar; Steinhausen, Georg, Deutsche Geistes und Kulturgeschiehte (Halle 1931), esp. 11.Google Scholar

62 “A rise in the social scale at one end and a fall at the other have produced one relatively equal and uniform social class [in West Germany]” (Schelsky, Helmut, “Elements of Social Stability,” German Social Science Digest [Hamburg 1955], 115Google Scholar). See also Dahrendorf, Ralf, “Recent Changes in the Class Structure of European Societies,” Daedalus, XLIII (Winter 1964).Google Scholar

63 “West German Trade Unions,” World Politics, VIII (July 1956), 507.Google Scholar

64 Janowitz, Morris, “Social Stratification and Mobility in West Germany,” American Journal of Sociology, LXIV (1958), 10–11.Google Scholar He concludes that “The weight of the evidence rests on the side of the conclusion that the consequences of social stratification and social mobility are now operating to decrease traditional class-consciousness and to increase social consensus concerning internal matters.”

65 Schelsky, Helmut, Die skeptische Generation (Duesseldorf 1957), 127.Google Scholar

66 Ibid., 148.

67 The Civic Culture (Princeton 1963), 429.Google Scholar

68 See the Grundsatzprogramm der Sozialdemokratischen Partei Deutschlands (Bonn 1959)Google Scholar, esp. 13–14- This is the so-called Godesburger Program.

69 Wallich, Henry C., Mainsprings of the German Revival (New Haven 1955), 11–12.Google Scholar

70 See Bracher, chap. 8.

71 Theodor Geiger speaks of this as the “institutionalization of class antagonism” (Die Klassengesellschaft im Schmeltztiegel [Cologne 1949], 184Google Scholar).

72 Rauschning, Hermann, The Revolution of Nihilism (New York 1939)Google Scholar, esp. 87–88.

73 Lerner, Daniel, The Nazi Elite (Stanford 1951).Google Scholar

74 Topf, Erwin, Die Gruene Front (Berlin 1933).Google Scholar

75 Reigrotzki, 103.

76 Ibid., 242.

77 Ibid., 105.

78 In addition to Pritzkoleit cited above, see Eschenburg, 65–66.