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Nuclear Strategy in Europe

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

T. C Schelling
T. C Schelling
Affiliation:
Harvard University
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Extract

Discussion of troop requirements and weaponry for NATO is much concerned with the battlefield consequences of different troop strengths and nuclear doctrines. But the battlefield criterion is only one criterion, and when nuclears are introduced it is secondary. The idea that European armament should be designed for resisting Soviet invasion, and is to be judged by its ability to contain an attack, is based on the notion that limited war is a tactical operation. It is not.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 14 , Issue 3 , April 1962 , pp. 421 - 432
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1962

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References

1 Schelling, T. C., “The Threat That Leaves Something to Chance,” in The Strategy of Conflict, Cambridge, Mass., 1960, pp. 198–99.Google Scholar