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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 18 July 2011
I Believe that much historical data can be assembled to support the following propositions:
(1) The trend of power politics is toward a bipolar world, and such a world tends toward increasing rivalry, suspicion, and tension between the two leading states, making them develop into garrison states in a continuous relationship of cold or hot war.
(2) A state actively preparing for war in time of peace tends to become over-centralized, intolerant, and aggressive; to encourage other states to gang up against it; and, when war eventuates, to win the first battles but to lose the war.
1 Wright, Q., A Study of War, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1942, pp. 382, 763, 816Google Scholar; Weigert, Hans W. and Stefansson, Vilhjalmur, eds., Compass of the World, New York, Macmillan, 1944, pp. 55 ff.Google Scholar; Ogburn, W. F., ed., Technology and International Relations, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1949, pp. 189–92.Google Scholar See also Morgenthau, Hans J., Politics Among Nations, New York, Knopf, 1948, pp. 270 ff.Google Scholar; Wright, Q., “Accomplishments and Expectations of World Organization,” Yale Law Journal, Vol. LV, No. 5 (August 1946), pp. 882 ff.Google Scholar, and Lasswell, Harold D., “The Interrelations of World Organization and Society,” loc. cit., pp. 889 ff.Google Scholar; Fox, William T. R., The SuperPowers, New York, Harcourt, Brace, 1944, p. 99Google Scholar; Wright, Q., ed., A Foreign Policy for the United States, Chicago, Univ. of Chicago Press, 1947, pp. 12 ff.Google Scholar; Poole, De Witt C., “Balance of Power,” Life, XXIII (Sept. 22, 1947), pp. 76 ff.Google Scholar
Increase of tension (rivalry among the powers), of rigidity (garrison character of each power), and of polarization (reduction in number of powers and orientation about two poles) reciprocally augment one another, all reaching a maximum, periodically at the crises of global wars and secularly at the transitions from systems of power politics to universal states. The above writers emphasize the possibility of mitigating the tendency toward such maximizations by rational action introducing complications.
2 Wright, , A Study of War, pp. 398, 1311 ff.Google Scholar, and tables pp. 641 ff.
3 Ibid., pp. 847 ff., 959 ff., 1007 ff., 1312; Lippmann, Walter, An Inquiry into the Principles of the Good Society, Boston, Little, Brown, 1937, pp. 89 ff.Google Scholar
4 Wright, , A Study of War, pp. 839 ff.Google Scholar
5 Ibid., pp. 1115 ff.; Wright, Q., “Methods in the Study of War,” World Politics, Vol. I, No. 2 (January 1949), p. 252Google Scholar; note 8 below.
6 Wright, , A Study of War, pp. 1223–24, 1233–34, 1236–39.Google Scholar
7 Bush, Vannevar, Modern Arms and Free Men, New York, Simon and Schuster, 1949Google Scholar; Brodie, Bernard, “What Is the Outlook Now?” Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists (B.A.S.), Vol. V, No. 10 (October 1949), p. 268Google Scholar; Baldwin, Hanson W., “Strategy for Two Atomic Worlds,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 28 (April 1950), pp. 386 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Aron, Raymond, “The Atomic Bomb and Europe,” B.A.S., Vol. VI, No. 4 (April 1950), pp. 110 ff.Google Scholar
8 Gestalt psychologists have emphasized the divergence between the “life space” or subjective picture of the total situation in each human mind and the “foreign bull” or situation as it really is. The latter has no influence on human motives and behavior except as it influences the former. See Lewin, Kurt, Principles of Topological Psychology, New York, McGraw-Hill, 1936CrossRefGoogle Scholar, chap, viii on “The Psychological Worlds and the Physical World.”
9 Dulles, John Foster, “Thoughts on Soviet Policy and What to Do About It,” Life, Vol. XX (June 3 and 10, 1946), pp. 112 ff.Google Scholar and 118 ff. (abridged in Reader's Digest, Vol. 49, August 1946, pp. 1–22); War or Peace, New York, Macmillan, 1950, pp. 253 ff. See also Cushman, Robert E., “Freedom Versus Security,” B.A.S., Vol. V. No. 3 (March 1949), pp. 69 ff.Google Scholar; Condon, E. U., “Reflections on Government,” B.A.S., Vol. V. Nos. 6–7 (June-July 1949), pp. 179 ff.Google Scholar
10 Wallace, Henry, Toward World Peace, New York, Reynal & Hitchcock, 1948Google Scholar; Morgenthau, Hans J., “The Conquest of the United States by Germany,“B.A.S., Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 1950), pp. 21 ff.Google Scholar, “The H-Bomb and After,” B.A.S., Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1950), pp. 76 ff., and “On Negotiating with the Russians,” B.A.S., Vol. VI, No. 5 (May 1950), pp. 143 ff.; Szilérd, Leo, “Shall We Face the Facts?” B.A.S., Vol. V, No. 10 (October 1949), pp. 269 ff.Google Scholar and “Can We Have International Control of Atomic Energy?” B.A.S., Vol. VI, No. 1 (January 1950), pp. 9 ff.; Senator Brien McMahon, address in U. S. Senate, Feb. 2, 1950, printed in B.A.S., Vol. VI, No. 3 (March 1950), pp. 80 ff.; Wright, Q., “Political Science and World Stabilization,” American Political Science Review, Vol. 44 (March 1950), pp. 1 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; Herz, John H., “Idealist Internationalism and the Security Dilemma,” World Politics, Vol. II, No. 2 (January 1950), pp. 157 ff.CrossRefGoogle Scholar; American Friends Service Committee, American-Russian Relations, Some Constructive Considerations, Philadelphia, July, 1949.Google Scholar
11 “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” Foreign Affairs, Vol. 25 (July 1947), pp. 566 ff. The article has been attributed to Kennan, George F., who also contributed an article to Reader's Digest, Vol. 26 (March 1950), pp. 1 ff.Google Scholar, entitled “Is War with Russia Inevitable?”