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Strategic Parity and Beyond: Soviet Perspectives

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

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Extract

The strategic relations between the two superpowers have for a long time been influenced by the strategically superior position of the United States. This strategic imbalance has recently been rectified through a massive Soviet program of developing weapons systems that in effect created superpower parity. However, the concepts of strategic superiority and parity in the nuclear context are rather ambiguous. It is the purpose of this study to examine the influence of strategic parity as well as several related factors that have in the past shaped Soviet strategic doctrine and policy, and that are likely to continue to do so in the future.

Type
Research Article
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1971

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References

1 “One may think that Lenin … left us a heritage of guiding theses on the military question… . Such a statement is incorrect, since in reality no such ‘theses’ of Lenin exist.” Stalin, J. V., “Comrade Stalin's Answer to a Letter from Comrade Razin,” Bol-shevikj in (February 1947Google Scholar).

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8 Radio Budapest, April 3, 1958.

9 The following is a typical Khrushchev view on limited war “with which the imperialists want to suppress the national liberation movements and do away with governments that do not suit them… . Should such wars break out, they could soon grow into a world war.” TASS, December 5, 1967.

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