Hostname: page-component-cd9895bd7-q99xh Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-12-28T18:35:50.208Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

The Normalization of an Anomaly: The Workers' Party in Brazil

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  13 June 2011

Wendy Hunter
Wendy Hunter
Affiliation:
University of Texas at Austin, [email protected]
Get access

Abstract

Drawing on historical and rational choice institutionalism, this article seeks to explain the evolution of the Workers' Party as it moved from opposition to government between 1989 and 2002. The Partido dos Trabalhadores (PT), a once radical and programmatic party, came to look more like its catchall competitors over time. This shift resulted from the heightened emphasis placed on immediate vote maximization after Brazil's adoption of market reforms rendered the party's socialist project unviable. Vote maximization made the PT more susceptible to the institutional incentives for building electoral and political support in Brazil, incentives that induce parties to weaken their programmatic positions, forge opportunistic alliances, and resort to patronage and even corruption. To grow, the PT ended up applying such tactics, which it had long condemned. Yet its adaptation was incomplete and uneven due to historical legacies that hindered change. The analysis thus suggests that institutions evolve in response to changing environmental conditions but in ways constrained by past trajectories.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 59 , Issue 3 , April 2007 , pp. 440 - 475
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 2007

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

1 For a discussion of catchall parties and their characteristics, see Kirchheimer, Otto, “The Transformation of the Western European Party Systems,” in LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron, eds., Political Parties and Political Development (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1966Google Scholar).

2 Hall, Peter A. and Taylor, Rosemary C. R., “Political Science and the Three New Institutional-isms,” Political Studies 44 (December 1996CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Katznelson, Ira and Weingast, Barry R., “Intersections between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism,” in Katznelson, and Weingast, , eds., Preferences and Situations: Points of Intersection between Historical and Rational Choice Institutionalism (New York:Russell Sage Foundation, 2005Google Scholar); Thelen, Kathleen, “Historical Institutionalism in Comparative Politics,” Annual Review of Political Science 2 (June 1999CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

3 Bates, Robert H., Greif, Avner, Levi, Margaret, Rosenthal, Jean-Laurent, and Weingast, Barry R., Analytic Narratives (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1998), 10–13Google Scholar.

4 Excellent analyses of the PT in the first decade of its existence remain Rachel Meneguello, PT: A Formaçāo de um Partido, 1979–1982 [The Workers' Party: The Formation of a Party, 1979–1982] (Sao Paulo: Paz e Terra, 1989); Keck, Margaret, The Workers' Party and Democratization in Brazil (New Haven:Yale University Press, 1992Google Scholar).

5 PT governance in cities was characterized by a participatory governing style and a unique array of social programs, such as participatory budgeting, school scholarship funds, microcredit, and family health programs. See Abers, Rebecca, Inventing Local Democracy: Grassroots Politics in Brazil (Boul der, Colo.:Lynne Rienner, 2000Google Scholar); Baiocchi, Gianpaulo, ed., Radicals in Power: The Workers' Party and Experiments in Urban Democracy in Brazil (London and New York:Zed Books, 2003Google Scholar); Genro, Tarso and de Souza, Ubiratan, Orcamento Participativo: A Experiencia de Porto Alegre [Participatory Budgeting: The Experience of Porto Alegre] (Sāo Paulo:Editora Fundaçāo Perseu Abramo, 1997Google Scholar); Nylen, William R., Participatory Democracy versus Ehttst Democracy: Lessonsfrom Brazil (New York:Palgrave Macmillan, 2003CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

6 Samuels, , “From Socialism to Social Democracy: Party Organization and the Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil,” Comparative Political Studies 37 (November 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

7 The organizational determinants of strategic flexibility are important to consider, but space constraints preclude treatment of the issue here.

8 Weber, Max, Wirtschaft und Gesselhchaft [Economy and Society], 5th ed. (Tubingen:J. C. B. Mohr, 1976Google Scholar).

9 Panebianco, Angelo, Political Parties: Organization and Power (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1988), xiiiGoogle Scholar.

10 Lipset, Seymour M. and Rokkan, Stein, Party Systems and Voter Alignments: Cross-National Perspectives (New York:Free Press, 1967), 30Google Scholar.

11 Shefter, Martin, Political Parties and the State: The American Historical Experience (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 1994), 5Google Scholar.

12 Ibid., 33.

13 For an excellent summary of the literature, see Levitsky, Steven, Transforming Labor-Based Parties in Latin America: Argentine Peronism in Comparative Perspective (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 2003), 13–15CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

14 Keck (fn. 4); Meneguello (fn. 4).

15 Mainwaring, Scott P., Rethinking Party Systems in the Third Wave of Democratization: The Case of Brazil (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 1999), 100Google Scholar.

16 See Krasner, Stephen D., “Sovereignty: An Institutional Perspective,” Comparative Political Studies 21 (April 1988CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

17 Pierson, Paul, “Big, Slow-Moving, and . . . Invisible: Macrosocial Processes in the Study of Comparative Politics,” in Mahoney, James and Rueschemeyer, Dietrich, eds., Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences (Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press, 2003Google Scholar); Schickler, Eric, DisjointedPluralism:InstitutionalInnovation andthe Development ofthe U.S. Congress (Princeton:Princeton University Press, 2001Google Scholar); Thelen, Kathleen, “How Institutions Evolve: Insights from Comparative Historical Analysis,” in Mahoney, and Rueschemeyer, ; idem, How Institutions Evolve: The Political Economy ofSkills in Germany, Britain, the United States, and Japan (Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press, 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

18 Downs, Anthony, An Economic Theory of Democracy (New York:Harper and Row, 1957), 11Google Scholar, 28

19 Duverger, Maurice, Political Parties: Their Organization and Activity in the Modern State (London:Metheun, 1954Google Scholar); Kirchheimer (fn. 1).

20 See, for example, Kitschelt, Herbert, The Transformation of European Social Democracy (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1994CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Levitsky (fn. 13); Przeworski, Adam and Sprague, John, Paper Stones: A History of Electoral Socialism (Chicago:University of Chicago Press, 1986Google Scholar).

21 Cox, Gary, Making Votes Count: Strategic Coordination in the World's Electoral Systems Cambridge University Press, 1997CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

22 See Ames, Barry, The Deadlock of Democracy in Brazil: Interestst Identities, and Institutions in parative Perspective (Ann Arbor:University of Michigan Press, 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Mainwaring (fn. 15). Other factors thought to contribute to party fragmentation include runoff elections, low barriers for party registration, and easy access to radio and television advertising. These are discussed by Geddes, Barbara and Ri-beiro Neto, Artur, “Institutional Sources of Corruption in Brazil,” Third World Quarterly 13 (December 1992CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

23 Neto, Octavio Amorim, “O Poder Executivo, Centra De Gravidade Do Sistema Polftico Brasil-eiro,” in Avelar, Lucia and Octavio Cintra, Antonio, eds., Sistema Politico Brasileiro: uma Introducao [The Brazilian Political System: An Introduction] (Rio de Janeiro:Konrad Adenauer Foundation, 2005Google Scholar); Samuels, David, Ambition, Federalism, and Legislative Politics in Brazil (Cambridge and New York:Cambridge University Press, 2003CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

24 Mainwaring, Scott, “Multipartism, Robust Federalism, and Presidentialism in Brazil,” in Mainwaring, Scott P. and Soberg Shugart, Matthew, eds., Presidentialism and Democracy in Latin America (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1997CrossRefGoogle Scholar); Soberg Shugart, Matthew and Carey, John M., Presidents andAssemblies: Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics (Cambridge:Cambridge University Press, 1992), 155CrossRefGoogle Scholar.

25 There is a clear trend in the region away from plurality and toward runoff systems, albeit with reduced thresholds in some instances. See Payne, Mark J., Zovatto, Daniel, and Mateo Diaz, Mercedes, Politics Matters: Democracy and Development in Latin America (Washington, D.C.:Inter-American Development Bank and the International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, 2007), 23Google Scholar. Jorge Lanzaro argues that the establishment of a majority runoff in Uruguay in 1996 was intended to induce the radical left to moderate or impede it from coming to power if it did not. See Lanzaro, Jorge, “La Reforma Electoral de 1996 en el Uruguay” (Manuscript, Instituto de Ciencia Poli'tica, Universidad de la Republica, Montevideo, April 2007Google Scholar).

26 Machado, Joao and Vannuchi, Paulo, “Lula: Maos A Obra,” Teoria e Debate 13 (January/February/March 1991), 6Google Scholar, my translation.

27 Frances Hagopian, “Economic Liberalization, Party Competition, and Political Representation: Brazil in Comparative (Latin American) Perspective” (Manuscript, 2005); Paulo Roberto Figueira Leal, O PT e o Dilema da Representação Politica [The Workers' Party and Dilemmas of Political Representation] (Rio de Janeiro: Editora da Fundação Getúlio Vargas, 2005); Scott P. Mainwaring and Anfbal Perez Linan, “Party Discipline in the Brazilian Constitutional Congress,” Legislative Studies Quarterly 22 (November 1997); Carlos Ranulfo Felix de Melo, “Partidos e Migração Partidária na Cāmara dos Deputados,” Dados 43 (April-June 2000); Celso Roma, “Atores, Preferências E Instituiçāo Na Camara Dos Deputados” (Ph.D. diss., University of São Paulo, 2004); Amaury de Souza, “Political Reform in Brazil, Promises and Pitfalls,” Policy Papers on the Americas, XV, no. 3 (Washington, D.C.: Center for Strategic and International Studies, 2004).

28 Avritzer, Leonardo and Navarro, Zander, eds., A Inovaçāo Detnocrática: O Orçamento Participa tivo No Brasil [Democratic Innovation: Participatory Budgeting in Brazil] (São Paulo:Cortez, 2002Google Scholar); Baiocchi, Gianpaulo, Militants and Citizens: The Politics ofParticipatory Democracy in PortoAlegre ford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 2005Google Scholar); Wampler, Brian, “Expanding Accountability through Participatory Institutions: Mayors, Citizens, and Budgeting in Three Brazilian Municipalities,” Latin American Politics and Society 46 (Summer 2004CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

29 Much of the information in this paragraph was gleaned from an interview with Luiz Gushiken, former party president (1988–90) and close adviser to Lula until 2006. Author interview, Luiz Gu-shiken, Brasilia, August 14,2006.

30 Plinio de Arruda Sampaio, “Sucessão Presidential-Depende Da Gente,” Teoria e Debate 6 (April/May/June 1989).

31 Yan de Souza Carreirāo and Maria D'Alva G. Kinzo, “Partidos Politicos, Preferência Partidária E Decisāo Eleitoral No Brasil (1989/2002),” Dados 47, no. 1 (2004), 141.

32 Brazilian society is considered relatively well organized, as discussed by Encarnación, Omar G., The Myth of Civil Society: Social Capital and Democratic Consolidation in Spain and Brazil (New Palgrave MacMillan, 2003CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Rates of church affiliation are comparatively high. See Frances Hago-pian, “Latin American Catholicism in an Age of Religious and Political Pluralism: A Framework for Analysis,” Comparative Politics (forthcoming); McDonough, Peter, Shin, Doh C., and Alvaro Moises, Jose, “Democratization and Participation: Comparing Spain, Brazil, and Korea,” Journal of Politics 60 (November 1998CrossRefGoogle Scholar). Trade union membership has remained steadier than in other countries that have undergone market reform. See Roberts, Kenneth M., Changing Course: Party System Change Latin America's Neoliberal Era (New York:Cambridge University PressGoogle Scholar, forthcoming). Neighborhood organizations abound in a cross-section of the country's cities.

33 Many of the insights in this paragraph come from an interview with a long established PT member and close associate of Lula. Author interview with Paulo Vannuchi, Brasilia, August 17, 2006.

34 Author interview with PT senator Ana Julia Carepa, Brasilia, August 14, 2003.

35 Almeida, Jorge, Come Vota o Brasikiro [How Brazilians Vote] (São Paulo:Casa Amarela, 1996), 87Google Scholar.

36 Interview with Gushiken (fn. 29).

37 Compatible with this institutional arrangement is the fact that PT politicians with more radical views are to the present day more likely to be found in the Chamber than in positions requiring an electoral majority (namely, the presidency, mayorships of cities with more than two hundred thousand registered voters, and senatorial and gubernatorial positions).

38 IBOPE poll, no. 339, February 1994.

39 Catholics in organized base communities showed nearly universal support for Lula in the 1994 presidential election. Unorganized Catholics showed an average propensity to vote for Lula in that election. See Flávio Pierucci, Antônio and , Reginaldo Prandi, “Religóes E Voto: A Eleiçāo Presidencial De 1994,” Opiniāo Pública 3 (May 1995Google Scholar).

40 DATAKOLHA poll, no. 00730, August 1997.

41 DATAFOLHA poll, no. 00806, February 1997.

42 Souza Carreirāo, Yan de, A Decisāo do Voto nas Eleiçāes Presidencias Brasileiras [Vote Choice in Bra zilian Presidential Elections] (Florianópolis/Rio de Janeiro:Editora da UFSc/Editora FGV, 2002), 89Google Scholar.

43 Almeida (fn. 35), 192–93.

44 Carreirāo (fn. 42), 130.

45 Guillermo Rosas and Elizabeth Zechmeister, “Ideological Dimensions and Left-Right Semantics in Latin America” (Paper presented at the Latin American Studies Association Congress, Miami, Fla., March 16–18, 2000).

46 “Em busca do bilion´rio liberal,” Veja on-line, February 27, 2002.

47 do Amaral, Oswaldo E., A Estrela nāo é Mais Vermelha: as Mudanças do Programa Petista nosAnos 90 [The Star Is No Longer Red: Programmatic Changes in the Workers' Party in the 1990s] (São Paulo:Editora Garçoni, 2003Google Scholar).

48 Baker, Andy, Consuming the Washington Consensus: Mass Responses to the Market in Latin America (Cambridge:Cambridge University PressCrossRefGoogle Scholar, forthcoming).

49 Ibid.; Celso Lafer and Fernando Kasinski Lottenberg, “Nacionalismo E Reestructuração Da Economia,” in Lamoumer, Bolívar, ed., Ouvmdo o Brasil: uma Anáhse da Opiniāo Pública Brastleira Hoje [Listening to Brazil: An Analysis of Contemporary Brazilian Public Opinion] (Sāo Paulo:Editora Sumaré, 1992), 72–73Google Scholar; Maílson da Nóbrega, “Presença do Estado na Economia e na Sociedade,” also in Lamounier, 33–34.

50 Baker (fn. 48).

51 For a discussion of improvements in the Brazilian economy, especially the sustained control of inflation and its resonance with the Brazilian public, see Leslie Elliott Armijo, Philippe Faucher, and Magdalena Dembinska, “Compared to What? Assessing Brazil's Political Institutions,” Comparative Political Studies 39 (August 2006).

52 Many indicators suggested growing state institutionalization. Key among them was lower ministerial turnover. Notably, whereas Brazil had thirteen finance ministers between 1985 and 1994, Cardoso had the same minister of finance (Pedro Malan) during his entire tenure in office (1995–2002). Also, electoral volatility diminished considerably over the 1990s and political competition became more structured. See Panizza, Francisco, “Is Brazil Becoming a Boring Country?” Bulletin of Latin American Research 19 (October 2000), 515Google Scholar.

53 Interview with Gushiken (fn. 29).

54 Singer, André, “Collor Na Periferia: A Volta Por Cima Do Populismo?” in Lamounier, Bolivar, ed., De Geisela Collor: O Balanço da Transiçāo [From Geisel to Collor: Assessing the Transition] (Sāo Paulo:Sumaré, 1990Google Scholar).

53 Meneguello, Rachel, “Electoral Behavior in Brazil: The 1994 Presidential Elections,” International Social Science Journal 146 (December 1995Google Scholar).

56 Almeida (fn. 35), 44.

57 Power, Timothy J., “Brazilian Politicians and Neoliberalism: Mapping Support for the Cardoso Reforms, 1995–1997',” Journal of Inter-American Studies and World Affairs 40 (Winter 1998CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

58 This assessment was made by comparing Lula's first-round vote shares to that of the party in simultaneous races. Public opinion research confirms the average Brazilian to be more drawn to Lula than to the PT. See Samuels, David, “Sources of Mass Partisanship in Brazil,” Latin American Politics and Society 48 (Summer 2006CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

59 Interviews with two key actors from opposing sides of the moderate/radical divide confirmed the use of such arguments at these debates. Author interview withJose Genoino, several-time national deputy and party president (2002–5), São Paulo, August 7, 2006; and author interview with Valter Pomar, Sao Paulo, August 3, 2006. Genoino was an outspoken advocate of electoral pragmatism. Party militant Valter Pomar led the resistance to this trend. See also “Baixos Teores de Radicalismo,” IstoÉ (November 2, 1994), 30–31.

60 José Genoino (fn. 59) and Paulo Vannuchi (fn. 33) stressed in author interviews the difficulty of gaining internal acceptance of the view that the PT should reorient its strategy around the premise that most poor people cared less about the PT'S ideological vision and more about the personal appeal of Lula and any immediate benefits they could receive from him as president. Their instincts received strong confirmation in the groundswell of support that Lula received in his 2006 bid for reelection from recipients of the Bolsa Família, a minimal income transfer program provided to the poorest Brazilians.

61 Jorge Almeida, “Esquerda, Pesquisas e Marketing Politico,” Teoria e Debate 34 (March/April/ May 1997); Luiz Dulci, “Por Uma Nova Estratégia,” Teoria e Debate 34 (March/April/May 1997).

62 Schickler (fn. 17);Thelen (fn. 17,2003).

63 See “PT reelege José Dirceu e abre para alianças,” Gazeta Mercantile September 1, 1997, A-8; and “Partido começa a discutir alianças,” Jornal do Brasil, September 13, 1999, 2-A.

64 At least 15 percent of all Brazilian voters identify as evangelicals. Evangelical Protestantism is expanding rapidly among the working class.

65 The perceived importance of Minas Gerais was one reason the PT also cultivated the support of PMDB governor, Itamar Franco. “PT nao vence sem Itamar, afirma Dirceu,” Folha de Sāo Paulo, May 20, 2000, A-6.

66 “Em busca do bilionário liberal,” Veja on-line, February 27, 2002.

67 Author interview with Gustavo Venturi, Sāo Paulo, August 9,2006.

68 Almeida (fn. 61), 12–15.

69 IBOPE poll, no. 00198, October 1989.

70 IBOPE poll, no. 00339, Februaryl994.

71 IBOPE poll, no. 01259, September 1998.

72 DATAPOIX, February 2002; DATAFOLHA, September 2002.

73 Almeida (fn. 35), 215.

74 IBOPE poll, no. 1811, November 2002, question 28.

75 Estudo Eleitoral Brasileiro, Centro de Estudos de Opiniāo Pública (CESOP) (Campinas:University of Campinas, 2002Google Scholar).

76 Space constraints preclude a presentation of evidence to this effect. A binomial logit analysis suggests that anticlientelistic sentiments and reservations about some aspects of market reform were important predictors of voting for Lula in the first and second rounds of the 2002 presidential contest. See Wendy Hunter, “Growth and Transformation of the Workers' Party in Brazil, 1989–2002,” Working Paper no. 326 (The Helen Kellogg Institute of International Studies, University of Notre Dame, August 2006), 20–21.

77 Kirchheimer (fn. 1), 192.

78 Samuels, David, “Money, Elections, and Democracy in Brazil,” Latin American Politics and Society 43 (Summer 2001CrossRefGoogle Scholar).

79 Whereas Cardoso's declared contributions in the 1994 campaign were $41,366,843, Lula's were $1,741,401. The numbers for 1998 were $37,088,337 and $1,933,129, respectively; Samuels (fn. 78), 31. In 1994 PT candidates (for various offices) each raised only about 10 percent of the amount from business that candidates from nonleftist parties raised. They did only slightly better in 1998 (p. 39).

80 Vannuchi (fn. 33) confirmed the left-wing's reservations about the party developing closer relations with big business.

81 “How a Murder Is Reviving Brazil's Furor over Corruption,” Financial Times, March 28, 2006.

82 Roma (fn. 27).

83 Souza (fn. 27).

84 Hagopian (fn. 27); Leal (fn. 27).

85 Payne, Zovatto, and Diaz (fn. 25), 154.

86 Santiso, Javier, Latin America's Political Economy of the Possible (Cambridge:MIT Press, 2006Google Scholar).

87 Mainwaring, Scott P., Bejarano, Ana Maria, and Pizarro Leongomez, Eduardo, eds., The Crisis of Representation in the Andes (Stanford, Calif.:Stanford University Press, 2006Google Scholar).

88 Coppedge, Michael, “Explaining Democratic Deterioration in Venezuela through Nested Inference,” in Hagopian, Frances and Mainwaring, Scott P., eds., The Third Wave of Democratization in Latin America (New York:Cambridge University Press, 2005Google Scholar).

89 This perception among Venezuelans is documented in Keller, Alfredo R., “Populismo Institutional e Populismo Revolucionário na Venezuela,” in Lodola, German, ed., Neopopulismo na América Latina [Neopopulism in Latin América] (Rio de Janeiro:Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, 2004Google Scholar); Romero, Am'bal, “Rearranging the Deck Chairs on the Titanic: The Agony of Democracy in Venezuela,” Latin American Research Review 32, no. 1 (1997Google Scholar). On Bolivian perceptions, see Aranibar, Antonio, “Los Bolivianos, La Democracia y el Cambio Político: La Emergencia de un Nuevo Sentido Común” (Paper presented at the WAPOR [World Association for Public Opinion Research], First Latin American Congress, Colonia del Sacramento, Uruguay, April 2007Google Scholar).

90 Rene Antonio Mayorga, “Bolivia's Democracy at the Crossroads,” in Hagopian and Mainwaring (fn. 88), 158. Evidence of the weakness of the Bolivian state leading up to the explosion of social protest in 2000 is considerable. One widely used indicator of poor governance is corruption. Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index supports the profile of the Bolivian state as more corrupt than the Brazilian. See Transparency International, Corruption Perceptions Index, 1997, 1998, www. transparency.org/policy_ research/surveys _indices/cpi. Indicators presented by Daniel Kaufman, Aart Kraay, and Massimo Mastruzzi confirm this depiction and rate Bolivia worse than Brazil in overall government effectiveness. See Kaufman, Kraay, and Mastruzzi, “Governance Matters V: Aggregate and Individual Governance Indicators for 1996–2005,” and “Appendices” (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2006). Moreover, efforts at administrative reform in Bolivia brought marginal results. See “Bolivia: From Patronage to a Professional State: Bolivia Institutional and Governance Review,” Report no. 20115-BO (Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2000). The pact that provided a political support base for stabilization and market reform there was greased by a large amount of political patronage, as discussed by Eduardo A. Gamarra, “Crafting Political Support for Stabilization,” in Smith, William C., Acuna, Carlos H., and Gamarra, Eduardo A., eds., Democracy, Markets, and Structural Reform Latin America (Miami:University of Miami, North-South Center Press, 1994Google Scholar).

91 Hall and Taylor (fn. 2); Katznelson and Weingast (fn. 2); Thelen (fn. 2).

92 Hall and Taylor (fn. 2), 955.

93 Ibid.

94 Katznelson and Weingast (fn. 2).

95 Keck (fn. 4), 19.