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Linkage Politics in China: Internal Mobilization and Articulated External Hostility in the Cultural Revolution, 1967-1969

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  18 July 2011

Kuang-Sheng Liao
Kuang-Sheng Liao
Affiliation:
United College, the Chinese University of Hong Kong
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Extract

Studies on the relationship between internal politics and external behavior present many contradictions. This paper attempts to modify previous research methods by focusing on the relationship between internal mobilization and articulated external hostility in China during the period of the Cultural Revolution, 1967-1969.

The findings suggest that during times of authority crisis, domestic mass mobilization tends to be associated with increased antiforeign verbal accusations and mass protests. The Maoists manipulated the expression of external hostility for the purpose of mobilizing internal support for their own domestic programs. Some suggestions concerning the study of China's international behavior and about cross-national research on the linkage of internal politics and external behavior are provided.

Type
Research Article
Information
World Politics , Volume 28 , Issue 4 , July 1976 , pp. 590 - 610
Copyright
Copyright © Trustees of Princeton University 1976

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References

1 Rosenau, James N., ed., Linkage Politics (New York: Free Press 1969), 4–5Google Scholar.

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13 Articulated external hostility in this study indicates the hostility as expressed by mass media and mass protest.

14 Whiting, Allen S., “Foreign Policy of Communist China,” in Macridis, Roy C., ed., Foreign Policy in World Politics (Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice-Hall 1972), 289–319Google Scholar.

15 Dutt, Vidya Prakash, China and the World: An Analysis of Communist China's Foreign Policy (New York: Praeger 1966), 1–2Google Scholar.

16 Ibid. Also see Halperin, Morton H. and Perkins, Dwight H., Communist China and Arms Control (Cambridge: Harvard University Press 1965), 21–22Google Scholar. The authors argue that there was a close relation between a hardening foreign policy line and a similar domestic policy line in 1958, perhaps even into 1960.

17 See Liao, Kuang-sheng and Whiting, Allen S., “Chinese Press Perceptions of Threat: The U.S. and India, 1962,” China Quarterly, No. 53 (01-03 1973), 80–97Google Scholar.

18 “New Victory for the Japanese People,” People's Daily, editorial, 06 24, 1960Google Scholar.

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23 Mark Selden, “The Yenan Legacy: Th e Mass Line,” ibid., 99-215; Johnson, Chalmers, “Chinese Communist Leadership and Mass Response,” in Ho, Ping-ti and Tsou, Tang, eds., China in Crisis, I (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1968), 397–473Google Scholar.

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25 For the Japanese role in peasant mobilization, see Johnson, Chalmers, Peasant Nationalism and Communist Power (Stanford: Stanford University Press 1962), 21–70Google Scholar.

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28 On China's foreign relations, see Gurtov, Melvin, “The Foreign Ministry and Foreign Affairs during the Cultural Revolution,” China Quarterly, No. 40 (10-12 1969), 65–102Google Scholar.

29 On internal political struggles, see Rice, Edward E., Mao's Way (Berkeley: University of California Press 1972)Google Scholar.

30 In 1966, when Mao began to intensify his control, power struggles were taking place in the Propaganda Department of the Central Committee and in the institute of People's Daily. The first reorganization of the Propaganda Department took place in June 1966, when Lu Ting-i was replaced by Tao Chu as Minister. However, this change in the staff of the Propaganda Department did not put the Department under Mao's control. Tao Chu was reported to have close links with the Liu-Teng group and resisted Mao's direction. Consequently, Mao launched a second reorganization of the Propaganda Department in January 1967, in which he replaced Tao Chu and put Wang Li in charge. But this new arrangement lasted only about three months. In April 1967, Mao dissolved the Propaganda Department and put its affairs under the direct control of the Central Cultural Revolution Group, led by Chiang Ch'ing and Ch'en Po-ta. Consequently, all mass media have been under the direct supervision of Mao and his close associates in the Central Group since April 1967. After seizing control of the Propaganda Department and the mass media, the Maoists lost no time in utilizing the media as a powerful weapon to arouse support for their programs and opposition to the Liu-Teng group.

31 It may be argued that serious disputes among Maoists existed. However, there is little evidence that they concerned foreign policy problems.

32 Haas and Whiting (fn. 21), 62.

33 See People's Daily, editorial, February 10, 1967; also Chang, Parris H., “The Revolutionary Committee in China, Two Case Studies: Heilungkiang and Honan,” Current Scene, VI, No. 2 (06 1, 1968), 1–22Google Scholar.

34 This includes U.S. military activities in Thailand, the Philippines, Laos, Cambodia, Taiwan, and Japan.

35 There were two practical difficulties that prevented me from obtaining data for the actual activities of the Soviet Union and the United States. First, these actions were not completely disclosed by the two governments. Reports in Soviet and American newspapers are clearly conditioned by governmental suppression of news and by editors' interests and prejudices. Second, Soviet and U.S. activities varied substantially in nature. The great variety of these activities and the lack of detailed material make it extremely difficult to use any single criterion of measurement. To avoid these problems I used reports in People's Daily, treating them as perceived rather than actual external factors.

36 Reports by People's Daily might be biased due to the geographical distance, the nature of communication between the local region and People's Daily, and the emphasis of the editor. Because of these possibilities the data are not considered as factual; instead, they represent the attitude and the encouragement of the press in these local struggles.

37 In the power-seizure campaign, the factor analysis reveals five important groups of provinces. The first group is best represented by Ninghsia and includes Tientsin, Hopei, Kirin, Kiangsu, Anhwei, Kiangsi, Hupei, Kwantung, and Kansu. The second group includes Shansi and Heilungkiang. The third group is best represented by Szechwan and includes Shensi, Kwangsi, and Honan. The fourth group includes Shanghai and Peking. The fifth group consists of Kweichou alone.

With reference to the denunciation campaign, the factor analysis reduces 29 provinces into six major groups. The first group is best represented by Shanghai and includes Peking, Shansi, and Inner Mongolia. The second group is best represented by Kwangtung and includes Kirin, Shantung, Honan, Szechwan, and Kiangsu. The third group is best represented by Liaoning and includes Kiangsi and Hupei. The fourth includes Kansu and Tsinghai. The fifth includes Kweichou and Heilungkiang. The sixth includes Hopei and Hunan. My paper, “China's Internal Power Struggle and Articulated Hostility Toward the Soviet Union, 1967-February 1969” (unpub.), provides a detailed discussion of these groups.

38 Stepwise Regression Program in MIDAS package of the Statistical Research Laboratory of the University of Michigan.

39 See fn. 12.