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Egalitarianism and the Putative Paradoxes of Population Ethics

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2008

TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ
TORBJÖRN TÄNNSJÖ*
Affiliation:
Stockholm [email protected]
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Abstract

The repugnant conclusion is acceptable from the point of view of total utilitarianism. Total utilitarians do not seem to be bothered with it. They feel that it is in no way repugnant. To me, a hard-nosed total utilitarian, this settles the case. However, if, sometimes, I doubt that total utilitarianism has the final say in ethics, and tend to think that there may be something to some objection to it or another, it is the objection to it brought forward from egalitarian thought that first comes to mind. But if my argument in this article is correct, then it is clear that the repugnant conclusion should be equally acceptable to egalitarians of various different bents as it is to total utilitarians.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 20 , Issue 2 , June 2008 , pp. 187 - 198
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2008

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References

1 Gustaf Arrhenius, ‘Egalitarianism and Population Change’, Intergenerational Justice, ed. A. Gosseries and L. Meyer (Oxford, forthcoming).

2 See Wlodek, Rabinowicz, ‘The Size of Inequality and its Badness – Some Reflections around Temkin's Inequality’, Theoria 69 (2003)Google Scholar.

3 See Arrhenius, ‘Egalitarianism and Population Change’.