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Against Consequentialist Theories of Virtue and Vice

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  01 June 2007

TODD CALDER
TODD CALDER*
Affiliation:
University of Wisconsin–[email protected]
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Abstract

Consequentialist theories of virtue and vice, such as the theories of Jeremy Bentham and Julia Driver, characterize virtue and vice in terms of the consequential, or instrumental, properties of these character traits. There are two problems with theories of this sort. First they imply that, under the right circumstances, paradigmatic virtues, such as benevolence, are vices and paradigmatic vices, such as maliciousness, are virtues. This is conceptually problematic. Second, they say nothing about the intrinsic nature of the virtues and vices, which is less than we could hope for from a theory of virtue and vice. Thus, we have reason to reject consequentialist theories in favour of theories that characterize virtue and vice in terms of the intrinsic properties of these character traits. Aristotle and Thomas Hurka have theories this sort.

Type
Research Article
Information
Utilitas , Volume 19 , Issue 2 , June 2007 , pp. 201 - 219
Copyright
Copyright © Cambridge University Press 2007

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References

1 Julia, Driver, Uneasy Virtue (Cambridge, 2001), p. 82Google Scholar.

2 Thomas, Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value (Oxford, 2001), pp. 19–23Google Scholar.

3 I follow Driver in calling theories that characterize the virtues and vices in terms of their instrumental, or consequential properties, ‘consequentialist theories’ (Driver, Uneasy Virtue, ch. 4). Some people might be tempted to characterize Hurka's theory as a consequentialist theory since he thinks that the value of the virtues and vices depends on the value of objects towards which we have appropriate or inappropriate attitudes. But this does not make his theory a ‘consequentialist theory’ in the sense in which Driver and I are using the term. Hurka's theory is not a consequentialist theory because he characterizes the virtues and vices in terms of their intrinsic properties rather than in terms of their consequential, or instrumental, properties. We might also say that Hurka's theory is an intrinsic theory since he contends that the virtues have intrinsic value and not merely instrumental value. But none of this makes his theory incompatible with consequentialist theories of right action such as utilitarianism. Although Hurka characterizes the virtues and vices non-consequentially, his view is not incompatible with the claim that the right act is the one that best promotes the good. For Hurka virtues and vices are further goods and bads that should be included in our utility calculus when deciding how best to promote the good. See, Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 4–11.

4 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 4–11.

5 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 68; Peter, Railton, ‘Alienation, Consequentialism, and the Demands of Morality’, Philosophy and Public Affairs 13 2 (1984), pp. 134–71Google Scholar.

6 Philippa, Foot, Virtues and Vices and Other Essays in Moral Philosophy (Oxford, 1978)Google Scholar; Philippa, Foot, Natural Goodness (Oxford, 2001)Google Scholar; Rosalind, Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics (Oxford, 2001)Google Scholar.

7 Michael, Slote, ‘Driver's Virtues’, Utilitas 16 1 (2004), pp. 29–30Google Scholar.

8 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, pp. 55–6, 66–7, 82; Julia, Driver, ‘Response to my Critics’, Utilitas 16 1 (2004), pp. 40–1Google Scholar.

9 Jeremy, Bentham, The Principles of Morals and Legislation (Amherst, NY, 1988), p. 131Google Scholar.

10 John, Stuart Mill, Utilitarianism (Indianapolis, 1979), pp. 19, 35Google Scholar.

11 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, pp. 74, 82.

12 Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 3, 8.

13 Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 43–5.

14 Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 43–4.

15 Foot, Virtues and Vices, pp. 33–43.

16 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 67.

17 Driver, ‘Response to my Critics’, pp. 40–1.

18 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 82.

19 I do not mean to say here that character traits chosen by virtuous people merely as a means cannot be virtues. They can be virtues, but they need not be. By contrast, although I will not argue for it here, it is probable that character traits chosen by virtuous people for their own sake are necessarily virtues.

20 It might be objected that if I concede that a virtuous person chooses between virtues on the basis of which will lead to the best consequences, then I have conceded that the consequentialist theory of virtue and vice is correct. But this objection is mistaken since by a consequentialist theory of virtue and vice I do not mean a theory that chooses between virtues on the basis of which leads to the best consequences. I mean a theory that characterizes the virtues and vices solely on the basis of the ability of these character traits to promote or detract from the good. Thus, we can consistently hold an intrinsic account of virtue and vice and allow that we should use a consequentialist principle for deciding between virtues. We just cannot consistently hold an intrinsic account and use a consequentialist principle to decide in what virtue consists.

21 Mary Midgley makes a similar point in her book Wickedness: A Philosophical Essay (London, 1984), pp. 3–9, 73–92.

22 There may be a better word for this virtue.

23 Hurka makes this point about malice in Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 102–4.

24 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, pp. 61–2.

25 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, p. 20.

26 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 11–17.

27 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 13, 16, 84.

28 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 16–17.

29 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, pp. 13, 33.

30 I owe the implausible rigidity objection to an anonymous reviewer for this journal.

31 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, p. 106.

32 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, p. 85.

33 Hurka, Virtue, Vice and Value, p. 85.

34 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, pp. 60, 70.

35 Aristotle, Nicomachean Ethics, trans. Martin Ostwald (Upper Saddle River, NJ, 1999), Book II, 1106b35–1107a, p. 43.

36 NE, 1107b9–1107b16, p. 45. See also NE, Book IV, Section 1, 1119b20–1122a15, pp. 83–9.

37 NE, 1107a35–1107b3, p. 45. See also NE, Book III, 1115a7–1117b20, pp. 68–77.

38 NE, Book II, 1105a30–35, p. 39 and Book VI, 1144b15–25, p. 171.

39 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 70.

40 Aristotle, NE, Book I, 1097b22–1098a18, pp. 16–17.

41 NE, 1099a20–2.

42 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 14.

43 For a discussion of this topic see Julia, Annas, The Morality of Happiness (New York, 1993)Google Scholar.

44 See David, Copp and David, Sobel, ‘Morality and Virtue: An Assessment of Some Recent Work in Virtue Ethics’, Ethics 114 (April 2004), pp. 530–2Google Scholar.

45 Aristotle, NE, Book I, 1099a32–1099b7, pp. 21–2.

46 NE, 1099a6–12, pp. 20–1.

47 NE, 1099a16–19, p. 21.

48 NE, Book II, 1105a30–5, p. 39; Book II, 1106b35–1107a, p. 43.

49 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 167.

50 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 174. See also Copp and Sobel, ‘Morality and Virtue’, pp. 526–31.

51 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 172–3, 185. It might be objected that Hursthouse does have a moralized conception of flourishing since she describes flourishing as real happiness or happiness worth having (Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 9–10). But, I do not think this implies that for Hursthouse virtue is part of the notion of flourishing. Rather it seems that for Hursthouse flourishing is having a satisfying life from one's own point of view. That is what she means by real happiness or happiness worth having. At least this interpretation fits best with the rest of what she says in the book.

52 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 173–4. See also Copp and Sobel, ‘Morality and Virtue’, p. 526.

53 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 124–5.

54 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. 70.

55 Driver, Uneasy Virtue, p. xx.

56 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 11, 124–5.

57 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 128.

58 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, pp. 133–5.

59 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 11.

60 Hursthouse, On Virtue Ethics, p. 167.

61 A similar argument could be made to show that mixed views such as Hursthouse's incorrectly deprive character traits such as malice of their status as vices in worlds where they generally lead to the good. I leave this argument out since Hursthouse herself says little about vice directly.

62 I want to thank Julia Driver, Colin Mcleod, Scott Woodcock, the Moral, Political and Legal Philosophy Research Group at the University of Western Ontario, and an anonymous reviewer for this journal for helpful comments on earlier versions of this article.