The Rights of Nature concept not only breaks with the anthropocentrism of existing (environmental) law; it also recognizes that nature has private interests, in addition to being of public interest. That is, whereas in classic sustainability thinking, the use of certain resources is allowed as long as public interests are not systematically/systemically harmed, rights of nature facilitate the protection of nature before planetary boundaries are transgressed. This recognition of nature as having private interests enables the framing of disagreements around ‘nature’ as matters of corrective justice, which renders the application of private legal doctrines more easily conceivable and arguably even necessary.

The contributions to this Symposium Collection showcase the viability of the intersection of private law and rights of nature. Firstly, it is necessary to research how existing private law will influence the effectiveness of rights of nature. Such an exercise is undertaken by Björn Hoops, who carefully assesses what rights for the German Black Forest would mean in terms of German constitutional property law. The mirror image of this approach is to explore what impact Rights of Nature will have on private law. Such an approach is taken by Alex Putzer and co-authors in their article on the transformation of land-ownership regimes after the introduction of Rights of Nature in Ecuador and Uganda. A third line of scholarship assesses the significance of Rights of Nature for private law theory: Visa Kurki proposes a new concept of legal personhood, prompting us to think through the meaning of statements like ‘a river is a legal person’.

In recent years, climate citizens’ assemblies – randomly selected representative citizens gathered to make policy recommendations on greenhouse gas emissions targets – have gained in popularity as a potential innovative solution to the failure of governments to design and adopt ambitious climate change laws and policies. This article appraises the process and outcomes of three climate citizens’ assemblies held at the national level – in Ireland, France and the United Kingdom – and evaluates their contributions to the making of climate law and policy. In doing so, it first looks at whether citizens’ assemblies have the ability to improve the substance of climate law and suggests that they face difficulties in providing an integrated, holistic response to the climate problem. It then explores how citizens’ assemblies have fed into subsequent legislative processes to show their positive influence and draws lessons for our understanding of the role of citizens’ assemblies in climate lawmaking.

Environmental law remains grounded in a ‘one-world world’ paradigm. This ontological structure asserts that, regardless of variation in world-construing, all beings occupy one ‘real’ world of discrete entities. The resulting legal system is viewed as an independent set of norms and procedures regulating the ‘human’ use of the ‘environment’ by specifying allowable harm rather than adjudicating on mutually enhancing relations. This legal form fails to fulfil its purpose of prevention and remediation, and constitutes a significant barrier to overcoming world(s)-destroying conditions. As such, we take up the injunction for a ‘legal ontological turn’ so as to lay bare these assumptions, and to be able to move beyond their constraints into a renewed exploration at the intersection of vastly differing legalities. In dialogue with systems-grounded ecological jurisprudence(s), Indigenous legal thinking, and anthropological insight, we seek to ground future discussions towards building a truly earth-sustaining form of environmental law for all beings.

Ownership has been a key tool in the exploitation of nature for centuries. However, ownership could also shield natural entities from extraction and pollution if it were vested in them, rather than in humans or corporations. Through a case study of German constitutional property law, this article examines the normative content of this constitutional right. It argues that in owning themselves, natural entities would have numerous tools to fend off human interference with their self-determination. Constitutional property law would require any harmful activity affecting the natural entity to be based upon legislation and necessary to achieve a public purpose. The natural entity would enjoy broader access to justice. Courts would also often award appropriate remedies; where the natural entity would be awarded only compensation, this would be unsatisfactory because money cannot replace nature. The article finds that constitutional property law offers the potential for further protection from human interference, which has not been realized because of anthropocentric value judgments prevalent in German legal doctrine. Ecocentric approaches to ownership and invalidity as a standard remedy would play an important role in unlocking the full potential of ownership for environmental protection.

Children and young people constitute more than one quarter of all plaintiffs in rights-based strategic climate litigation cases filed globally up to 2021. This article examines the implications of this development for children's environmental rights inside and outside the courtroom, relying on the analysis of case documents, media coverage, and the broader literature on strategic climate litigation and children's rights. The article finds that children are well placed to make powerful arguments for intergenerational justice. Conversely, children's rights arguments that address their current-day grievances are under-utilized. More consistent inclusion of these types of claim could strengthen children's environmental rights, clarifying and enforcing legal obligations towards children in the context of the climate crisis as it unfolds. The involvement of children in strategic climate litigation, moreover, can advance the critical role of this demographic as stakeholder in climate solutions. However, the participation of children also raises ethical and practical dilemmas, which are currently poorly understood and only haphazardly addressed.

Humanity is at a crossroads in addressing biodiversity loss. Several assessments have reported on the weak compliance with the Aichi Biodiversity Targets by the parties to the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD). To address this lack of compliance, the challenges in implementing and enforcing CBD obligations must be understood. Key implementation challenges of the CBD are identified through a content analysis of policy documents, multi-stakeholder interviews, and participant observation at the recent CBD Conference of the Parties. Building on this analysis, the article explores the extent to which the review mechanisms of international human rights law, with their various strategies for eliciting compliance, can help to improve CBD mechanisms. The findings of this article reveal insights that the CBD can draw from international human rights law to address these compliance challenges, such as facilitating the participation of civil society organizations to provide specific input, and engaging independent biodiversity experts to assess implementation. The article concludes that insights from human rights review mechanisms are useful for improving the emerging peer review mechanism of the CBD, which is important for strengthening accountability within the post-2020 global biodiversity framework.

International human rights law (IHRL) offers potential responses to the consequences of climate change. However, the focus of IHRL on territorial jurisdiction and the causation-based allocation of obligations does not match the global nature of climate change impacts and their indirect causation. The primary aim of this article is to respond to the jurisdictional challenge of IHRL in the context of climate change, including its indirect, slow-onset consequences such as climate change migration. It does so by suggesting a departure from (extra)territoriality and an embrace of global international cooperation obligations in IHRL. The notion of common concern of humankind (CCH) in international environmental law offers conceptual inspiration for the manner in which burden sharing between states may facilitate international cooperation in response to global problems. Such a reconfiguration of the jurisdictional tenets of IHRL is central to enabling a meaningful human rights response to the harmful consequences of climate change.

Climate emergency declarations occupy a legally ambiguous space between emergency measure and political rhetoric. Their uncertain status in public law provides a unique opportunity to illuminate latent assumptions about emergencies and how they are regulated in law. This article analyzes climate emergency declarations in Canada, the United Kingdom, Australia, and Aotearoa/New Zealand. It argues that these climate emergency declarations reflect back a set of paradoxes about the legal regulation of emergencies – paradoxes about defining the emergency, how time regulates and contains emergency power, and who gets to respond to the emergency and how. These paradoxes challenge long-held and over-simplified assumptions about emergencies and allow us to see the complex ways in which public law regulates emergencies – a necessity in a climate-disrupted world.

Despite the growing prominence and use of Rights of Nature (RoN), doubts remain as to their tangible effect on environmental protection efforts. By analyzing two initiatives in post-colonial societies, we argue that they do influence the creation of institutionalized bridges between differing land-ownership regimes. Applying the methodology of inter-legality, we examine the Ecuadorian Constitution of 2008 and the Ugandan National Environment Act 2019. We identify five normative spheres that influence land-ownership regimes. We find that the established Ecuadorian RoN have an institutionalized effect on the nation's legal system. Their more recently established Ugandan counterpart shows potential to develop in the same direction.

This article examines rosewood trafficking in the Casamance region of Senegal to determine whether acts of massive deforestation committed in the context of a non-international armed conflict can be prosecuted before the International Criminal Court (ICC) as war crimes of pillage and destruction of property under Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii) of the Rome Statute, respectively. It examines two of the main challenges resulting from the application of these provisions to acts of massive deforestation in the light of the ICC Elements of Crimes. Firstly, the article addresses the delicate issue of the establishment of a nexus between these acts and the related non-international armed conflict. Secondly, it discusses whether natural resources may qualify as ‘property’ for the purpose of Article 8(2)(e)(v) and (xii). It then offers avenues of reflection regarding the determination of ownership of these resources to fulfil the requirements of the Rome Statute.

This article categorizes and evaluates how regulatory regimes conceptualize plastics, and how such conceptualizations affect the production, consumption, and disposal of plastics. Taking a doctrinal and policy-oriented approach, it identifies four ‘frames’ – that is, four distinct and coherent sets of meanings attributed to plastics within transnational regulation – namely, plastics as waste to be managed; a material to be prevented; a good (or waste) to be traded freely; and inputs or outputs in production-consumption systems. Based on this analysis, three significant deficiencies in the transnational regulation of plastics are identified: the failure to frame plastics in terms of environmental justice and human rights issues; insufficient focus on plastics prevention (rather than management); and the role of law in reinforcing its production and consumption.

The Rights of Nature movement has recently achieved significant successes in using legal personhood as a tool for environmental protection. Perhaps most famously, the Whanganui River in Aotearoa New Zealand was accorded legal personhood in 2017. These kinds of development have attracted plenty of scholarly interest, but few have scrutinized a foundational underlying question: Can natural areas, such as rivers, or other non-sentient natural entities actually be legal persons?

The case of the Whanganui River is an example of the direct legal personhood model: it purports to grant legal rights to the river directly. Some other jurisdictions have set up legal persons to administer rivers, without declaring the rivers themselves to be legal persons: the indirect legal personhood model. This article offers legal-philosophical arguments for why legal personhood cannot be attributed to rivers directly.

Normally, legal persons can hold claim-rights and be legally wronged. Some legal persons, such as human adults, can also be held legally responsible and exercise legal competences by entering into contracts. Natural entities cannot do any of these things. Hence, they cannot be legal persons directly; rather, their putative direct legal personhood will collapse into indirect legal personhood. Hence, treating natural entities as direct legal persons amounts only to a legal fiction. Such fictions may be justified for symbolic reasons. However, if environmental protection requires setting up a legal person to protect a natural entity, such protection in most cases can be realized without claiming that the natural entity itself would have become a legal person.

The law of international watercourses consists mainly of a series of bilateral, multilateral, regional, and global agreements that establish binding rules through which state parties jointly manage transboundary water resources. China similarly manages its shared freshwaters through a series of bilateral agreements. Increasingly, however, it relies on non-binding soft law instruments to manage these resources with its riparian neighbours. An important example of this is the Lancang-Mekong Cooperation, a branch of the Belt and Road Initiative. Its use of soft instruments, which recognize international law and promote projects, displays evidence of merging and emerging normativities, ensuring that it is capable of playing both a supporting and a developmental role in the law of international watercourses.

China's climate governance is distinguished by the contrast between an abundance of policies on climate change and the lack of legally binding laws. This article argues that Chinese courts bridge this difference, which fosters a ‘rule of climate policy’ rather than a strict rule of law. The effective authority of Chinese climate policy is made possible in practice both by provisions of the Chinese Constitution and the prevailing use of legal reasoning. China's constitutional design of ‘ecological civilization’ delegates the duty and the power of managing climate change issues to the executive branch of its government. Most Chinese documents on climate governance have no binding legal force, which means, according to positive law, that they cannot serve as legal grounds for judicial decisions. Chinese judges, in deciding climate-related disputes, must combine legal provisions and non-binding materials to achieve regulatory goals. They use non-legal materials to support statutory or contractual interpretations and determine the existence or limits of rights, which alters the meaning and scope of existing legal terms and principles. This rule of climate policy is possible in the courtroom because judges justify public policy considerations with arguments of principle that are substantiated in various non-binding climate plans.

At first blush, normative arguments justifying representation of future generations and nature appear to rest on contradictory values. This article argues, however, that there are strong synergies between these discourses. Arguments for institutions for future generations based on human rights are compared with justifications for proxy representation of nature based on ecological justice, Indigenous ecological justice and socio-ecological justice. Case studies involving the Welsh Commissioner for Future Generations, the Aotearoa New Zealand Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment, and ascribing legal personality to rivers in Australia and Aotearoa New Zealand, are presented to demonstrate that representing future generations and nature reflect mutually supporting values. Building on these synergies is vital for reform efforts.

Groundwater is a largely unseen common pool resource. Yet, driven by strong economic incentives, whether or not encouraged by existing policies, and the difficulty to exclude others, groundwater users are competing with each other to extract as much as possible, with devastating consequences for its sustainability. The challenges faced for sustainably managing such common pool resources, on which people have established de facto individual rights, are manifold. However, creating a market for trades of some kind in ecosystem services associated with groundwater could actually enhance the protection of this critical resource on the basis that protection can benefit individual groundwater users economically as well as provide a broader public good. This article uses Elinor Ostrom's design principles as an analytical tool to examine how market-based approaches such as payments for ecosystem services (PES) fit with some of the governance models that could be used to protect and enhance groundwater as a common pool resource. It argues that while there are specific design challenges to be overcome, PES as an institutional tool can align with Ostrom's ideas for the governance of groundwater.

It is sometimes assumed that, in order for animals to be adequately protected by the legal system, their status first needs to change from property to person in one fell swoop. Legal personhood is perceived as the necessary requirement for animals to possess legal rights and become visible in law, distinguished from legal things. In this article I propose an alternative approach to animal legal personhood, which construes the road towards it as a gradual transition rather than a revolution. According to this alternative approach, animals become increasingly visible in law when their existing simple rights are shaped to function more like the rights of humans. Instead of a condition for the possession of rights, legal personhood should then be regarded as a (potential) consequence of growing animal rights.