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Cicero, Pompey, and the Rise of the First Triumvirate

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  29 July 2016

Thomas N. Mitchell
Thomas N. Mitchell*
Affiliation:
Swarthmore College
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Extract

Modern analyses of the course of Roman politics in the years 62–60 b.c. reveal a high level of agreement in comparison with the welter of conflicting theories that have emerged from studies of the political activity of the fifties.

The dismissal of his army at Brundisium and certain seemingly conciliatory gestures toward the conservative elements of the Roman aristocracy have led most scholars to conclude that in 62 b.c. Pompey, at heart a conservative, was eager for closer ties with Rome's oligarchs, and willing to accept the notion of government by the senate if his immediate but modest needs were met.

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Articles
Information
Traditio , Volume 29 , 1973 , pp. 1 - 26
Copyright
Copyright © Fordham University Press 

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References

1 The bibliography on this period is too extensive to list here. Some more interesting recent discussions of Pompey's conservatism include: Sherwin, A. N.-White, ‘Violence in Roman Politics,’ JRS 46 (1956) 5–9; Gelzer, M., Kleine Schriften II (Wiesbaden 1963) 146–189; R. Rossi, F., ‘Sulla lotta politica in Roma dopo la morte di Silla,’ PP 20 (1965) 133–152; E. Gruen, S., ‘Pompey, the Roman Aristocracy and the Conference at Luca,’ Historia 18 (1969) 71–108; Meier, C., Res Publica Amissa (Wiesbaden 1966) 270–300. Laffi, U., ‘Il mito di Silla,’ Athenaeum 45 (1967) 177–213.Google Scholar

2 The highlights of Cicero's consulship are related by Dio 37.25 ff. Cf. Cicero, Pis. 4; Att. 2.1.3; Pliny, NH 7.117.Google Scholar

3 Cf. Pis. 4; Phil. 2.11; Sest. 137; Rull. 1.26; Rab. 33. Sallust, Cat. 49, and Dio 37.35, relate that many suspected Caesar and Crassus.Google Scholar

4 The prosecution of Rabirius in 63 should have served as a warning that any attempt by the senate to claim new powers over the lives of citizens would stir a furor.Google Scholar

5 Sallust, , Cat. 51. Bestia's opposition is reported in Plutarch, Cic. 23.1; Cicero, , Ad Brut. 1.17.1; Sulla 31; Schol. Bob. 82 Stangl.Google Scholar

6 Fam. 5.2; Pis. 3; Sulla 34; Plutarch, , Cic. 23.1; Dio 37.42. Cicero responded with the speech Contra Contionem Metelli, Q.; Quintilian, , Inst. Or. 9.3.50; Gellius, , 18.7.7; Att. 1.13.5.Google Scholar

7 Dio 37.42. Cf. Sest. 11. On the senate's responsibility in such instances cf. Sest. 61; Dio 38.14; Greenidge, A. H. J., Legal Procedure of Cicero's Time (Oxford 1901) 324.Google Scholar

8 Pis. 6; Pliny, , NH 7.117; Plutarch, , Cic. 23.2; Appian, , BC 2.7; Dio 37.42.Google Scholar

9 Plutarch, , Cat. Min. 26.1; Cic. 23.2; Appian, , BC 2.7; Pliny, , NH 7.117. Cf. Frank, T., An Economic Survey of Ancient Rome I (Baltimore 1933) 328.Google Scholar

10 Suetonius, , Div. Jul. 15; Dio 37.43–44; Plutarch, , Cat. Min. 27–29. Caesar was already angling for Pompey's favor in 63, when he supported the proposal of the tribune Labienus to grant special honors to Pompey. Velleius 2.40; Dio 37.44. Cf. L. Taylor, R., ‘Caesar and the Roman Nobility,’ TAPA 73 (1942) 19.Google Scholar

11 Dio 37.43; Plutarch, , Cat. Min. 26; Cic. 23; Fam. 5.2.8: ‘cum agere coepisset, tertio quoque verbo orationis suae me appellabat, mihi minabatur.’ For Cicero's attitude towards the bill cf. Sest. 62. There is one other ancient source on the activity of Nepos, the Scholia Bobiensia (134 Stangl), which does not, however, discuss the content of this particular bill, but states that Nepos tried to carry ‘plerasque leges per seditionem,’ including one to recall Pompey ‘adversus arma Catilinae,’ and another to grant him the consulship in absentia. The comment is carelessly worded, for Nepos cannot have brought several bills to a vote in so short a period of time, nor would repeated attempts to carry legislation with repeated acts of violence have escaped mention in the other ancient historians. Nepos may have framed several bills, one of which possibly advocated a purely military command for Pompey, when the military threat from Catiline still seemed significant, but it appears certain that he tried to carry only the bill described by Plutarch and Dio. The scholiast has failed to distinguish between proposals promulgated and those actually brought to a vote, and his vague account of Nepos’ overall activity is of little value in considering the specific measure under discussion here.Google Scholar

12 In both of his accounts, Plutarch indicates that Pompey was to have jurisdiction in Rome. The different reasons probably reflect the different emphasis of different Lives, and are not necessarily contradictory. Putting Pompey in control of the city would both end the allegedly dynastic behavior of Cicero and the senate in their handling of the conspiracy, and transfer to the general responsibility for the elimination of remaining threats from Catiline's followers, threats which were by no means considered ended by the action of December 5. It should be noted that Plutarch's words (Cat. Min. 26): παϱαλαβόντα σώξειν τὴν πόλιν ὡς ὑπὸ Καταλίνα κινδυνεύουσαν do not neccesarily imply an external military threat.Google Scholar

13 It is even possible that, by the time Nepos’ proposal came to a vote, Catiline was already dead. Dio says that his defeat came at the very beginning of 62: εν ἀϱχῇ εὐθύν τοṽ ἔτους. The accounts of Sallust, Cat. 57, and Appian, BC 2.6, also point to an early date in 62. It is also worth mentioning that if Pompey were placed in command of military operations against Catiline, one of the people adversely affected would be Nepos’ own brother, Metellus Celer, one of the commanders confronting Catiline at the beginning of 62.Google Scholar

14 According to Plutarch, Cat. Min. 26.29, the senators considered the proposal μανία, extreme enough to cause a civil war. J. Strachan, L.-Davidson, Cicero (London 1898) 161, saw the close connection between Nepos’ bill and the controversy over the executions, but he did not develop the point.Google Scholar

15 Pompey had bitter enemies among the Metelli. Cf. E. Gruen, S., op. cit. (n. 1. supra) 82. Nepos was Pompey's legatus, but the history of the late republic does not show that legati were firmly bound to their generals. Caesar, the other major force behind the bill, was no stranger to the tactic of backing moves which he did not expect to succeed, but which might increase his following regardless of the outcome. The prosecution of Rabirius is an example.Google Scholar

16 Plutarch, , Cat. Min. 20; Mur. 81; Sest. 11; Fam. 5.2.6.ff. For Bestia's associations with Catiline, cf. Sallust, Cat. 43; Sulla 31.Google Scholar

17 Att. 2.12, 2.7. Cf. Gruen, , op. cit. (n. 1 supra) 82.Google Scholar

18 In the face of determined opposition from the senate and both consuls, Nepos and Caesar could succeed only by the use of massive force. The speed with which they abandoned their efforts indicates that they were not prepared for such a course.Google Scholar

19 Plutarch, , Cat. Min. 29; Dio 37.43; Suetonius, , Div. Jul. 55; Caesar, , BC 1.7.Google Scholar

20 Suetonius, , Div. Jul. 16; Plutarch Cat. Min. 29.Google Scholar

21 Cf. Att. 2.9.2. Cicero admits that the potentia of the senate was invidiosa in 63 and 62. The importance of libertas to the Romans is also attested by Cicero's belief that excessive power in any group or individual, unless forcefully imposed, would not be tolerated for long. Cf. Att. 2.9.1, 2.21.2.Google Scholar

22 Att. 1.16.11. He finds it noteworthy that he was not hissed at the games. Cf. Att. 1.19.6, 2.3.4. Another attempt early in 62 to implicate Caesar in the Catilinarian conspiracy is a further indication of the concern of the optimates at the rising strength of their opponents. The similarity between the effort and an earlier one by Catulus and Piso suggests the same authors for both. Cf. Dio 37.41; Suetonius, Div. Jul. 17; Sallust, Cat. 49.Google Scholar

23 Cf. Comm. Pet. 6.33; Allen, W., ‘On the Importance of Young Men in Ciceronian Politics,’ CJ 33 (1938) 357–359; Frank, T., ‘Cicero and the Poetae Novi,’ AJP 40 (1919) 396–415. For the equestrian centuries cf. Nicolet, C., L'ordre équestre à l'époque républicaine, 312–43 av. J. C. (Paris 1966); T. Wiseman, P., ‘The Definition of Eques Romanus in the Late Republic and Early Empire,’ Historia 19 (1970) 67.Google Scholar

24 Cf. Att. 1.14.5, 1.16.1.11, 1.18.2; Cael. 25–30, 39–42, 48.Google Scholar

25 Att. 2.7.2, 2.8.1, 2.12.2, 2.18.1, 2.19.3, 2.24.2.Google Scholar

26 Cael. 10–12; Mur. 49; Sallust, Cat. 14.Google Scholar

27 Sulla 29–35. From this same passage it is clear that such sentiments were frequently heard and listened to with sympathy.Google Scholar

28 Att. 1.19.8: ‘odia autem illa libidinosae ac delicatae iuventutis quae erant in me incitata, sic mitigata sunt. …’Google Scholar

29 Prov. Cons. 27; Dio 37.44; Plutarch, Cat. Min. 29–30. There is a conflict between the testimony of Dio and Plutarch. The former says that the senate granted a request from Pompey that the elections be postponed to enable Piso to stand; the latter says that the purpose of the request was to enable Pompey to campaign for Piso, and that it was denied. Cf. Stein, P., Die Senatssitzungen der Ciceronischen Zeit (Münster 1930), whose lengthy footnote (p. 19), arguing for acceptance of Dio's account, is convincing.Google Scholar

30 Sulla 67; Planc. 85; Fam. 5.7.2. Schol. Bob. 167 Stangl. Cicero found in Pompey's reply ‘exiguam significationem tuae erga me voluntatis.’Google Scholar

31 Cicero says that the letter was sent reipublicae causa and was calculated reipublicae prodesse. Fam. 5.7.2; Planc. 85.Google Scholar

32 The only indication in this whole period that Pompey had any desire to associate himself with the conservatives is his offer of a marriage alliance with the family of Cato. But this move is no proof of conservative leanings in Pompey, nor its failure proof of unwillingness in the senate to conciliate him. Cato was at this time only a tribunicius and, though a spirited and influential senator, he cannot be regarded as the leader or spokesman of any faction. He was opinionated and independent and many of his views, which often prevailed only through his notorious use of filibustering, were not widely shared in the senate. His prosecution of Murena in 63, his opposition to honors for Pompey (Dio 37.21), his opposition to the equites in 61 (Att. 1.18.7, 2.1.8), and to Caesar in 60 (Plutarch, Cat. Min. 31), are examples. His hostility to Pompey was well known and the latter's attempt to neutralize it tells little about his political sympathies.Google Scholar

33 It is seldom emphasized that Clodius was not actually caught in Caesar's house, and that positive identification of a heavily disguised man would be difficult to establish.Google Scholar

34 Plutarch, , Luc. 30–34; Dio 31. 14–18; Har. Resp. 42. Cf. Lintott, A. W., ‘P. Clodius Pulcher — Felix Catilina,’ Greece and Rome 14 (1967) 157–169; J. Balsdon, P. V. D., ‘Fabula Clodiana,’ Historia 15 (1966) 65–73.Google Scholar

35 For the membership of the College of Pontiffs cf. L. Taylor, R., ‘Caesar's Colleagues in the Pontifical College,’ AJP 63 (1942) 385–412. The letters of Cicero dealing with the incident are: Att. 1.13, 1.14, 1.16.Google Scholar

36 It is impossible to say whether Caesar and Clodius were friends or active allies at this time. They were both opponents of the status quo and both targets of the optimates in the incident under discussion, but it would seem that Caesar's main aim in the whole affair was to keep his name out of it as much as possible. He immediately divorced his wife on grounds that the mere allegations against her made it necessary. The move might win him sympathy; it would certainly help to separate him from any impropriety which might be proven to have taken place in his house and would thwart to some extent the goal of the optimates to associate his name with sacrilegious immorality. He was in Spain when Clodius came to trial and does not appear to have played any open part in the struggle surrounding the senate's bill, though it is possible that, like Pompey, he worked behind the scenes to defeat the conservatives.Google Scholar

37 The precise date of the trial cannot be determined. Cf. Balsdon, , op. cit. (n. 34 supra) 65. The notion that Crassus was behind the bribery must be rejected. So barefaced a tactic to defeat the senate in a crucial fight is contrary to everything we know about Crassus’ politicalstyle and relationship with the senate at this time. Cf. Att. 1.14.3, 1.18.6; Dio 37.56.5; T. Wiseman, P., ‘Two Friends of Clodius in Cicero's Letters,’ CQ 18 (1968) 297–299; Frank, , op. cit. (n. 23 supra); E. Gruen, S., ‘P. Clodius: Instrument or Independent Agent?’ Phoenix 20 (1966) 120–130.Google Scholar

38 Cf. Att. 1.16.6, 1.18.3.Google Scholar

39 Cicero does not comment on the substance of Pompey's speech at his first contio, but it is probably that speech which is referred to by Orosius, 6.6.4, and Pliny, NH 7.99. Cf. Gelzer, M., Pompeius (München 1949) 118.Google Scholar

40 Att. 1.14.1.Google Scholar

41 Cf. Haskell, H., This was Cicero (London 1942) 210; Syme, R., The Roman Revolution (Oxford 1939) 33; Mommsen, T., The History of Rome <e>trans. by Dickson, W. P. IV (New York 1895) 501; CAH IX 507.trans.+by+Dickson,+W.+P.+IV+(New+York+1895)+501;+CAH+IX+507.>Google Scholar

42 Cf. Gelzer, , op. cit. (n. 39 supra) 119; L. Taylor, R., Party Politics in the Age of Caesar (Berkeley 1949) 129; Van Ooteghem, J., Pompée le Grand (Brussels 1954).Google Scholar

43 The words aperte tecte are variously interpreted. I accept the explanation of Shackleton Bailey, R. D., Cicero's Letters to Atticus I (Cambridge 1965) 309.Google Scholar

44 Cicero is sharply critical of Pompey throughout the early months of 61. Cf. Att. 1.13.4, 1.14.1, 1.16.12.Google Scholar

45 Att. 1.13.2, 1.14.5.Google Scholar

46 Plutarch, , Luc. 30–34; Att. 1.14.5. Plutarch twice relates that Pompey was very friendly with Clodius early in 60. Cat. Min. 31; Pomp. 46.Google Scholar

47 Cf. Stockton, D., ‘Cicero and the Ager Campanus,’ TAPA 93 (1962) 480.Google Scholar

48 For Pompey's reticence and evasiveness cf. Dio 36.24; Att. 2.16.2, 4.1.7, 4.9.1, 4.15.7; Fam. 1.1.3, 1.2.3, 1.5b.2; Q.F. 2.2.3, 3.8.4.Google Scholar

49 Cf. Att. 2.16.2, 2.21.3.Google Scholar

50 Syme, , op. cit. (n. 41 supra) 31.Google Scholar

51 Afranius was a legatus of Pompey in the campaigns against Sertorius and Mithridates. The sources are listed in T. Broughton, R. S., Magistrates of the Roman Republic II (New York 1952) 99, 156; cf. Att. 1.16.12, 1.18.3.Google Scholar

52 Among the praetors were Metellus Nepos, Attius Balbus, and Lentulus Spinther, all adherents of Pompey at this time. Cf. Broughton, , op. cit. (n. 51 supra) 183; Bailey, Shackleton, op. cit. (n. 43 supra) 374.Google Scholar

53 Pompey's triumph is described by Plutarch, Pomp. 45; Appian, , 12, 116; Pliny, , NH 7. 95 ff; Dio 37. 21. R. Smith, E., Cicero the Statesman (Cambridge 1966) 136, is in error when he states that Pompey omitted reference to Crete.Google Scholar

54 Cf. T. Broughton, R. S., ‘Notes on Roman Magistrates,’ TAPA 77 (1946) 35–43; F. Marsh, B., Founding of the Roman Empire (2nd ed. Oxford 1927) 84. For Pompey's eastern settlement see Ooteghem, Van, op. cit. (n. 42 supra) 244.Google Scholar

55 Dio 37. 49; Plutarch, , Pomp. 46; Luc. 42.5; Cat. Min. 36; Appian, , BC 2.9.Google Scholar

56 Plutarch, , Pomp. 46. Cf. Badian, E., Roman Imperialism in the Late Republic (Ithaca 1968) 78. For the terms of the bill cf. Dio 37.50; Att. 1.19.4.Google Scholar

57 Att. 1.18.6, 1.19.4.Google Scholar

58 Att. 1.19.4, 2.1.8; Dio 37.50.Google Scholar

59 Cicero's report of the planned coalition is extremely casual (Att. 2.3.3). It seems certain that Pompey and Caesar had come to an agreement before the elections, since Pompey, who was undoubtedly interested in securing a friendly consul, does not appear to have been backing any other candidate. Lucceius was later a friend of Pompey, but he was an obscure figure, and it is unlikely that the general was promoting another nonentity after his experience with Afranius. Crassus and Pompey were probably not reconciled before the end of 60, since there is no reason to reject Balbus’ statement to Cicero in December that Ceasar was only then working to bring them together.Google Scholar

60 For Cicero's doctrine of compromise and coexistence cf. note 69.Google Scholar

61 Att. 1.17.8, 1.18.3.7, 2.1.7.8; Q.F. 1.1.32.Google Scholar

62 Att. 1.14.4, 1.16.8, 1.17.9, 1.18.1.6, 1.19.6, 1.20.3, 2.1.7. Cicero's phrases concordia ordinum and consensio Italiae amounted to the same thing; the latter did not represent a development in his thinking, as is sometimes suggested. Cf. Syme, op. cit (n. 41 supra) 16. The strength of the equites and the basis of Cicero's hope in them lay mainly in the fact that the order included the upper classes of Italy.Google Scholar

63 The Social War and Sullan reforms brought many equites into the senate, and forged new links between the orders. The effect of these backbenchers on senatorial policy remains debatable, however, and the signs of increased unity between the old nobilitas and the equester ordo remain few. Cicero regarded the cooperation of the two orders in 63 as a remarkable achievement.Google Scholar

64 Att. 1.17.8–10, 1.18. passim, 1.19.6–8, 1.20.2–3, 2.1.6–8.Google Scholar

65 Att. 1.13.4, 1.14.1, 1.18.3. Once (Att. 1.16.11), Cicero mentions that he and Pompey are on good terms, but this is not in conflict with the many signs of their political differences, for at no time, not even in 59, did Pompey and Cicero cease to have a cordial personal relationship.Google Scholar

66 Att. 1.17.10: ‘ad retinendas opes nostras;’ Att. 1.19.6: ‘putavi mihi maiores quasdam opes et firmiora praesidia esse quaerenda.’ Cf. Att. 1.20.2. Clodius was already threatening, and Cicero was taking notice. Att. 2.1.5.Google Scholar

67 Att. 1.18.4.6, 1.20.2, 2.1.6.Google Scholar

68 Att. 1.20.2, 2.1.6–7.Google Scholar

69 Cf. Att. 2.14.1, 2.19.3, 2.21.2; Prov. Cons. 20–24; Balb. 60–62; Planc. 91–94.Google Scholar

70 Att. 2.3.3. He was already turning his mind to literary pursuits by May 60 (Att. 1.20. 7), always an indication in Cicero of unhappiness with public life.Google Scholar