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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 29 February 2016
In Summa theologiae 1a.2.1, St. Thomas Aquinas asked “whether that God exists is self-evident” and argued that it is not. His response is generally taken as a rejection of St. Anselm's argument for the existence of God in the Proslogion. In his Summa quaestionum ordinarium (hereafter SQO) 22, Henry of Ghent asks as his second question: “whether that God exists is naturally self-evident to a human being,” and like St. Thomas, he argues that the proposition that God exists is not self-evident. Neither Thomas nor Henry mentions the Archbishop of Canterbury in these questions, although they both use expressions that are clearly borrowed from the argument in the Proslogion. Moreover, both Thomas and Henry also cite in the arguments to the contrary St. John Damascene's statement in De fide orthodoxa that “the knowledge that God exists is naturally implanted in all,” as well as Aristotle's definition from the Posterior Analytics of what it means for a proposition to be self-evident. Henry, however, regards the Proslogion argument quite favorably and examines it at length in SQO 30.2 in an article on the immutability of God in which he asks whether God can be thought not to exist and argues that God cannot be thought not to exist, at least if one has a proper concept of God. Hence, Henry holds both that God cannot be thought not to exist and that the proposition that God exists is not naturally self-evident to a human being, and that would seem to be contradictory or at least to require some careful distinctions.
1 “Utrum Deus potest cogitari non esse” (Henry of Ghent, Summa quaestionum ordinarium 20.3 [Badius, fol. 179vK]). Since the new critical edition of Henry's Summa for these questions is not complete, one has to rely on the Badius edition (Paris, 1520), which was reprinted by The Franciscan Institute, St. Bonaventure, NY, in 1953. In citing the Badius edition I give the folio number, whether it is recto or verso, and the paragraph letter, all of which are also found in my translation of the articles. See Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Existence and Essence , trans. Decorte, Jos and Teske, Roland J. S.J., Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 5 (Leuven, 2005), and Henry of Ghent's Summa: The Questions on God's Unity and Simplicity , trans. Teske, Roland J. S.J., Dallas Medieval Texts and Translations 6 (Leuven, 2006).Google Scholar
2 “Omnibus cognitio existendi Deum naturaliter est inserta” (Damascene, John, De fide orthodoxa 1.2, ed. Buytaert, Eligius M., O.F.M. [St. Bonaventure, NY, 1955], 14).Google Scholar
3 Jean Paulus clearly held that Henry's metaphysical argument is a version of the so-called ontological argument in his article, “Henri de Gand et l'argument ontologique,” Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen âge 10 (1935–36): 265–323, esp. 318. Macken, Raymond, on the other hand, claims that the metaphysical argument is not an ontological argument in “The Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God in the Philosophy of Henry of Ghent,” Franziskanische Studien 68 (1986): 247–60. For further evidence of the scholarly dispute over whether Henry's metaphysical argument is a version of the Anselmian argument, see my “Henry of Ghent's Metaphysical Argument for the Existence of God,” The Modern Schoolman 83 (2005): 19–38, in which I argued that Henry's metaphysical argument is a version of the Proslogion argument. Other studies on Henry's metaphysical argument include: Anton Pegis, “Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent,” Mediaeval Studies 30 (1968): 226–47; Pegis, , “Toward a New Way to God: Henry of Ghent, II,” Mediaeval Studies 31 (1969): 93–116; Pegis, , “Four Mediaeval Ways to God (St. Anselm of Canterbury, St. Bonaventure, St. Thomas Aquinas, Henry of Ghent),” The Monist 54 (1970): 317–58; Pegis, , “Henry of Ghent and the New Way to God, III,” Mediaeval Studies 33 (1971): 158–79; Dumont, Steven, “The quaestio si est and the Metaphysical Proof for the Existence of God according to Henry of Ghent and J. Duns Scotus,” Franziskanische Studien 66 (1984): 335–67; Porro, Pasquale, Enrico di Gand: La via delle proposizioni universale (Bari, 1990).Google Scholar
4 “id quo nihil potest cogitari maius, non potest non esse. Deus est hujusmodi. Ergo, et caetera” (SQO 30.2, fol. 179vK). In Heinrich von Gent über Metaphysik als erste Wissenschaft. Studien zu einem Metaphysikentwurf aus dem letzten Viertel des 13. Jahrhunderts (Leiden, 2007), 323–25, Martin Pickavé discusses the relationship between the proofs of the existence of God that Henry gives and the Proslogion argument, but does not discuss SQO 30.2. He notes the curious fact that, although Henry presents a long list of arguments for the existence of God in SQO 22.4, he makes no mention of the Proslogion argument (323). Pickavé does however quote Porro who says that Henry did not seem to consider “l'argomento del Proslogion come una prova dell'esistenza di Dio, quanto piutosto come un contributo alla discussione sulla natura divina” (Enrico di Gand, 91–92).Google Scholar
5 “Maior evidens est quoniam quod non potest cogitari non esse, necessario melius est eo quod potest cogitari non esse, ut dicit Anselmus et probat quatuor rationibus contra insipientem, ut patet inspicienti” ( SQO 30.2, fol. 179vK).Google Scholar
6 “Si dixit hoc, aut dixit quod cogitare potuit, et habeo propositum, aut cogitare non potuit. Sed quomodo cogitare non potuit quod dixit … cum idem sit dicere in corde et cogitare” (SQO 30.2, fol. 179vK). Here and elsewhere I have italicized direct quotes from the Proslogion to show Henry's reliance on Anselm's argument.Google Scholar
7 “quaestio de cognoscendo de Deo an sit potest esse de incomplexu et de esse Dei in natura sua qua est id quod est vel de complexu et de esse Dei in anima cogitante” (SQO 30.2, fol. 179vL).Google Scholar
8 For example, in SQO 22.4, Henry presents a series of demonstrative arguments for the existence of God from creatures.Google Scholar
9 “quaestio de cogitando Deum non esse potest esse de incomplexo, an, scilicet, contingit cogitare non entitatem Dei aliquam quae possit ei convenire secundum naturam eius in se, vel de complexo, an scilicet contingit cogitare per divisionem in anima esse removeri a Deo, sive non entitatem inesse in eidem” (SQO 30.2, fol. 179vL). It now seems to me that there was an extra “non” in the Latin text before “cogitando,” which I had not removed from my printed translation, but have removed here.Google Scholar
10 “Primo modo est impossbile cogitare Deum non esse quia nihil in natura rei cogitari non esse nisi possibile est cogitare seorum ipsam rem ut res est et essentia quaedam in se et seorsum ipsum esse, unum removendo ab altero per negationem, sicut contingit in creaturis, quae quandoque habent esse, quandoque non esse, quoniam in eis different essentia et esse” ( SQO 30.2, fols. 179vL–180rL).Google Scholar
11 For the various sort of distinction in Henry's metaphysics, see my “Distinctions in the Metaphysics of Henry of Ghent,” Traditio 61 (2006): 227–45.Google Scholar
12 “Aliter enim … cogitatur res cum vox eam significans cogitatur. Alio modo cum idipsum quod res est intelligitur. Illo itaque modo, ut dicit, et verum dicit, potest cogitari Deus non esse, isto vero minime” (SQO 30.3, fol. 180rM).Google Scholar
13 See Nicomachean Ethics 7.3.1147a22–24.Google Scholar
14 See SQO 30.3, fol. 180rO, where Henry appeals to Aristotle, , Metaphysics 6.4.1027 (ed. Venice, , 1562–74; repr. Frankfurt, , 1962, fol. 152rB), where Averroes used the expression “diminished being” for being in the soul. See Maurer, Armand, “Ens diminutum: A Note on Its Origin and Meaning,” Mediaeval Studies 12 (1950): 216–22.Google Scholar
15 “Deum esse et Deum non esse. Sed unum cum assensu, alterum vero sine assensu” ( SQO 30.3, fol. 180rO).Google Scholar
16 “cogitans cum assensu aut intelligit quid per vocem significatur distincte et in particulari cum dicitur: Deus non est, aut non, sed solum confuse et in universali” (SQO 30.3, fol. 180rP).Google Scholar
17 “nullus omnino potest cogitare Deum non esse, quia praedicatum, ut dictum est supra, est de intellectu subiecti, et sic cogitans subiectum necessario cogitat in ipso praedicatum” (SQO 30.3, fol. 180rP).Google Scholar
18 “idem affirmaret et negaret, assentiendo utrique simul, quod est impossibile” (SQO 30.3, fol. 180rP).Google Scholar
19 See Aristotle, , Metaphysics 10.4.1055a19–24.Google Scholar
20 “Nullus ergo intelligens rem quae Deus est, distincte et in particulari, potest cogitare cum assertione quia non est, quamquam verba dicat in corde suo” ( SQO 30.2, fol. 180rP).Google Scholar
21 “Nullus, inquit, intelligens id quod est ignis et aqua, potest cogitare ignem esse aquam secundum res, licet … secundum voces. Ita ergo nemo qui intelligit id ens quod est Deus, potest cogitare quia Deus non est, licet haec verba dicat in corde suo” (SQO 30.2, fol. 180rP).Google Scholar
22 “Deus enim est id quo melius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit idipsum sic esse ut nec cogitare quaeat non esse. Qui ergo, (ut dicit) intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare” (SQO 30.2, fol. 180rP).Google Scholar
23 “solummodo quandam essentiam omnium nobilissimam, non cointelligendo in nobilitate eius includi rationem ipsius esse, bene potest intellectu phantastico et ignorante intelligere Deum non esse” ( SQO 30.2, fol. 180rQ).Google Scholar
24 “Deus … semper existens non potest intelligi non esse, quia esse suum nullo modo se habet per additionem super essentiam, sed essentia est ipsum esse” ( SQO 30.2, fol. 180vT).Google Scholar
25 “est verum quantum est ex parte rei et cognitionis intellectus puri cum assensu, et sic intelligit Anselmus, ut patet ex rationibus quibus hoc probat contra insipientem. Quantum tamen est ex parte vocis et cognitionis intellectus confusi et phantastici aut sine assensu, nihil impedit quin Deus et id quo nihil maius cogitari potest, possit cogitari non esse” (SQO 30.2, fol. 180vY).Google Scholar
26 “Deus … est … quo maius cogitari non potest. Quod qui bene intelligit, utique intelligit idipsum sic esse ut nec cogitatione quaeat non esse. Qui ergo intelligit sic esse Deum, nequit eum non esse cogitare” ( SQO 30.2, fol. 180vY).Google Scholar
27 See n. 2 above.Google Scholar
28 “Illud autem quod non potest ignorari est per se naturaliter notum” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 130rP).Google Scholar
29 See Aristotle, , Posterior Analytics 1.3.72b18–25.Google Scholar
30 “cognito eo quod significatur hoc nomine Deus et quod significatur per est, statim cognoscitur quia Deus est, eo quod in Deo penitus sunt idem esse et essentia” (SQO 22.2, fol. 130rP).Google Scholar
31 See Avicenna, , Metaphysics 1.1 (Liber de philosophia prima seu scientia divina), ed. Riet, Simone Van, 2 vols. (Leuven and Leiden, 1977), 4–5.Google Scholar
32 “Uno modo in generali, inquantum Deus intelligitur sub nomine entis vel boni absolute vel alicuius proprietatis nobilis, quae ei convenit et similiter creaturis” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
33 “Intellige hoc bonum; intellige illud. Intellige bonum simpliciter si poteris; intellexeris Deum” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ). Augustine says: “Bonum hoc et bonum illud; tolle hoc et illud, et vide ipsum bonum, si potes; ita Deum videbis” (De trinitate 8.3.4 [PL 42:949]).Google Scholar
34 “Alio modo in special, ut significatur sub hoc nomine Deus, scilicet ut natura aliqua excellentissima” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
35 See Augustine, , De doctrina christiana 1.6.6 (PL 34:21).Google Scholar
36 “cognitio essendi Deum naturaliter nobis inserta est, quia in primis conceptibus cum intelligimus ens, unum, aut bonum simpliciter in generali, intelligimus Deum sub quadam confusione” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
37 “omnes … volunt esse beati, et in hoc volunt saltem in universali primum et summum bonum, quod Deus est” (SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
38 “sic nec ex illa cognitione universali dicendum est quod omnes cognoscant Deum esse” (SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
39 St. Thomas uses a similar comparison in Summa theologiae , 1a.2.1 ad 1 (ed. Medieval Institute of Ottawa, 5 vols. [Ottawa, 1941–45]).Google Scholar
40 “potest homo Deum magis in particulari, scilicet, inquantum significatur hoc nomine Deus, non intelligere esse” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
41 “ad hoc quod propositio ista ‘Deus est’ esset per se nota, oporteret quod ex virtute termini huius ‘Deus,’ inquantum hoc termino significatur deitas, in subiecto cointelligereter in particulari ‘esse,’ non solum in universali inquantum intelligitur esse sub ratione generali entis et boni, intelligendo esse ens aut bonum simpliciter” (SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ).Google Scholar
42 See n. 2 above for the reference to Damascene, John.Google Scholar
43 “ista quaestio … intelligitur de complexo, scilicet utrum sit per se notum praedicatum eius inesse subiecto, ut homo communi animi conceptione enunciationem istam qua dicitur quod Deus est, statim probat auditam” (SQO 22.2, fol. 130vR).Google Scholar
44 See SQO 22.5, fol. 134vC, where Henry develops his metaphysical argument; in the previous question he had argued that the existence of God is demonstrable from creatures.Google Scholar
45 “si loquimur de notitia Dei an sit ex parte rei cognoscendae, dicendum sit quod Deum esse notissimum sit, et per se et naturaliter notum. … Si vero loquimur de notitia Dei an sit ex parte cognoscentis, distinguendum erit ulterius” (SQO 22.2, fol. 130vR).Google Scholar
46 See Averroes, , Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle , in Aristotelis opera cum Averrois commentaria (n. 14 above) 8: fol. 29rBC.Google Scholar
47 “haec propositio, quantum in se est, per se nota est, quia praedicatum est idem cum subiecto: Deus est enim suum esse … Sed quia nos non scimus de Deo quid est, non est nobis per se nota, sed indiget demonstrari per ea quae magis nota quoad nos et minus nota quoad naturam, scilicet per effectus” (Summa theologiae 1a.2.1 cor.).Google Scholar
48 “aliquae enunciationes notissimae sunt in sua veritate, quantum est ex ipsius rei subiectae et praedicatae” (SQO 22.3, fol. 130vS).Google Scholar
49 “in tantum dicamus propositionem notam esse per se, in quantum subiectum et praedicatum in natura rei sunt nota per se, et cum hoc sese ultro et per se notificant alteri, ut rem significatam statim quis probet per vocem auditam” (SQO 22.3, fol. 130rS).Google Scholar
50 “Omne totum est maius sua parte. Si ab aequalibus aequalia demas, quae relinquuntur aequalia sunt” (SQO 22.3, fol. 130rT).Google Scholar
51 See Aristotle, , Posterior Analytics 1.6.28a38–39, and SQO 22.2, fol. 131rT.Google Scholar
52 “Alio autem modo est terminos illos cognoscere, cognitione determinata, sine tamen visione aperta” ( SQO 22.2, fol. 131rV).Google Scholar
53 “ex instructione habita de ipsa re per studii diligentiam” (SQO 22.2, fol. 131rV).Google Scholar
54 Taylor, Richard, for example, says in his introduction to A. Plantinga's book: “Actually St. Anselm formulated what appear to be two arguments, the conclusions of which are not exactly the same. It is unfortunate that so few have realized that two distinct arguments can be made out in his writing” (The Ontological Argument from St. Anselm to Contemporary Philosophers , ed. Plantinga, Alvin [Garden City, NY, 1965], ix). Henry does deal with the content of the argument in the second chapter of the Proslogion in SQO 22.3, where he asks: “Utrum contingat cogitare Deum, non cogitando eum esse.” See Dumont, Stephen, Henry of Ghent as a Source for John Duns Scotus's Proof for the Existence of God (Toronto, Ph.D. diss., 1982), where he argues for the centrality of quidditative or conceptual knowledge for Henry's metaphysical argument.Google Scholar
55 “Prima est cognitio Dei cum primis intentionibus entis concepta statim et naturaliter. Secunda vero est cognitio via ratiocinativae deductionis animadversa” (SQO 24.7, fol. 144rF). See SQO 1.4 ad 3, fol. 13rI, for Henry's explanation of how the human intellect naturally acquires the first intentions and the first principles in knowing anything at all.Google Scholar
56 See SQO 22.2, fol. 130vQ.Google Scholar
57 See SQO 22.5, fol. 134vD, where Henry quotes from Avicenna, Metaphysics 1.5 (ed. Van Riet, [n. 31 above]), 31.Google Scholar
58 “intelligendo hoc bonum et hoc summe indistincte a creatura. Dicendo enim hoc bonum duo dico et quia bonum et quia hoc. Quod dicitur hoc, hoc est creaturae; quod dicitur bonum, hoc est commune creatori et creaturae” (SQO 22.6, fol. 142vV). Henry provides a lengthy explanation of the sort of commonality between the creator and the creature, but that is another subject for another article. Henry also holds that God is what is first known (primum cognitum) by the human intellect in such indistinct knowledge of of the first intentions. On God as first known, see Laarmann, Matthias, Deus, primum cognitum: Die Lehre von Gott als dem Ersterkannten des menschlichen Intellekts bei Heinrich von Gent (Münster, 1999).Google Scholar
59 “A quo si substraxeris hoc et illud, est secundus modus intelligendi bonum, scilicet, minus contractum ad creaturam quam prius, et est commune analogum ad Deum et creaturam, et est de primis intentionibus quae per se et primo concipit intellectus de rebus, ut sunt unum et ens” ( SQO 22.6, fol. 142vV).Google Scholar
60 “abstrahendo per intellectum bonum ab hoc, consideramus bonum primo simpliciter, ut est commune quoddam et universale bonum, non ut hoc neque ut illud, sed tantum ut participatum et existens in multis, scilicet, in hoc et in illo” (SQO 22.6, fol. 142vS).Google Scholar
61 “abstrahendo bonum per intellectum ab alio omnino et considerando ipsum ut bonum simpliciter, non ut hoc vel illud, neque ut huius vel illius, sed ut nullius omnino (quod est bonum in se subsistens solius creatoris), secundario iuxta bonum participatum creaturae, cognoscimus bonum per essentiam ipsius creatoris” (SQO 22.6, fol. 142vS).Google Scholar
62 “Et sicut est de bono, sic est de omnibus aliis attributis, communiter convenientibus creaturae et creatori, quae … possunt ex creaturis cognosci inesse creatori” ( SQO 22.6, fol. 142vS).Google Scholar
63 “sub quadam praeeminentia ut, scilicet, est quaedam natura excellentissima” (SQO 22.6, fol. 142vS).Google Scholar
64 “quia remotio pura defectus creaturae a Deo nihil ponit in Deo” (SQO 22.6, fol. 143rY).Google Scholar
65 “reducendo … omnia nobilitatis et dignitatis attributa eius in unum primum simplicissimum, scilicet, per intellectum quia quicquid in ipso est sit eius essentia, et quod eius essentia nihil omnino sit aliud re vel intentione quam eius esse sive existentia” (SQO 22.6, fol. 143rZ).Google Scholar
66 Henry says that natural knowledge of God extends only to the first two levels of knowledge of the divine quiddity in the first degree. See SQO 24.7, fol. 144rG. Hence, the second form of abstraction and the last two degrees of knowledge of the divine quiddity are rational knowledge.Google Scholar