The aim of this article is not to make any arguments that oppose veganism or having children or, in any way, to denigrate those who make them. Rather, the intention is twofold: (1) To attack the inconsistency of those who make arguments for veganism in relation to climate change and the natural world, but who omit to make arguments against having children and the problem of rapidly increasing global population on the same grounds. (2) To attack a form of sanctimony which manifests itself in inconsistent applications of such arguments and which exploits genuine and very serious problems in ways that aim to bring power to their advocates by inducing a sense of shame in their victims. In this way, such moralists try to strengthen the legitimacy of their own preferences – preferences that often run into conflict with other concerns based on the same arguments.

Many people claim that you can't prove or disprove God's existence. But why would anybody think you could? What's such a proof or disproof supposed to look like?

In this essay, I argue that we are merely biological organisms. This view (animalism) explains everyday practices like watching ourselves in the mirror. The claim that we are psychological in nature – i.e. wherever our conscious experience goes, we follow – cannot explain something as trivial as watching ourselves in the mirror. Thus, we should accept animalism.

Richard Swinburne responds to criticisms of his arguments from design for the existence of God.

This article discusses how difficult it is to be morally consistent when choosing what to eat. Applying a moral justification in a consistent manner may result in some unorthodox diets. I distinguish two ways in which we might be inconsistent in our approach to food. We might fail to apply our morals in a consistent way, or we might fail to put our morals into practice at all. I argue that the latter represents a greater failing. Given the complexity of making food choices, the former is more excusable.

Sam Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape, argues that ‘science can determine human values.’ Against this view, I argue that while secular moral philosophy can certainly help us to determine our values, science – at least as that word is commonly understood – must play a subservient role. To the extent that science can ‘determine’ what we ought to do, it is only by providing us with empirical information, which can then be slotted into a chain of deductive (moral) reasoning. The premises of such reasoning, however, can in no way be derived from the scientific method: they come, instead, from philosophy – and common sense.

Locke's analysis of the origins of meaning is clear, coherent, cogent and devastating to our commonsense beliefs. His analysis establishes that in the last resort the meaning, he would say ‘Signification’, of words is ineluctably private, subjective, personal. Where meanings are concerned we are, Locke judged, irremediably solipsistic. ‘Words’, he notes, ‘in their primary or immediate Signification stand for nothing but Ideas in the Mind of him that uses them.’

This is a short introduction to ontological arguments. It begins with a brief characterization of ontological arguments that proceeds mainly by way of example. The rest of the discussion is given over to consideration of what looks like a very simple ontological argument. This consideration turns up many of the issues that arise when more complex ontological arguments are examined.

Running a marathon is not solely a personal achievement; rather it sets an example. Because of the nature of this example, it constitutes an achievement that deserves our praise (contrary to what has recently been argued in this Journal).

This article examines the prisoner's dilemma paradox and argues that confessing is the rational choice, despite this probably entailing a less-than-ideal outcome.

Do some people have a paranormal power to ‘see’ into the future? There are innumerable anecdotes of events foretold, of course. But is there any scientific evidence of the ability? Fiona Steinkamp, a leading investigator of the paranormal, believes there is.

Moral and ethical agreements require sufficiently shared values, or at least some common ground. We might think of this in terms of a shared ‘form of life’, ‘lebensform’, as Wittgenstein describes it in his Philosophical Investigations. Yet it is not clear what will be sufficient, nor how to bridge gaps when disagreement occurs, for instance on whether it is ever right to lie. Ethical and moral theories offer some guidance, but there is no guide for which theory one ought to follow. Whether you favour eudaimonist (flourishing, well-being), deontological (duty), or utilitarian (consequentialist) principles, the selection of a philosophy says much about who you are (preferences, judgements, beliefs) and your context (social, political, cultural). More than this it can indicate certain psychological and personal dispositions, whether defined as brain states, mental states, or personalities. In this article I outline some arguments for why ethics might need a philosophy of mind, and why this poses problems for ethical and moral theory building.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously

Chris Horner opens our debate on pragmatism with this handy introduction to the subject. Those entirely new to the topic of pragmatism might also find helpful Stephen Law's article ‘Is it all relative?’ (see issue 2 of Think).

Phillip Johnson introduces the debate over intelligent design.

In issue 4, Mark piper presented the famous problem of evil, which appears to show that there is no God, that is to say, no all-powerful, all-knowing and all-good being. Here James Franklin suggests that there may, after all, be a solution to the problem.

What is art? Marcel Duchamp made this question pertinent when he developed his ‘Readymades’: ordinary, manufactured objects that he presented as art. In this paper, I use pragmatics – the branch of linguistics concerned with language use in context, and which has its historical roots in the philosophy of language – to argue that, if we accept that art is a form of communication, from artist to audience, then Duchamp was correct to claim that anything can be art, so long as it is presented as such.