This is a short introduction to ontological arguments. It begins with a brief characterization of ontological arguments that proceeds mainly by way of example. The rest of the discussion is given over to consideration of what looks like a very simple ontological argument. This consideration turns up many of the issues that arise when more complex ontological arguments are examined.

Proponents of same-sex marriage often defend their view by appealing to the concept of justice. But a significant argument from justice against same-sex marriage can be made also, as follows. Heterosexual union has special social value because it is the indispensable means by which humans come into existence. What has special social value deserves special recognition and sanction. Civil ordinances that recognize same-sex marriage as comparable to heterosexual marriage constitute a rejection of the special social value of heterosexual unions, and to deny such special social value is unjust.

Should you give to beggars? One argument that you should not is that since there are people who are much worse off than beggars, to give to a beggar is to deny some assistance to those who need it most. You should give instead to the most poor, and in general, you ought in your action to do the most good you can. This argument was defended in a paper published recently in /Think/, and the principle that lies behind it is the basis of a popular movement called ‘effective altruism’. I attack that argument in this paper. Morality does not require of you merely that you do the most good; there is more to it than that.

The aim of this article is not to make any arguments that oppose veganism or having children or, in any way, to denigrate those who make them. Rather, the intention is twofold: (1) To attack the inconsistency of those who make arguments for veganism in relation to climate change and the natural world, but who omit to make arguments against having children and the problem of rapidly increasing global population on the same grounds. (2) To attack a form of sanctimony which manifests itself in inconsistent applications of such arguments and which exploits genuine and very serious problems in ways that aim to bring power to their advocates by inducing a sense of shame in their victims. In this way, such moralists try to strengthen the legitimacy of their own preferences – preferences that often run into conflict with other concerns based on the same arguments.

Orr argues that the latest attack on evolution is cleverly argued, biologically informed — and wrong. This is his review of Behe's book, Darwin's Black Box: The Biochemical Challenge to Evolution.

‘Just don't pull the knot tight before being certain that you have got hold of the right end.’ Wittgenstein.

Sam Harris, in his book The Moral Landscape, argues that ‘science can determine human values.’ Against this view, I argue that while secular moral philosophy can certainly help us to determine our values, science – at least as that word is commonly understood – must play a subservient role. To the extent that science can ‘determine’ what we ought to do, it is only by providing us with empirical information, which can then be slotted into a chain of deductive (moral) reasoning. The premises of such reasoning, however, can in no way be derived from the scientific method: they come, instead, from philosophy – and common sense.

Being morally responsible means being blameworthy and deserving of punishment if we do wrong and praiseworthy and deserving reward if we do right. In what follows I shall argue that in all likelihood we're not morally responsible. None of us. Ever.

This article is my latest attempt to come up with a minimal version of my evolutionary theory of fairness, previously summarized in my book Natural Justice. The naturalism that I espouse is currently unpopular, but Figure 1 shows that the scientific tradition in moral philosophy nevertheless has a long and distinguished history. John Mackie's Inventing Right and Wrong is the most eloquent expression of the case for naturalism in modern times. Mackie's demolition of the claims made for a priori reasoning in moral philosophy seem unanswerable to me.

Do some people have a paranormal power to ‘see’ into the future? There are innumerable anecdotes of events foretold, of course. But is there any scientific evidence of the ability? Fiona Steinkamp, a leading investigator of the paranormal, believes there is.

Anne Conway (1631–79) produced only one short treatise – The Principles of the Most Ancient and Modern Philosophy – but addressed key problems in the philosophy of religion which are still much discussed today. The most significant of these are the problem of religious diversity and the problem of evil. Although the sources of her ideas may be found in the Kabbalah of Isaac Luria and the work of the Cambridge Platonists and the Quaker George Keith, among others, she offers her own unorthodox solutions to these problems. The idea of Christ as an indwelling mediator of the divine who assists us in our moral endeavours is designed to appeal to those of all religions and none, while her claim that God created creatures knowing that they would eventually be redeemed, and that suffering promotes moral development which leads to redemption offers a novel response to the problem of evil. Conway's work is also important for its influence on the work of Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and some have argued that it prefigures, at least in outline, the field theory of modern physics.

Thinking Tools is a regular feature that introduces pointers on thinking clearly and rigorously

Tim Crane responds to the several recent attacks on religion made by Richard Dawkins, Sam Harris, et al.

A dialogue investigating whether the usual religious defences of belief in God are really up to the job.

Phillip Johnson introduces the debate over intelligent design.

In the philosophy of mind, zombies often make an appearance. It seems we can conceive of zombies — beings physically exactly like ourselves but lacking conscious experience. There may not actually be any zombies, of course. But the suggestion that they could exist does at least seem to make sense. Or does it? Robert Kirk investigates.

Can you know something that isn't true?

People often assume that everyone can be divided by sex/gender (that is, by physical and social characteristics having to do with maleness and femaleness) into two tidy categories: male and female. Careful thought, however, leads us to reject that simple ‘binary’ picture, since not all people fall precisely into one group or the other. But if we do not think of sex/gender in terms of those two categories, how else might we think of it? Here I consider four distinct models; each model correctly captures some features of sex/gender, and so each is appropriate in some contexts. But the first three models are inadequate when tough questions arise, like whether trans women should be admitted as students at a women's college or when it is appropriate for intersex athletes to compete in women's athletic events. (‘Trans’ refers to the wide range of people who have an atypical gender identity for someone of their birth-assigned sex, and ‘intersex’ refers to people whose bodies naturally develop with markedly different physical sex characteristics than are paradigmatic of either men or women.) Such questions of inclusion and exclusion matter enormously to the people whose lives are affected by them, but ordinary notions of sex/gender offer few answers. The fourth model I describe is especially designed to make those hard decisions easier by providing a process to clarify what matters.

My argument is that naturalism is too restricted and dogmatic an account of the many different sorts of entities and explanations that we employ in trying to understand our world. It is a faith rather than a mode of inquiry.