Hostname: page-component-586b7cd67f-l7hp2 Total loading time: 0 Render date: 2024-11-23T22:49:16.587Z Has data issue: false hasContentIssue false
  • English
  • Français

AESTHETIC RISK

Published online by Cambridge University Press:  07 February 2018

Duncan Pritchard
Get access

Abstract

Artists often emphasize the importance of risk to their work. But this raises a puzzle, as on a standard probabilistic account of risk we are obliged to treat some of these cases as not involving genuine risk at all. It is argued that the way to resolve this puzzle is to recognize a crucial shortcoming in the probabilistic account of risk. With this shortcoming rectified, and hence with a revised modal account of risk in place, we are able to treat the relevant cases of putative aesthetic risk as entirely genuine.

Type
Research Article
Information
Think , Volume 17 , Issue 48 , Spring 2018 , pp. 11 - 24
Copyright
Copyright © The Royal Institute of Philosophy 2018 

Access options

Get access to the full version of this content by using one of the access options below. (Log in options will check for institutional or personal access. Content may require purchase if you do not have access.)

References

Hansson, S. O. (2004) ‘Philosophical Perspectives on Risk’, Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology 8: 10–35.Google Scholar
Hansson, S. O. (2014) ‘Risk’, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy, ed. Zalta, E. N., <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2014/entries/risk/>.Google Scholar
Kahneman, D. and Varey, C. A. (1990) ‘Propensities and Counterfactuals: The Loser That Almost Won’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 59: 1101–10.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Lewis, D. (1973) Counterfactuals (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
Lewis, D. (1987) On the Plurality of Worlds (Oxford: Blackwell).Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2004) ‘Epistemic Luck’, Journal of Philosophical Research 29: 193–222.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2005) Epistemic Luck (Oxford: Oxford University Press).CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2006) ‘Moral and Epistemic Luck’, Metaphilosophy 37: 1–25.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2007) ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology’, Synthese 158: 277–97.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2012) ‘Anti-Luck Virtue Epistemology’, Journal of Philosophy 109: 247–79.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2014) ‘The Modal Account of Luck’, Metaphilosophy 45: 594–619.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2015 a) ‘Anti-Luck Epistemology and the Gettier Problem’, Philosophical Studies 172: 93–111.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2015 b) ‘Risk’, Metaphilosophy 46: 436–61.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2016) ‘Epistemic Risk’, Journal of Philosophy 113: 550–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Pritchard, D. H. (2017) ‘Legal Risk, Legal Evidence, and the Arithmetic of Criminal Justice’, Jurisprudence. DOI: 10.1080/20403313.2017.1352323.Google Scholar
Pritchard, D. H., and Smith, M. (2004) ‘The Psychology and Philosophy of Luck’, New Ideas in Psychology 22: 1–28.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Sainsbury, R. M. (1997) ‘Easy Possibilities’, Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 57: 907–19.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teigen, K. H. (1995) ‘How Good is Good Luck? The Role of Counterfactual Thinking in the Perception of Lucky and Unlucky Events’, European Journal of Social Psychology 25: 281–302.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teigen, K. H. (1996) ‘Luck: The Art of a Near Miss’, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 37: 156–71.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teigen, K. H. (1997) ‘Luck, Envy, Gratitude: It Could Have Been Different’, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 38: 318–23.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teigen, K. H. (1998 a) ‘Hazards Mean Luck: Counterfactual Thinking and Perceptions of Good and Bad Fortune in Reports of Dangerous Situations and Careless Behaviour’, Scandinavian Journal of Psychology 39: 235–48.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teigen, K. H. (1998 b) ‘When the Unreal Is More Likely Than the Real: Post Hoc Probability Judgements and Counterfactual Closeness’, Thinking and Reasoning 4: 147–77.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Teigen, K. H. (2003) ‘When a Small Difference Makes a Large Difference: Counterfactual Thinking and Luck’, in Mandel, D. R., Hilton, D. and Catellani, P. (eds.) The Psychology of Counterfactual Thinking (London: Routledge), 112–32.Google Scholar
Tetlock, P. E. (1998) ‘Close-Call Counterfactuals and Belief-System Defenses: I Was Not Almost Wrong but I Was Almost Right’, Journal of Personality and Social Psychology 75: 639–52.CrossRefGoogle Scholar
Tetlock, P. E., and Lebow, R. N. (2001) ‘Poking Counterfactual Holes in Covering Laws: Cognitive Styles and Historical Reasoning’, American Political Science Review 95: 829–43.CrossRefGoogle Scholar