There has been much debate about the role of carbon prices in reducing greenhouse gas emissions in Australia. However there has been far less attention paid to the evaluation of complementary and other non-price policies designed to accompany the carbon price. The purpose of this article is to develop a framework for considering the case for, and effectiveness of, the wide range of existing and proposed complementary policies that are designed to accompany the carbon price in the effort to reduce Australia’s greenhouse gas emissions. The article concludes that an effective evaluation of complementary policies should include identifying the market failure the policy is aimed at correcting. The complementary policy should work in conjunction with, not opposition to, other polices aimed at reducing emissions. It should be complementary with the policies of other levels of government and it should also consider issues of efficiency, equity, accountability and adaptability.

The Your Rights at Work Campaign in the lead-up to the 2007 Australian federal election successfully mobilised a groundswell of community opposition to the radically anti-union Work Choices employment relations legislation of 2005. There were hopes that its successor, the 2009 Fair Work Act, would usher in a new regime of good-faith workplace relations, support for collective bargaining and vulnerable workers’ access to enforceable labour rights. Major gaps are the failure to address workplace power imbalance, especially in small workplaces, and lack of support for employee participation and voice mechanisms. A case is made for the inclusion of such mechanisms in legislative National Employment Standards. The article concludes by arguing that it is a mistake for unions to expect too much from legislation, rather than investing in the pursuit of the sort of community alliances which, after all, have made a restoration of Work Choices untenable.

The problem of long-term unemployment has, at last, taken centre stage in the policy debate with the publication of the Green Paper Restoring Full Employment. While economic growth will reduce the general level of unemployment, to return the long-term unemployed to work will require increased training and reduction of labour costs. More recently the concept of a ‘training wage’ whereby employers would be allowed to pay below the current award wage to previously long-term unemployed has received some support. The Green Paper did not give much attention to training wages, preferring instead to focus on wage subsidies. In this paper the case for wage adjustments is discussed and evaluated.

This paper examines the structure of Australian multi-employer awards. It suggests that these awards do not exhibit occupational, industry or representational concentration and thus follow no clear rational principles. The hybrid award system is sub-optimal and can be explained by employer associations’ neglect in the formative period of arbitration. Multi-employer awards are in need of reform if Australia is to become and remain internationally competitive.

When viewed against its ostensibly successful management of the global economic crisis between 2008 and 2013, growing electoral disenchantment with the Australian Labor Party government during that time defied standard explanations and calls for further analysis. A major reason for the party’s electoral loss in 2013 was arguably popular disappointment with its eschewal of social democratic principles. Notwithstanding some progressive measures initiated between 2008 and 2013, successive Australian Labor Party governments were constrained by neoliberal strictures, even when they chose to implement progressive policies. Whatever other reasons exist for its decline in popularity between 2007 and 2013, the Australian Labor Party’s unwillingness or inability to mark out a clear alternative to neoliberalism was fundamental. In making this case, this article uses the conceptual framework of ‘depoliticisation’, defined as the displacement of policy decisions from the sphere of democratic accountability and public debate, making them matters for regulation by technocratic experts operating according to supposed edicts of the market.

Australian industrial relations was a curious beast for much of the twentieth century. For many it was the institutional equivalent of a marsupial — native to the Australian environment. It developed in the economic and social circumstances of the nineteenth century. Indeed the development and elaboration of the arbitral model of Australian industrial relations was one of the major social experiments of a vibrant, young and successful Australia.

Conventional poverty and inequality measures, based only on comparisons of financial resources, may underestimate gender differences in living standards. The value of time spent in household work by oneself and partner, and the value of leisure are key elements that need to be considered in measures of living standards. This article develops a method for measuring wellbeing at the level of the individual, rather than the household. Following the tradition of Australian models of ‘full income’, the final measure of wellbeing includes the value of time in leisure and unpaid work along with individual income, the benefits accruing from the social wage and the welfare gains from the ownership and use of assets. The article then compares the conventional income distribution and the ‘full income’ distribution to identify population subgroups disadvantaged on each of these measures. The results show that gender inequalities in living standards may be underestimated by conventional income measures, and that inequalities in personal income and time use contribute most substantially to gender inequality in the full income distribution.

Although workplace death is known to have profound social and psychological effects on families, the economic consequences have not been explored. This pioneering study investigated families’ financial situations following fatal workplace injuries. An online survey explored the impact of post-death financial change on 142 participants from Australia, Canada, the USA, and the UK using a scale from the economic strain model. Half of the participants experienced financial loss, and the proportion struggling financially increased from 24% to 62% after the death. Workers’ compensation claims were made by 74% of participants, but they reported problems with delays, levels of entitlement, and satisfaction with the scheme. Other key sources of assistance were family and friends or support groups and services. Participants who were older, next-of-kin, and partner/spouses were significantly more likely to experience financial loss as were those whose deceased relative worked 51+ hours per week, possibly because the deceased was self-employed or worked significant overtime not covered by compensation settlements. Those experiencing financial loss sought short- and long-term financial help, accessed social security, re-entered the workforce, acquired mental disorders, and experienced declines in physical health, at significantly higher rates than participants without financial loss, and their children developed mental health problems significantly more often. Findings highlight the detrimental, and potentially intergenerational, effects of financial loss on the health and wellbeing of families bereaved by traumatic workplace deaths. Policy issues flowing from the results are discussed, including how this informs wider debates on refashioning regulatory protection.

Relative to the rest of the population, Indigenous Australians are disadvantaged across a number of outcomes. Not only is income lower, but so is life expectancy. Furthermore, the incidence of a number of chronic conditions is much higher (especially after controlling for the younger age profile). There are a number of interrelated historic, social and economic reasons for these poorer outcomes, but one important factor is likely to be substantially lower education levels. That is, Indigenous Australians are much less likely to finish high school, and for those that do, less likely go on to university or other studies. This paper looks in an empirical way at the relationship between education and health for Indigenous Australians, comparing it to similar associations for the non-Indigenous population. Using probit model estimates on data from the 2001 National Health Survey, two traditional health outcomes (self-assessed health and chronic conditions) as well as a set of health risk-factors are examined. For all health measures used, those with lower education levels have significantly worse health outcomes. Interestingly, education is found to have a significantly different magnitude of association for some measures across Indigenous and non-Indigenous Australians.

In the United States, as in other advanced industrial countries, worker participation in management has taken on increasing importance, placing pressures on employers and unions to change how they deal with employees/members, and with each other. This paper examines two of the most impressive cases in the U.S.: the partnerships between General Motors (G.M.) and the United Autoworkers union (U.A.W.) at Saturn and between BellSouth and the Communication Workers union (C.W.A.). We outline the evolution and the basic features of these innovations, as well as highlighting certain ongoing problems. These problems, we argue, confront the parties to employment relations in the U.S. more generally, reflecting profound ambivalence about such experiments, and their continued isolation as ‘islands of excellence’. As such, these cases both illustrate the vast potential for labor-management partnerships as well as the dampening effect of the employment relations context in the U.S.

A large and increasing share of economic activity in modern rich economies can be shown to lie outside what mainstream neoclassical economics itself says it can be applied to: according to neoclassical economics, such activities are unsuited to markets. Since World War II rich economies have de-industrialised, shifted to services. Since the 1970s neoclassical economics has come to dominate policy advice. This worldview justifies state interventions when there is remediable market failure, but it ignores irremediable market failure, where its theory says that markets cannot work efficiently (such as where there is joint production or own consumption). Servicisation, this article argues, has increased and is increasing the extent to which neoclassical economics is, in its own terms, ‘knowably ignorant’. This is because, where service provision is subject to irremediable market failure, neoclassical economics, in its own terms, is inapplicable. The GDP [Gross Domestic Product] share of sub-sectors serving diverse human needs, such as aged care and education, is large and rising. Such sub-sectors are dominated by joint production, manifest as diverse outputs (complex and inter-related changes in the welfare of their diverse clients). Setting aside questions of the wider ‘scientific’ validity of neoclassical theory, the article focuses on its assertion that markets cannot generate economically efficient outcomes in such activities. Arguing that the constrained optimisation of its conceptual world cannot happen in the case of joint production and own consumption of service outputs, neoclassical theory reports itself as unable to determine optimal resource allocation, and so by implication cannot fulfil its role as the foundational basis of state economic policy. Yet the literature shows that the coverage of this theoretical result is not publicised – it is ‘knowable’ but not widely known. The article concludes that, as neoclassical economics is foundational to contemporary state policy, both GDP data and neoclassical theory show that it, and markets, are knowably and increasingly inapplicable. Therefore, mainstream policy thinking continues to face an increasing ‘state of ignorance’, and the cognitive foundations of state policy are correspondingly weak.

Much more is learned in the workplace than efficient skills. We have rather few concepts with which to theorise the ‘counter-cultural’ nature of much workplace learning. In leading off four articles that address this gap, this introduction dips into Australian labour history to open a discussion aimed at making visible some of the other learning that occurs at work. It asks why most workplace learning researchers have not acknowledged or extended such learning, and suggests that changing working conditions within universities may change this.

A great deal of the research into the determinants of labour market outcomes has focussed on the role of human capital and the structure of the labour market. Relatively little attention has been paid to the role of social capital. This paper investigates the extent to which an individual’s social capital relates to their labour market outcomes. The relationships between social capital and labour force status and social capital and job search method are explored using data collected from a national random sample of Australians. Both a network and typology approach to measuring social capital are used.

Peak union bodies in Australia have a long and influential history, and most recently have developed an approach to union revitalisation based on community-based campaigning strategies. In responding to labour market changes, declining union membership and hostile governments and employers, peak union bodies have developed new ways to strengthen the collective ability of their affiliated unions to successfully represent members at the workplace level. They have embraced local-level strategies that tap into community concerns and are aimed at capacity building across the labour movement. The resulting grass-roots organisations have the potential to shape both the workplace and the public domain. We explore one example of this approach: the establishment of Local Union Community Councils by Unions NSW. We argue that although peak bodies are well placed to spearhead community campaigning, the grass-roots councils being created will need to progress through several stages of development, if they are to become self-sustaining organisations, contributing effectively over the long term to community mobilisation and stronger, more coordinated union campaigns.

This article provides a brief introduction to a research program which has been under way since 2007 to examine, using data from a large-sample panel survey, whether jobs in Australia are becoming more or less skilful over time. It redefines the debate on deskilling which ran through the 1970s and 1980s by expanding the focus beyond simple job quality to issues of current policy interest, notably the contribution of skill to innovation and productivity. To map this kind of dynamism it is necessary to use a metric capable of capturing change over short periods. This is achieved by adding a third dimension, skill-intensity, to Spenner’s classic definition of skill in terms of two loosely related constructs, worker autonomy/control and substantive job complexity. Data drawn from the first eight waves of HILDA are analysed to demonstrate that this metric is capable of capturing statistically significant change in the average skill content of jobs over much shorter periods than was possible with the metrics used in earlier decades. The broadly parallel aggregate trendlines for skill-intensity and autonomy/control suggest that these two dimensions are linked in the way Spenner suggests, even though major discrepancies appear between them in some industries and occupations.

This article uses Loïc Wacquant’s concept of the centaur state to analyse symbolic framings of the meaning and future of work in the Australian policy response to COVID-19 in 2020. In contrast with historical conceptualisations anchored in rights and social security, contemporary Australian social welfare policy discourse is dominated by political representations of the imperative to work. For people currently outside of the labour market, self-reliance through paid work is a primary objective of social security policy. In 2020, economic impacts of national lockdowns were ameliorated by large transfers from the state to businesses and individuals. Concurrent announcements of plans for a ‘business-led’ post-pandemic economic recovery centred the message that the meaning of work lies in its individual and social utility. Prior to the pandemic, transformation of the modes of organisation of work had already brought into question normative claims about the meaning of work, and what is comprehended by the term ‘job’. Analysis of key ‘economic recovery’ policy initiatives illustrates that they combined considerable corporate welfare with a construction of job seekers as having unrealistic expectations of meaningful work, for which there could be no room in the institutional machinery driving economic recovery. In the policy trajectory of the Australian centaur state, the future of work for people currently unemployed is to serve as a resource to fuel the business-led recovery.

Non-compliance with labour standards impedes enforcement of workers’ rights in human resource supply chains. Despite governments’ efforts to improve labour standards and encourage employer-centred voluntary compliance programmes, infringements of workers’ rights are widely reported. Using a qualitative socio-legal study of Chinese seafarers’ workers’ compensation rights, we investigate whether shipping companies and their crewing agencies comply with their legal obligations following workplace injuries and fatalities. Through 74 semi-structured interviews and analysis of crew management policies from 7 shipping companies, we identify a failure of most shipowners’ internal policies to comply with legal obligations. Furthermore, multinational shipping companies use crewing agencies to evade their liabilities to injured seafarers. We propose the establishment of a joint liability mechanism between employers and labour intermediaries to fill this compliance gap that exists in global human resource supply chains.

The Howard government’s WorkChoices legislation appeared set to irremediably remake industrial relations in Australia by prioritising individual agreement making (through AWAs) at the expense of Australia’s traditional award systems based on collective bargaining. That government explicitly intended these changes to reduce labour market rewards to, and protections for, low paid and more vulnerable employees. Yet, it also deployed a rhetoric of individual choice in advocating these changes, promoting, in particular, a notion that individual bargaining and agreement making under WorkChoices empowered individual employees by opening opportunities for integrative (mutual gains) bargaining. This article asks what these changes really meant for bargaining between individual employee and employer. We analyse crucial elements of WorkChoices to highlight how its main structural mechanisms intensified employee bargaining weakness in individual bargaining. As well, we use negotiation theory, especially in relation to integrative bargaining, to evaluate the government’s own published advice to individual employees on how to bargain for an AWA. We find that the government explicitly sought to disempower employees through WorkChoices’ additional legal and institutional impediments and also through the concerted attempt at coaching employees to choose a losing path in their AWA negotiations.

Mainstream economists argue that unemployment must be tackled with ‘flexibilisation’ or ‘labour market deregulation’. The public policy application has been the principle of ‘flexicurity’, with mixed labour market outcomes and limited success. Central contributions to theoretical and empirical economics writing on unemployment issues still espouse ‘flexibilisation’ as a general approach and warn about the detrimental effects of systematic deregulation under expectations of outcomes such as lower unemployment. Departing from a review of this literature, we take a step further from the ‘flexicurity’ prescription, to follow the capabilities approach of Sen and others, and develop a concept of social capabilities – based flexicurity for a learning economy, arguing that labour market performance must be targeted in an approach that includes a strong commitment to social well-being.