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Published online by Cambridge University Press: 01 January 2023
This paper argues that previous discussion of this question has erred when it looks for a particular provision of the Constitution to support the Coalition’s policy. It may be a matter of depending on several sources of power. The relevant question is: to what extent can this power help to achieve the policy? The author’s opinion is that, when considered in this light, the achievement of the Coalition’s policy is not beyond the constitutional competence of the Commonwealth.
1. Craven’s paper was published in the June 1992 issue of this Review under the title “The Coalition and Voluntary Industrial Agreements: Some Constitutional Questions”.
2. As the previous footnote indicates, the title was changed when the paper was published.
3. I can see at least one probable exception to this proposition, namely an Act to repeal those provisions of the Judiciary Act 1903 which operate to bring into existence the High Court of Australia. Section 71 of the Constitution says that “The judicial power of the Commonwealth shall be vested in a Federal Supreme Court, to be called the High Court of Australia…” There could be an argument that once Parliament has exercised its legislative power to call that Court into existence, s. 71 requires the continuance of that Court. And if you don’t think that argument would win, I do.
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