U.S. Grant was stumped: “The muddle down there is almost beyond my fathoming,” the president told the New York Herald in the summer of 1871. What had him flummoxed was the recently adjourned “Gatling Gun Convention” in New Orleans, a Republican state nominating gathering that reads like a passage from a novel by Gabriel Garcia Marquez. The run-up was punctuated by open combat in the trenches and foxholes of countless ward clubs and party conventions—the so-called “War of the Factions.” When the sitting Republican governor, the colorful and roguish Henry Clay Warmoth, hobbled by a boating accident earlier in the summer, led delegates supporting his candidacy to the designated meeting place inside the U.S. Customhouse on Canal Street, federal soldiers manning the latest in automatic weaponry turned him and his followers away when they tried to barge into a rival group's caucus. Warmoth thereupon guided his followers to another meeting hall. For the next 18 months, warring Republican factions moved in and out of opportunistic alliances with Conservative-Democrats. They divided into rival legislatures, used force to achieve quorums, and arrested and impeached their own senior leaders. If some of the more scurrilous allegations are to be believed, they even poisoned their lieutenant-governor. Were Louisiana politics on the verge of becoming “Mexicanized”—plunged into chronic crisis and political tumult? That was the question beginning to trouble Republican observers north of the Ohio River.

There are few scholars who would disagree with the proposition that individual economic position and economic risk play a critical role in shaping preferences for income redistribution and social insurance. There is less consensus, however, about the extent to which non-economic factors also influence individual preferences regarding social insurance provision. A number of scholars have examined how issues of race and identity have influenced the development of social insurance programs in the United States, as well as individual attitudes with respect to these programs. In a theoretical context, other authors have considered how attitudes toward income redistribution might also depend upon psychological dispositions such as the “belief in a just world.” In this article, we focus on religiosity as an important factor that can shape both individual preferences and policy outcomes regarding social insurance in the United States. To do so, we develop an argument about religion and social insurance as substitutes that draws both on existing work on the political economy of social insurance and on findings in social psychology regarding what we call the “coping effect” of religion. We test our hypothesis using historical evidence from two early social insurance policies: workers’ compensation legislation enacted by state governments between 1910 and 1930 and New Deal unemployment relief.

The National Association of Manufacturers (NAM) led the corporate attack on labor organization and government regulation in the early twentieth century. Yet NAM's deep distrust of coordination, in fact, developed years into its organizational life: at its inception, NAM organizers sought mechanisms to coordinate economic and political business activity, and held policy positions that resembled those favored by contemporaneous European manufacturers. Thus, the organization's dramatic shift in policy preferences almost a decade later was something of a sea change: suddenly NAM became committed to laissez-faire liberalism—the antithesis of coordination—and became best-known for its commitment to fighting organized labor.

From 1788 to 1913, the basic model for the election of U.S. senators was based on state legislatures serving as intermediaries between the people and their senators. The Framers' intent in constructing indirect elections to the U.S. Senate was to help insulate senators from sudden and drastic shifts of public opinion that could lead to senators enacting detrimental national policies (Federalist 63). Underlying this “insulation” was the supposition that indirect elections, combined with a six-year term, would create a different electoral environment for senators than for their counterparts in the House, and would thus produce a legislator who would not be directly responsive to individual constituents.

After more than a decade of membership stability, the U.S. Supreme Court experienced a pair of vacancies following its 2004–2005 term. In July 2005, Justice Sandra Day O'Connor announced her intention to retire. It is widely believed that her own health, that of her husband, and the favorable political environment influenced her decision to step down in January 2006. In the interim, Chief Justice William Rehnquist, after struggling with ill health for many months, passed away on 3 September 2005, becoming the first sitting justice to die in more than five decades.